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ARTICLES
Religion, Politics, Race, and Ethnicity:
The Range and Limits of Voir Dire
BY BARRY P. GOODE*
INTRODUCTION
E very weekday, in courtrooms around the country, hundreds of
judges and lawyers ask prospective jurors thousands of questions.
Their ostensible purpose is to determine whether to exercise a challenge for
cause or a peremptory challenge.
Often, lawyers are aided by jury consultants who have "profiled"
jurors. They suggest categories of people who should be selected for or
"deselected" from the jury. So lawyers typically want the greatest latitude
to question prospective jurors. As Clarence Darrow said:
[E]verything pertaining to the prospective juror needs to be questioned
and weighed: his nationality, his business, religion, politics, social
standing, family ties, friends, habits of life and thought[, and] the books
and newspapers he likes and reads .... Involved in it all is... above all,
his business associates, residence and origin.'
But does the law really permit all that? To what extent must prospective
jurors reveal their views of religion, politics, race, and national origin?
These are not idle questions to the practicing lawyer. On September 18,
2001, a case was called in which "nearly a quarter of potential jurors said
* Barry P. Goode is a judge of the Superior Court of California. A.B. 1969,
Kenyon College; J.D. 1972, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to
acknowledge the assistance of Kalyani Robbins, Brian Lehman, Matthew J.
Wagner, Laurie Schumacher, and Amelia Burroughs.
Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, ESQUIRE MAG., May 1936,
reprinted in CLARENCE DARROW, VERDICTS OUT OF COURT 315 (Arthur Weinberg
& Lila Weinberg eds., Ivan R. Dee 1989) (1963).
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they might be biased against the Egyptian-born defendant following last
Tuesday's terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C."2 Clearly,
voir dire mattered in that case. But what are the rules for the conduct of
voir dire in such sensitive areas? What should they be?
Although the right to trial by jury is preserved in every jurisdiction in
the country,3 the rules regarding jury selection vary widely.4 Thus, it is not
possible to "state the law" regarding voir dire in a way that is universally
applicable. There are two propositions, however, that seem to be in effect
in most jurisdictions. Because these propositions are sometimes in tension,
they frame a key problem of voir dire.
2 Donna Huffaker, In Capital Case, Potential Jurors Admit Prejudice: Judge
Delays Trial of Egyptian Born Man Dismisses Jury Pool, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 18,
2001, at 1; accord Harriet Chiang, Terrorist Attacks Transform Courtroom Psyche
of Jurors, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 11, 2001, at A-3.
'Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) ("[Elvery American
State... uses the jury extensively. . . ."); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22
(1961) ("[E]very State has constitutionally provided trial by jury."). The right to
trial by jury has long historic roots in America. One of the grievances stated in the
Declaration of Independence is that the King has "depriv[ed] us in many cases, of
the benefits of Trial by Jury." See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3
(U.S. 1776). When the Constitution of 1789 failed to provide for the right to trial
by jury in civil cases, the Antifederalists made that a theme of their opposition to
ratification. See THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES 173 (Eldridge Gerry's Objections to Draft Constitution);
id. at 175 (George Mason's Objections to Draft Constitution); id. at 198 ("John
DeWitt" Essay II "To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts");
id. at 200, 202, 212 (Patrick Henry, Speeches to the Virginia Ratifying
Convention); id. at 228 ("Centinel" Number I "To the Freemen of Pennsylvania");
id. at249-50 ("Address of the Pennsylvania Minority Convention of Pennsylvania
to their Constituents"); id. at 266 (Letters from the Federal Farmer, Oct. 9, 1787)
(Ralph Ketcham ed., Mentor Books 1986) (1981). Of course, this objection was
met by passage of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, which were sent by
Congress to the states in September 1789 and became effective on December 15,
1791. The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states by incorporation into
the Fourteenth Amendment. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145; The
Seventh Amendment is not. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 718-19 (1999); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432
(1996); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974).
" Citations to the law regarding jury selection in the fifty states can be found
in ANN FAGAN GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS § 4.53, at
174 (1984) and ARNE WERCHICK, MODERN CIVIL JURY SELECTION 317-71 (2d ed.
1993).
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The first general rule is that trial courts are granted considerable
discretion to control the way in which prospective jurors are questioned.
"Voir dire 'is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal
must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.' "" This includes what
topics should be covered and what questions may be asked.'
The second general rule is that a party has a right to a fair and impartial
jury, and, therefore to sufficient voir dire to determine whether a juror
should be challenged for cause. In most jurisdictions, that right extends to
inquiries deciding whether to exercise a peremptory challenge.'
5 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1976) (quoting Connors v. United
States, 158 U.S. 408,413 (1895)); accordMu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,427
(1991); Edmondson v. Leesburg Concrete, 500 U.S. 614, 623 (1991) ("The trial
judge exercises substantial control over voir dire in the federal system."); Rosales-
Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188-89 (1981) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433,435 (5th Cir. 1992); People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d 420
(Cal. 1995); Robinson v. State, 297 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ind. 1973); State v. Morris,
691 So. 2d 792, 800 (La. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Manley, 255 A.2d 193 (N.J.
1969); State v. Jones, 491 S.E.2d 641, 647 (N.C. 1997); Strube v. State, 739 P.2d
1013, 1015 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) ("The manner and extent of examination of
prospective jurors rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge .... ."); State v.
Smart, 299 S.E.2d 686, 690 (S.C. 1982).
6 Mu 'Min, 500 U.S. at 424; Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 1987)
("[T]he district court has broad discretion as to the manner in which it conducts the
voir dire and the inquiries it chooses to make, subject only to the essential demands
of fairness .... It need not ... pose every voir dire question requested by a litigant.
It is more than enough if the court covers the substance of the appropriate areas of
concern by framing its own questions in its own words."); United States v. Giese,
597 F.2d 1170, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 1979) ("A district court has considerable
discretion to accept or reject proposed questions .... and as long as it conducts an
adequate voir dire, its rejection of a defendant's specific questions is not error.");
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 139-40 (1974); accord Herman v. Johnson,
98 F.3d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 738 (4th
Cir. 1996); People v. Saiz, 660 P.2d 2, 4 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Bishop v.
Crowther, 415 N.E.2d 599, 607-08 (I11. App. Ct. 1980); State v. Burr, 461 S.E.2d
602, 613 (N.C. 1995). On the other hand, there are cases that require inquiry into
racial prejudice and pretrial publicity. The former is discussed later in this article.
See infra notes 390-88 and accompanying text; see also Mu 'Min, 500 U.S. at
425-27 (holding that an inquiry into racial prejudice must be made following the
Court's decision in Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 311).
7 This is so in federal court. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,
143-44 (1994) ("Voir dire provides a means of discovering actual or implied bias
and a firmer basis upon which the parties may exercise their peremptory challenges
intelligently."); Mu 'Min, 500 U.S. at 431 ("Voir dire examination serves the dual
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In a sense, the trial court's discretion is limited by the party's right to
purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in
exercising peremptory challenges."); United States v. Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494, 1497
(10th Cir. 1983) ("Without an adequate foundation [laid by voir dire], counsel
cannot exercise sensitive and intelligent peremptory challenges ...."); Ham v.
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Of course, the right to challenge has little meaning if it is
unaccompanied by the right to ask relevant questions on voir dire upon which the
challenge for cause can be predicated."); Brown. v. United States, 338 F.2d 543,
545 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that there is reversible error when a judge fails to
inquire as to potential jurors' biases because it, "might have supplied defense
counsel . . . with relevant and useful information for exercising peremptory
challenges or challenges for cause.").
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE AND
MANAGEMENT 58 (1993) ("Voir dire examination should be limited to matters
relevant to determining whether to remove a juror for cause and to exercising
peremptory challenges.").
State courts also recognize a party's right to voir dire. See, e.g., Gasiorowski
v. Homer, 365 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) ("It is well established that
limitation of voir dire questioning may constitute reversible error where its effect
is to deny a party a fair opportunity to probe an important area of potential bias or
prejudice among prospective jurors."); Morris, 691 So. 2d at 803 ("An accused in
a criminal case is constitutionally entitled to a full and complete voir dire
examination .... Voir dire is designed to discover grounds for challenges for cause
and to secure information for an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.");
Strube, 739 P.2d at 1016 ("In the examination of jurors, wide latitude must be
given the parties to enable them to obtain a jury free of outside influence, bias or
personal interest."); State v. Patterson, 351 S.E.2d 853, 854 (S.C. 1986)
(recognizing that a South Carolina statute permits voir dire questioning on bias and
prejudice); Maddux v. Texas, 862 S.W.2d 590, 593 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
(Miller, J., concurring) ("The right to ask questions of panel members is included
in the right to counsel and is of constitutional magnitude in this State."). Often
there is a statutory basis for this. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-82f (2001); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-12-133 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1258-A (West
2003).
This is not universally true. For example, in California criminal cases, voir dire
may be conducted "only in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause," not
peremptories. See CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE. § 223.
Note, too, that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required, so the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to treat many complaints about peremptory
challenges as violations of a constitutional right. Mu 'Min, 500 U.S. at 424-25; see
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). Butcf Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986) (holding a constitutional violation occurs when individuals are excluded
from the jury based on their race) and its progeny.
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inquiry sufficient to inform a challenge. The party's right to ask such
questions is limited by the trial judge's very broad discretion.
How then are these to be reconciled in a government of laws? What
rules emerge from the cases to make voir dire something more than simply
a clash of wills between aggressive counsel and a trial judge trying to set
limits? And how, in reconciling these principles, does the law consider
whether jurors must reveal matters they may ordinarily consider private?
Few cases have attempted to answer this in the abstract. The academic
literature rarely addresses these questions comprehensively. Some authors
have focused on the value of peremptory challenges and, as a consequence,
have urged wide latitude to question prospective jurors.8 Other authors have
focused more on the competing concern--that of a juror's privacy, and
urged more narrow questioning.' Still others take something of a tighter
focus, essentially reviewing a recent case or short line of cases.' ° The latter
8 See, for example, the seminal article by Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire:
Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975); see also Richard
J. Crawford & Daniel W. Patterson, Exploring and Expanding Voir Dire
Boundaries: A Note to Judges and Trial Lawyers, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 645,
662 (1997) ("Opening up the questioning process is likely to enhance the quality
of juror screening without doing violence to the fair trial ideal."); Barat S.
McClain, Note, Turner's Acceptance ofLimited Voir Dire Renders Batson's Equal
Protection a Hollow Promise, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 273, 306 (1989) ("The
Supreme Court should . . . issu[e] an opinion in the near future which
acknowledges the essential linkage of a thorough voir dire to the non-
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges.") (1989). One article attempts
to state rules of general applicability. See Jay M. Spears, Voir Dire: Establishing
Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise ofPeremptory Challenges, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 1493, 1494 (1975).
9 See, e.g., Michael R. Glover, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors
During Voir Dire, 70 CAL. L. REV. 708 (1982); Case Comment, Voir Dire
Limitations as a Means of Protecting Jurors' Safety and Privacy: United States v.
Barnes, 93 HARV. L. REV. 782 (1980).
'
0 See, e.g., Nancy Lewis Alvarez, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impartial
Jury: A Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 959 (1982);
Charlene S. Bazarian, Individual Voir Dire Examination of Potential Jurors in
Interracial Murder Cases-Commonwealth v. Young, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 895
(1988); John T. Bibb, Voir Dire: What Constitutes An Impermissible Attempt to
Commit a Prospective Juror to a Particular Result, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 857
(1996); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors: Constitutional Limits to the Right
of Inquiry Into Prejudice, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 525 (1977); Timothy M. Gebhart,
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court: Is There a Juror Right to Privacy that
Justifies Closing Voir Dire in Criminal Trials?, 30 S.D. L. REV.134 (1984);
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are often more helpful, for it is useful to examine particular lines of cases
if one is to discover neutral principles that govern (or should govern) voir
dire. But before one reviews the cases, a caution is in order.
I. Two CAVEATS
A. Standard of Review
Trial courts are reversed on only limited grounds for permitting or
excluding a voir dire question. Most commonly, the standard is abuse of
discretion." Sometimes, however, a party claims his or her constitutional
right to a fair trial was violated. Then, the appellate court must determine
whether the party was deprived of some constitutional protection. 2 In other
cases, an appellant claims the conduct in voir dire constituted a deprivation
of the effective assistance of counsel. 3 Then, the federal standard is not
whether the trial court abused its discretion, but whether trial counsel's
Michael P. Malak, First Amendment---Guarantee ofPublic Access to Voir Dire, 75
J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 583 (1984); S.J. Meltzer, United States v. Greer: Is a
Racial Inquiry Necessaryfor an Adequate Voir Dire, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1700 (1993);
Dean A. Stowers, Note, Juror Bias Undiscovered During Voir Dire: Legal
Standards for Reviewing Claims of a Denial of the Constitutional Right to an
Impartial Jury, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 201 (1989-90). For an attempt to canvass the
law of one state, North Dakota, see Michael J. Ahlen, Voir Dire: What Can IAsk
and What Can ISay, 72 N.D. L. REV. 631 (1996). An excellent survey of the law
regarding sexual orientation and voir dire is Paul R. Lynd, Juror Sexual
Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section Requirement, Privacy, Challengesfor Cause,
and Peremptories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 231 (1998); see also Vanessa H. Eisemann,
Striking a Balance of Fairness: Sexual Orientation and Voir Dire, 13 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1, 2 (2001) (arguing that "sexual orientation should be treated the same
as race, religion, ethnicity and gender for the purposes of voir dire").
" See cases cited supra note 6; see also Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 364-69 (1991) (plurality opinion) (discussing standard of review of Batson
challenges); Cordero v. United States, 456 A.2d 837, 841 (D.C. 1983) (using an
abuse of discretion standard for reviewing trial court's voir dire examination).
12 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 593-94 (1976); Ham, 409 U.S. at 527.
" See, e.g., Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1035-36 (5th Cir. 1998);
Anderson v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1208, 1216-19 (5th Cir. 1994); Buxton v. Collins,
925 F.2d 816, 826 (5th Cir. 1991). At least one defendant has used state law
instead of the Constitution to claim ineffective assistance of counsel.
Commonwealth v. Griffim, 644 A.2d 1167, 1173 (Pa. 1994) (claiming ineffective
counsel under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Hearing Act).
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performance was deficient and prejudicial. 4 In still other cases, a party
seeks a certificate of appealability under the Antiterrorist and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996." 5 Such cases require a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right. 6
These standards of review present high hurdles for an appellant. Thus,
decisions affirming trial courts are not necessarily instructive. They should
not be ignored, however, for there is much to be learned from studying how
trial courts have exercised their discretion. Cases in which trial courts have
permitted (or excluded) certain lines of inquiry may be useful precedent to
a practitioner. In addition, they provide a basis for understanding what a
trial judge should consider when deciding how to exercise his discretion.
Although the standard of review is difficult to meet, there are cases in
which an appellate court has reversed a trial court based on the conduct of
voir dire. 7 These cases are particularly instructive, for they help mark the
outer limits of proper inquiry.
B. The Context of the Case
When reading voir dire cases, one must also be alert to the context in
which each arose. It is worth bearing in mind the following distinctions.
1. Federal Versus State Cases
Each state has its own laws governing jury selection. 8 When attempt-
ing to determine the law, it is sometimes the case that an idiosyncratic
" See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This requires a
party to establish that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment"
and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id.; see, e.g., Green
v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the defendant did not
prove that his counsel's actions prejudiced him).
1' 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2003).
16 See, e.g., Herman v. Johnson, 98 F.3d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1996). Herman
discusses whether the standard for obtaining a certificate of appealability governs
an application for a certificate of probable cause that was pending at the time the
Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was passed. The difference
between those two standards may affect how a court analyzes a particular voir dire
issue. Id.
"7 See, e.g., Ham, 409 U.S. at 524; Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258,
259 (1950) (per curiarn); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 409 (7th Cir.
1972).
" Mirroring the Federal Rules, law governing jury selection is found in Rule
47 of the Rules of Court of many states: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware,
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statute or rule bears on the matter. 9 Thus, cases from one jurisdiction
cannot simply be cited in another. Sometimes they are on point, sometimes
not.
2. Federal Appellate Cases
When reading federal appellate cases, one must note whether trial was
held in a state or federal court. If the trial was held in state court, the
federal court is limited to determining whether the decision below accords
with the United States Constitution.20 If the trial was in a United States
District Court, then the appellate court has greater latitude, for it may
exercise its "supervisory" authority over lower courts.2'
3. Civil Versus Criminal Cases
It may matter whether the case at issue was civil or criminal. For
example, California has separate rules governing voir dire in civil and
criminal cases.22 Similarly, the Supreme Court gave careful consideration
whether to extend Batson23 (a criminal case) to civil cases.24
District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. In many of those states, however, there are additional
statutory provisions governing jury selection. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-
202 to 203 (Michie 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 635-27 to 29 (2003); MISS. CODE
ANN § 13-5-69 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.210 (2003). Other states have
unique statutory or civil rule provisions. See, e.g., CAL. R. OF CT., 228; CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 205, 222.5, 225-234 (2003); FLA. R. CIV. PROC. 1.43 1; GA
CODE ANN. § 15-12-133 (2002); GA. SUPER. CT. R. 11; ILL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2-
1105.1; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 234; IOWA R. CIV. PROC. 187; Mo. REV. ANN. STAT. §
494.480 (2003); OKLA. STAT. CIV. PROC. § 575.1 (2003); OKLA. R. DIST. CT., 6.
'" See, e.g., Cowan v. State, 275 S.E.2d 665 (Ga. 1981); Strube v. State, 739
P.2d 1013 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); see discussion of United States v. Goland
infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text. There is considerable variation in the
States' general willingness to permit extensive voir dire. For example, Texas allows
quite liberal examination. See McGee v. State, 35 S.W. 3d. 294,298 (Tex. Ct. App.
2001). Illinois does not. See People v. Cloutier, 622 N.E.2d. 744, 781 (I11. 1993).
20 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991); see Turner v. Murray, 476
U.S. 28 (1986); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9 (1976).
2 Mu 'Min, 500 U.S. at 422; Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182,
190 (1981) (plurality opinion).22 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 222.5 (West 2003) (civil case rules); id. § 223
(criminal case rules).
23 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also discussion infra notes
347-58 and accompanying text.
24 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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4. Peremptories Versus "For Cause'" Cases
In some jurisdictions, the rules governing the exercise of peremptory
challenges are different from those governing challenges for cause.25
5. Rights of Parties Versus Rights of Jurors
Most cases turn on the rights of the parties.2 6 Others turn on the rights
of the jurors.27 In attempting to understand the rationale and holding of a
case it is important to be clear whose rights are at issue.
6. Rights of Prosecutor Versus Rights of Defendant
Similarly, in some cases, a right is given to a defendant. That right may
not necessarily extend to the prosecution."
7. Challenges to a Venire Versus a Venireman
In some cases, a party challenges an entire venire. The party may, for
example, assert the jury panel was not properly composed.29 In most of the
25 In California criminal cases, voir dire may be conducted only "in aid of the
exercise of challenges for cause," not peremptories. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 223 (adopted as Proposition 115 in the June 1990 election.). That statute
superseded the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Williams, 628
P.2d 869 (1981), which had, in turn, overruled People v. Edwards, 127 P. 58 (Cal.
1912). In Maryland, too, jurors may be questioned only to determine whether there
is a basis to challenge for cause. See Davis v. State, 633 A.2d 867, 871 (Md.
1993); see also United States v. Ible, 630 F.2d 389, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that refusal to permit certain inquiries deprived defendant of the effective
exercise of his peremptory challenges); State v. Maxwell, 102 P.2d 109 (Kan.
1940) (holding that certain voir dire questioning was not an abuse of discretion
insofar as challenges for cause were concerned but did not address the questioning
in relation to peremptory challenges).
26 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88 (discussing the interests of the parties,
jurors, and the community at large); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,530 (1975);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,599 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,397
(1880).
27 See, e.g., Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 614; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
407-11 (1991); United States v. McDade, 929 F. Supp. 815, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Tex. 1995); United States v.
Padilla-Valenzuela, 896 F. Supp. 968, 972 (D. Ariz. 1995).
21 Consequently, the Supreme Court had to determine separately whether to
extend Batson to permit prosecutors to challenge a defendant's exercise of
peremptory challenges. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 46-48 (1992).29 See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979); Taylor, 419 U.S. at
524; People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 437 (Cal. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Bastarache, 414 N.E.2d 984, 987 (Mass. 1980); State v. Elbert, 424 A.2d 1147,
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cases discussed in this article, the relevant challenge is to an individual
juror. Different considerations govern each kind of case.
8. Challenges to Grand Juries Versus Petit Juries
There are cases that deal with the composition of grand juries.30 That
topic is outside the scope of this article.
9. Bias of Individual Juror Versus Bias Imputed to a Class
In most cases, the inquiry is whether a particular juror has a bias that
would preclude a fair trial. In some situations, however, courts consider
whether bias may be based simply on the individual's membership in a
class of persons.3
With these caveats in mind, this article explores three areas in which
courts have struggled to define the extent to which attorneys may ask
prospective jurors questions about potentially sensitive, personal matters:
religion, politics, and immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and
nationality.
11. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
At common law, those who did not profess a belief in God were
unqualified to serve as jurors.32 Now, it is held to be unconstitutional to
require jurors to affirm their belief in God.33
1148 (N.H. 1981); State v. Fulton, 566 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ohio 1991).
30 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 n. 12 (1977) (collecting
prior grand jury discrimination cases); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-31
(1940); State v. Wright, 542 A.2d 299, 302 (Conn. 1988); State v. Castonguay, 481
A.2d 56, 63-65 (Conn. 1984); Bastarache, 414 N.E.2d at 987; State v. Baker, 636
S.W.2d 902, 907-08 (Mo. 1982); State v. Cofield, 357 S.E.2d 622, 624 (N.C.
1987) (discussing selection of grand jury foreman); Fulton, 566 N.E.2d at 1195.
31 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 181-82 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (per curiam) (Smith, J., writing an opinion supporting the per
curiam opinion).
32 United States v. Joseph, 892 F.2d 118, 124 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
33 See Schowgurow v. State, 213 A.2d 475,480 (Md. 1965); State v. Madison,
213 A.2d 880, 882 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1965); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("A
person is not incompetent to be a witness or juror because of his or her opinions on
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Still, the religion of a potential juror can raise a number of questions on
voir dire. This is of particular interest since jury consultants often "profile"
religion,34 and trial counsel may themselves have biases about such things.a"
religious beliefs."); MO. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("[N]o person shall, on account of his
religious persuasion or belief,... be disqualified from... serving as ajuror."); OR.
CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be rendered incompetent as a... juror in
consequence of his opinions on matters of religion."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4
("[N]or shall any person be incompetent as a... juror on account of religious
belief or the absence thereof."); 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2003) ("No citizen shall be
excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United
States ... on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic
status.").
14 See People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 875 n.8 (Cal. 1981) (explaining that
in one case, the profile of a juror favorable to the defense was a working-class
Catholic earning between $8000 and $10,000 per year, who read the New York
News); GINGER, supra note 4, § 5.12, at 211, § 19.55, at 1101-02; NAT'L JURY
PROJECT, INC., JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES §§ 2.06[l], 17:0312][f] (2d
ed. 2000); DONALD E. VINSON & DAVID DAVIS, JURY PERSUASION:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES AND TRIAL TECHNIQUES 88 (3d ed. 1996); Richard
L. Moskitis, Note, The Constitutional Need for Discovery of Pre- Voir Dire Juror
Studies, 49 So. CAL. L. REV. 597, 605 (1976); see also DARROW, supra note 1, at
313, 315 (encouraging a lawyer to inquire into a prospective juror's religion); TED
A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY SELECTION: STRATEGY & SCIENCE §
32:1 (mentioning that religion is often included in an investigator's report on
prospective jurors) (3d ed. 2002); JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY
SELECTION § 4.02, at 108 (2d ed. 1990) ("Among items typically included in an
investigator's report [is] the prospective juror's... religion.").
35 See United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1113-14 (7th Cir. 1998); State
v. Davis, 504 N.W. 2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993); F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH J.
FISHMAN, 2 CRIMINAL TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 39-48, at 39-48 (1994); FRANCIS X.
BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 146 (1949) ("Clarence Darrow...
placed a high value upon . . . information [of a juror's religious affiliation].
Although an agnostic, Mr. Darrow was a deep student of ancient and contemporary
religions. In a criminal case he preferred Catholics, Episcopalians, and
Presbyterians to Baptists and Methodists."); WARD WAGNER, JR., ART OF
ADVOCACY: JURY SELECTION § 1.04[8], 1.12 (2002). It is easier to find overt
examples of bias in older literature. See, e.g., FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, GENTLEMEN
OF THE JURY 266, 282-83 (1924). But modem examples exist. Stacy Finz, Is
Selecting a Jury Scientific? Yeah, Right... ,S.F. CHRON., Feb. 29, 204, at A-1, A-
23 ("O'Sullivan,... who... does criminal defense work, likes Irish Catholics,
Italians and Latinos on his juries ... Asians, Germans and evangelicals don't make
good jurors, according to [him].").
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Nonetheless, the extent to which trial counsel is able to discover the
religion or beliefs of a venireman turns on a number of factors.36
It is often said that if religion is irrelevant to the case at bar, the trial
counsel is not entitled to ask the religious preference of a juror,37 but that
is not invariably the case. In some states, there may be a statutory right to
inquire. For example, a Georgia statute provides that "the Counsel for
either party shall have the right to inquire of the individual jurors examined
touching any matter ... including ... the religious, social, and fraternal
connections of the juror."3 Even if there is no statutory right, as with so
much else involving voir dire, the trial judge enjoys considerable discre-
tion.
The Jury Manual for the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas contains a "Confidential Questionnaire" that suggests
asking, "What is your religious preference and church affiliation, if any?"39
According to the Fifth Circuit, "this question is standard on the juror
questionnaires used in the state courts in Dallas County and recommended
for the federal courts." 40
Similarly, the Federal Judicial Center has reprinted a "Proposed Juror
Questionnaire" from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan. Question 15 (which is preceded by the instruction that
"[tlhis question may be skipped if you wish") asks: "What is your religious
affiliation at this time, if any (circle)? Protestant--Catholic-Jewish--
Other-None."'
36 There appears to be no constitutional right, per se, that prospective jurors be
questioned regarding possible religious bias. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589,
596 n.8 (1976) ("In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional
considerations militate against the divisive assumption as a per se rule that justice
in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or
the choice of religion.").
" Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 772; see also In re Malvasi's Estate, 273 P. 1097,
1100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929) ("Ordinarily the religious belief of a prospective
juror is immaterial and [the juror had] no duty... to volunteer.").
31 See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-133 (2002). An earlier version of this statute
was applied in Cowan v. State, 275 S.E.2d 665 (Ga. 1981), to reverse a conviction
by a trial court that refused to permit defendant to inquire about "each juror's
membership in... church organizations.. . ." See id. at 666.
39 United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 439 n.9 (5th Cir. 1992).
4 Id. at 439; see also Alexander v. State, 903 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Tex. App.
1995) (employing a questionnaire asking about jurors' membership in any "church
in which you actively participate").
4' GORDON BERMANT, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES IN UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS 34.
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The same Federal Judicial Center publication reprints "Standard Voir
Dire Questions" from the Bench Book for United States District Court
Judges. Question 2.a(10) reads: "[P]lease state.., whether you observe all
religious holidays of your faith.' ' 2
Questionnaires used in recent trials support this. Prospective jurors in
the criminal trial of Marion Barry, the former mayor of Washington, D.C.,
were asked: "Do you attend church or synagogue on a regular basis? If
'yes', please explain briefly."43 Similarly, the questionnaire used in the
Exxon Valdez trial said: "Please list all organizations you have belonged to
or contributed to in the past ten years. This should include social, civic,
religious, community, fraternal or other such organizations."" It then asked
for information about the nature of the juror's involvement in the organiza-
tions in which she has been "most involved."4
The questionnaire in Ariel Sharon's defamation case against Time
magazine asked prospective jurors:
"Are you or any of your close friends or relatives of Arab, Palestin-
ian, Lebanese, Muslim, Israeli or Jewish heritage? __ Yes - No. If
yes, explain.
What civic, educational, professional, sports, business, religious or
political activities do you participate in?
Have you ever made a contribution to or financially supported the
State of Israel or any Arab State?' 46
Courts have sometimes tried to summarize the circumstances in which
inquiry will be permitted. For example, Riley v. State stated:
42 Id. at 39 (quoting THE BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES § 1.12 (1st ed. 1971)). The Fourth Edition of the BENCH BOOK does not
contain this question. See BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES (4th ed. 1996).
43 JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION:
GAINING AN EDGE IN QUESTIONING AND SELECTING A JURY 212 (1995).
44Id. at 238.
" Id. at 239; see also United States v. Battle, 979 F. Supp. 1442, 1472-73
(N.D. Ga. 1997) (in prosecution for murder of prison guard, questionnaire sought
information about religious affiliation).
4CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK 632-35 (Robert A. Robbins et al. eds.,
1997) (citations omitted). Ariel Sharon's case arose out of Time's reporting of his
alleged actions while serving as the Israeli defense minister. Id.; see generally 47
AM. JUR. 2d Jury § 272 (2003) (discussing how courts treat religious beliefs,
prejudices, and memberships throughout voir dire).
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[R]eligious affiliations of prospective jurors may be a proper subject of
voir dire examination if: (1) religious beliefs are involved in an issue in
the case; (2) a religious organization is a party to the litigation; or (3)
"special circumstances" raise the possibility of religious prejudice.47
Similarly, Coleman v. United States48 stated as a general rule: "Inquiry
as to ajuror's religious beliefs is proper on voir dire where religious issues
are presented expressly in the case, or where a religious organization is a
party to the litigation, or where it is necessary to the exercise of peremptory
challenges." '49 These are not wholly satisfactory. Riley does not explain
what "special circumstances" are, and both formulations fall short of the
wide variety of cases in which inquiry has properly been permitted.5"
A. Religious Organization as Party
Where a religious organization is party to the litigation, inquiry into
religious affiliation is allowed to some extent. "[I]n a civil case, if the
action is between religious institutions or their representatives, or concerns
church property, a reasonable inquiry should be permitted as to a juror's
religious affiliations and his attitude in the particular case."'"
For example, in Hornsby v. Corporation ofthe Presiding Bishop of the
Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter Day Saints, plaintiff was injured when his
motorcycle struck a cow owned by the church.52 At trial, his counsel sought
to ask every prospective juror whether he or she was a member of or held
a position in the church, and whether that would affect the juror's ability
to evaluate the evidence.53 The trial court refused to permit that, saying,
"it's none of this Court's business, or anybody's business what [jurors']
religious preferences are."54 The court of appeals reversed. Citing a party's
47 Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1006 (Del. 1985).
48 Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 954 (D.C. 1977).
491 Id. (citing 47 AM. JUR.2d Jury § 283 (1969)); see also 54 A.L.R. 2d 1204
(1957).
5oColeman, 379 A.2d. at 954.
5' BUSCH, supra note 35, § 146, at 211 (citing Cleage v. Hayden, 53 Tenn (6
Heisk.) 73 (1871)).52 Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
53 id.
54 Id. The trial judge did ask, "Are there any of you who feel that you would
have trouble being an impartial juror because of feelings you may have either pro
or con with regard to the L.D.S. Church that you think might affect your ability to
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right to exercise peremptory challenges, it said, "Whenever a religious
organization is a party to the litigation, voir dire regarding the jury panel's
religious affiliation is proper.""
Compare that with Congregation of the Passion v. Touche Ross."
Plaintiff was "a corporate entity and an order of the Roman Catholic
Church."57 The trial court permitted some inquiry regarding "membership
in, or employment by, any religiously affiliated institution or organization."
But jurors were not asked to reveal their own religious affiliation, and the
defendant was not permitted to ask whether prospective jurors had made
any contribution to the plaintiff, who was suing for lost investment funds. 8
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, citing the trial court's discretion
in such matters; the court indicated the better practice for the parties would
have been to permit questions about contributions to the church, since the
loss of those funds was at issue.59 That is the least that should have been
asked if the parties were to have some assurance of an impartial jury.
B. Possible Bias Because of Religion of Party, Witness or Lawyer
Some cases raise a concern that potential jurors will be biased against
a party because of his religion.' For example, in United States v. Hoffman,
defendant was an adherent of the Reverend Sun Yung Moon.6' On voir dire,
the court asked whether anyone has "any bias or prejudice against the
be a fair and impartial juror in this case?" Id. at 931-32.
"Id. at 933 (citing State v. Via, 704 P.2d 238 (Ariz. 1985); Colemanv. United
States, 379 A.2d 951 (D.C. 1977); Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Baltimore, 143 A.2d 627 (Md. 1958)). In Casey, a parishioner slipped and fell on
a waxed floor in church, sustaining significant injuries. Casey, 143 A.2d at 629.
The court of appeals faulted the trial court's crabbed voir dire and stated, "[I]f the
religious affiliation of a juror might reasonably prevent him from arriving at a fair
and impartial verdict in a particular case.., the parties are entitled to ferret out, or
preferably have the court discover for them, the existence of bias or prejudice
resulting from such affiliation." Id at 632.
Congregation of the Passion v. Touche Ross, 636 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1994).
"Id. at 505.
"Id. at 516.
59 See id.
60 A recent example of a case in which sympathy for a party's religion was held
to interfere with a juror's ability to discharge his duties is AI-Bari v. Crody, No.
93-6402, 1995 WL 523375 (6th Cir. 1995). There a juror was dismissed because
he expressed a view that defendant's religious beliefs should have been given more
deference than the law permitted. Id. at **2.
61 United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Unification Church or the Reverend Sun Yung Moon, and would that bias
or prejudice prevent you from judging the facts in this case fairly and
objectively. 6 2 Those who said they had such a bias were excused. The
Seventh Circuit held that was sufficient.63
On appeal from Reverend Moon's own conviction for tax evasion,
"public animosity toward Moon and his religion," the Second Circuit held,
"could be satisfactorily resolved only upon voir dire of prospective
jurors."' In that case jury selection lasted "seven painstaking days."65
On the other hand, a judge may limit or refuse such questioning when
she does not expect the party's religious beliefs to be put in evidence. For
example, in United States v. Lowell, the court held there was no reason to
ask whether jurors would be prejudiced against defendant simply because
he is Jewish when, apparently, no party sought to introduce evidence of
defendant's religion.'
People v. Velarde represents the same idea.67 The defendant was an
atheist, yet the Colorado Supreme Court said the trial judge properly
refused defendant's request to ask jurors' religious affiliation since they
would hear no evidence of defendant's irreligion. It is not necessarily
reversible error to refuse to permit such questions, even if the party's
religion does become known.6"
621d. at 705.
63 Id. at 710.
" United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1218 (2d Cir. 1983).
65 Id. In Mu 'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991), the trial judge permitted
counsel to ask prospective jurors about their "feelings toward members of the
Islamic Faith." See id. at 421. Courts sometimes conflate the religious, ethnic, and
national origin dimensions of Islamic defendants. See infra note 326.
66See United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897, 906-07 (D.N.J. 1980).67 See People v. Velarde, 616 P.2d 105, 105 (Colo. 1980).
68 See United States v. Alarape, 969 F.2d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A judge
serves the interest of justice by keeping potentially distracting information under
wraps, Questions about religion would have injected an unnecessary issue.");
Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 63 (4th Cir. 1956) (holding that inquiry
is unnecessary when irrelevant to case). Where defendants fail to propose voir dire
questions, it is within the court's discretion to refrain from asking specific
questions about religious bias, even though such questioning might have been
proper. United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(affirming the conviction of a number of the Black Hebrews); United States v.
Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 774-75 (3d Cir. 1982) (Black Muslims accused of RICO
violations); State v. Mauro, 716 P.2d 393,398 (Ariz. 1986) (defendant's proposed
questions poorly drafted, argumentative, vague, and unfair); see also People v.
Weitz, 267 P.2d 295, 302 (Cal. 1954). In Weitz, prosecutor asked jurors whether
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Similar issues have arisen in more unusual contexts. For example, state
and federal courts in New York have grappled with whether parties,
witnesses, or lawyers could wear religious garb in court. In two cases, the
courts held that any prejudice, for or against a party or witness' religion,
could (and should) be ferreted out on voir dire.69 In a third case, an attorney
was not permitted to wear his priest's collar while representing a client. It
was held that voir dire would not be sufficient to discover bias.7"
InNunfio v. Texas, the defendant was charged with raping a nun.7' The
trial court refused to permit defense counsel to discuss the vocation of the
victim during voir dire. The appellate court reversed, saying it was
appropriate to ask about "potential bias or a prejudice in favor of the victim
by virtue of her vocation. 72
C. Religious Affiliation Versus Beliefs
These cases should not obscure a fundamental point. It has been said
more specifically that "[i]t is necessary to distinguish among religious
they were members of the Seventh Day Adventist Church even though there was
no evidence of defendant's religion, and the high court held that there was no
prejudice to defendant. Id.
69 People v. Drucker, 418 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1979) (witness permitted to wear
clerical garb); Close-it Enters. v. Weinberger, 407 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1978) (party
permitted to wear skull cap).
71 See LaRocca v. Gold, 662 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 1981) and the many cases
it cites in chronicling Father LaRocca's litigation of this issue.
71 See Nunfio v. Texas, 808 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1991),
overruled by Barajas v. State, 93 S.W. 3d 36, 40 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2002).72 See id. at 484; see also Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 954 (D.C.
1977) (Roman Catholic priests victims of armed robbery in church rectory); People
v. Dallas, 405 N.E.2d 1202, 1211-13 (Ill. 1980) (nuns victims of armed robbery
and attempted murder). But see McFadden v. State, 402 A.2d 1310, 1311 (Md.
1979) (holding no error in refusing to ask whether potential jurors would give
greater weight to testimony of rape victim if she testifies she is "a missionary or
Christian lady"); see also Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985). In Riley, the
victim was a devout Roman Catholic and the church had sponsored fund raisers for
his orphaned children. Id. at 1001-02. The court held it was sufficient to ask,
"Were you involved or did you in any way contribute to, [or] take part in any series
of fund raisers or activities sponsored or assisted by or associated with the Holy
Cross Church or School in connection with the family of James E. Feeley, Sr.?" Id.
at 1006 (alteration in original). The defendant's request to ask whether the jurors
were (or "associated with" or "friends with") members of the Roman Catholic
Church was properly refused. Id; see also United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 342
(2d Cir. 1996) (holding that it is not error for the district court to advise venire that
defendant was a priest and ask about possible religious bias).
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affiliation, a religion's general tenets, and a specific religious belief."" In
United States v. Stafford, the Seventh Circuit observed that it is "improper
and perhaps unconstitutional to strike a juror for being a Catholic, Jew,
Muslim, etc. It would be proper to strike him on the basis of a belief that
would prevent him from basing his decision on the evidence and instruc-
tions, even if the belief had a religious backing."74
The classic cases were the polygamy prosecutions of the late nineteenth
century." There, courts routinely determined whether members of the
venire shared defendant's belief in polygamy.
In these cases, the precise disqualifying bias was not simply the fact
that the juror was a member of the Mormon Church; it was found in his
deeply held religious beliefs. Indeed, jurors seem not to have been asked
"what is your religion?" The grounds for disqualification included relevant
factors such as this:
"[Venireman] Dunn, in answer to questions propounded to him, testified
that he believed polygamy to be right, that it was ordained of God, and
that the revelations concerning it were revelations from God, and that
those revelations should be obeyed, and that he who acted on them should
not be convicted by the law of the land."76
In other instances, jurors were excused after admitting they were polyga-
mists or after refusing to respond on the ground that an answer might
incriminate them.77
These cases are sometimes read as permitting discrimination against
Mormon jurors. Thus, in Miles, petitioner claimed, "it was the deliberate
purpose of the [trial] court to exclude from the jury every one who was of
the Mormon faith .... Neither the court nor counsel had the right to inquire
" See United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998).
74See id. As Stafford suggests, it appears to be an open question whether it is
unconstitutional to strike a juror simply because of his religion. See also Battle v.
Delo, 19 F.3d 1547, 1564 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[D]ischarging a potential juror for his
religious or moral beliefs violates a defendant's constitutional rights.... ."); United
States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 441 (5th Cir. 1992) (district court had said it was
unconstitutional to strike based on religion of venireman, but equally divided court
of appeals did not decide the question); infra note 101 (discussing Davis v.
Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994)).
71 See, e.g., Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
76Miles, 103 U.S. at 306.
77 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 147-48; Miles, 103 U.S. at 307.
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into the religious belief of the juror.""8 The Supreme Court, however,
squarely rejected that claim when it characterized Reynolds and Miles only
a few years after deciding them:
Ajuror who has conscientious scruples on any subject, which prevent him
from standing indifferent between the government and the accused, and
from trying the case according to the law and the evidence, is not an
impartial juror. This court has accordingly held that a person who has a
conscientious belief that polygamy is rightful may be challenged for cause
on a trial for polygamy.
79
There are many similar cases. In United States v. Ible, the court held
that counsel should have been permitted to inquire into prospective jurors'
religious beliefs about alcohol when the defendant's drinking would be an
issue at trial."0 In People v. Wilson, counsel was permitted to ask a minister
of a fundamentalist Christian church "numerous questions concerning his
personal religious beliefs" to determine whether he could be impartial in
the trial of a voodoo priest accused of sexual assault on a child.8
In United States v. Joseph, a minister said, on voir dire, that he would
be unable to follow the judge's instructions if they were contrary to what
he believed to be the Lord's instructions.8 2 He was excused for cause. 3 In
71 Miles, 103 U.S. at 309.
"9 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 293 (1892). The significance of this
distinction is underscored if one considers what would be appropriate in jury
selection in a prosecution for polygamy in Utah today. Although the Mormon
Church no longer preaches polygamy, there are still some members of the church
who believe (and practice) it. Thus, on jury selection, it would not be church
membership, but individual belief, that would be relevant to a juror's impartiality.
10 United States v. Ible, 630 F.2d 389, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1980). In Ible, it was
said that refusal to permit such inquiry deprived defendant of the effective exercise
of hisperemptory challenges. See id. at 394; accord State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055,
1060-61 (Utah 1984).
s' See People v. Wilson, 678 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
2See United States v. Joseph, 892 F.2d 118, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
83 Id. at 123. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was critical of the trial judge's
last question---"Well, what you are saying is that if there is a conflict between what
the Lord has told you and what I'm telling you, the Lord prevails." (The juror
responded, "That's right.") Id. The court noted "requiring a choice between
obedience to God and obedience to the law, did not accurately test his fitness to
serve as a juror, as certainly many or most religious persons actually put to that test
would respond in the same fashion as the juror in this case." Id. However, "while
we certainly do not recommend that district court judges make a practice of putting
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United States v. Pappas, ajuror said he was a "Born Again Christian [and]
he cannot serve in the judgment of his fellow man."" Understanding that
to mean "because of religious scruples, [he] would not be able to pronounce
judgment on another individual," the appellate court affirmed the trial
judge's dismissal of the juror."5
Similarly, in United States v. Burrous, the Second Circuit held there
was no abuse of discretion in dismissing a juror during deliberations for
asserting a religious conviction against passing judgment on a defendant.86
The court noted with approval that trial courts "often" avoid this by asking
"during jury selection whether any juror has religious beliefs that could
prevent the juror from rendering a verdict based on the evidence."87
Standard texts suggest just such questions. For example, one proposes
asking, "Do you have any religious, moral or ethical beliefs that would
make it difficult for you to pass judgment on this or any other defen-
dant?"(for criminal cases)88 and "Do you have any religious, moral or
ethical beliefs that would make it difficult for you to decide this case in
favor of either party?" (for civil cases).8 9 These appear to be appropriate
formulations.
United States v. Greer is a particularly instructive case." The defen-
dants were "skinheads," charged with "hate crimes" against Hispanics,
blacks, and Jews. The trial judge administered a questionnaire that asked
whether prospective jurors "regularly attended 'church, temple, or other
religious services'; [and] whether he or she held 'any offices in a church,
temple or religious organization' and, if so, what that office was."9' But the
the question posed in this case, we cannot conclude, given the deference we owe,
that the District Court necessarily erred in the exclusion of this single juror." Id. at
124.
4See United States v. Pappas, 639 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1980).
5See id. at 4 (citing United States v. Lawrence, 618 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1980)).
86 See United States v. Burrous, 147 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1998).
7 See id. at 117 n.5; see also United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448,452 (11 th
Cir. 1996) (holding that after deliberations are underway, proper to dismiss a juror
who, because of "religious beliefs at odds with the factual situation and the law
applicable to this case, made it plain she could not follow the court's
instructions."); Lawrence, 618 F.2d at 986 illustrating another solution to this
problem when it surfaces after jury deliberations have concluded.
88 FREDERICK, supra note 43, at 193.
89 Id. at 203.
9o See United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(per curiam).
9' Id. at 436 (Smith, J., writing for those who would affirm).
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trial judge refused to permit defendants to ask which members of the venire
were Jewish. He also refused to permit defendants to "ask the venire
specific questions about the subject matter of the case and whether that
would affect their impartiality."92 Finally, he denied defendants' motion to
strike for cause all black, Hispanic, and Jewish members of the panel.93
Hearing the case en banc, the Fifth Circuit was evenly divided. The
challenge to strike members of all three groups for cause did not attract the
vote of any of the judges, but they split over how much voir dire was
necessary to insure a fair trial.94 Those judges voting to reverse recognized
that recent Supreme Court cases, such as Batson,95 require limits on the
exercise of challenges so that the equal protection rights of the potential
jurors are not denied; however, they observed the tension between that
concern and the rights of the defendants to an impartial jury.96 The seven
judges who would have affirmed the convictions found the trial judge
struck the right balance;97 the seven who would have reversed believed he
did not.98
The latter identified the difficult nature of the problem when trying to
probe behind stereotypes:
If we are to eliminate peremptory challenges based on racial stereotypes,
as Batson, Edmonson, and McCollum mandate, we must insist on a
searching inquiry into the individual biases and prejudices of members of
the venire in civil rights cases redolent with prejudice, bias, and anger.
This includes investigation of the potential for racial bias on the part of
individual jurors.... The rights of defendants were lost in the effort to
protect the venire.99
92 See id. at 440 (Higginbotham, J., writing for those who would reverse).
9' See id. at 439 (Higginbothan, J., writing for those who would reverse).
9See id. at 434, 438.
" Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
96 Greer, 968 F.2d at 442 (Higginbotham, J., writing for those who would
reverse).
97 Id. at 438 (Smith, J., writing for those who would affirm).
98 Id. at 446 (Higginbotham, J., writing for those who would reverse).
99 Greer, 968 F.2d at 446 (Higginbotham, J., writing for those who would
reverse). Eisemann shows an unaccountable sympathy for the notion that all
Hispanic and Jewish jurors should have been excluded. See Eisemann, supra note
10, at 12-13. That gives far too much credit to the notion of implied group bias and
ignores the real question: could an individual juror judge the case fairly? It might
have been better if the trial judge had permitted counsel to determine which
prospective jurors were Jewish, not so they could be excluded, but so that they
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Although Greer was influenced byBatson and its progeny, it is an open
question as to whether the exercise of peremptory challenges based on
religion gives rise to a Batson challenge. In State v. Davis, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that Batson does not extend to religious affiliation. 00
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from the United States Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari.' They argued that the case should be
remanded for reconsideration in light of the then-recent decision in J.E.B.
v. Alabama ex rel. TB. 102 Given the logic of the cases, remand would have
been the correct result.
D. Death Penalty Cases
Questions regarding jurors' religion-based views (or similar scruples)
also arise in death penalty cases. Thirty years ago, in Witherspoon v.
Illinois, the Court held that jurors may not be excluded simply for having
conscientious or religious scruples against the death penalty, but that those
who could never inflict it may be dismissed. 3
could be questioned more carefully and intelligently. As a corollary, the trial judge
should have been alert to the use of peremptories to exclude Hispanic or Jewish
jurors based on an implication of group bias.
0 State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115
(1994).
10, See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1116 (1994). The dissenting
justices argued that J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), extended
Batson to gender based challenges. Since claims of discrimination of gender are
reviewed under the "intermediate scrutiny" test, the justices argued, "no principled
reason immediately appears for declining to apply Batson to any strike based on a
classification that is accorded heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause." See Davis, 511 U.S. at 1117.
102 Davis, 511 U.S. at 1118. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 127. But see People v. Wheeler,
583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). In dicta, Wheeler states that the exercise of peremptory
challenges to remove members of "an identifiable group distinguished on racial,
religious, ethnic or similar grounds" is improper. See id. at 761; accord People v.
Motton, 704 P.2d 176 (Cal. 1985); People v. Lopez, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 11 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991).
103 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). "[W]e hold that a
sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended
it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples
against its infliction." Id. at 522. Then, the Court noted:
We repeat, however, that nothing we say today bears upon the power of
a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the
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More recently, the Supreme Court revised its teaching. In Wainwright
v. Witt, the Court stated that "the proper standard for determining when a
prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital
punishment" should be "whether the juror's views would 'prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath.' """ Both Witherspoon and Witt follow
Stafford's view that the appropriate focus is the juror's belief (even if based
in religion) rather than his religious affiliation.'
E. Cross-Section
Finally, a line of Supreme Court authority holds that a defendant has
a right to a venire that is a representative cross-section of the community.10 6
In United States v. Joseph, the defendant argued that dismissal of a juror
only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who
made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against
the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that
might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their
attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an
impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
Id. at 522 n.21.
'0"Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). The Court added, "in addition to dispensing with
Witherspoon's reference to 'automatic' decision making, this standard likewise
does not require that a juror's bias be proved with 'unmistakable clarity."' Id. In
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), the Court held defendants are entitled to
"reverse- Witherspoon" venire by asking whether a prospective juror automatically
vote to impose the death penalty following a conviction in a capital case. Id. at
733-34.
1o5 See supra notes 71 & 72 and accompanying text.
106 See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,480 (1989); Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 370 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528-30 (1975); Ballard
v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220
(1946); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1940) (grand juries); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1861 (2003) (declaring the United States policy that the entitlement to
jury includes one selected from a fair cross-section of the community). Although
the Sixth Amendment has been held to be applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
146 (1968), the "fair cross-section" result has also been reached on state
constitutional grounds. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 758 (Cal. 1978);
Illinois v. Payne, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
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with strong religious views precluded a fair trial.' °7 The Court easily
rejected that challenge on alternate grounds: first, there was no defined
class being excluded; second, the trial judge is given broad discretion in
determining "for cause" challenges; and third, exclusion of only one juror
is not ordinarily grounds for reversal.' °
F. Summary of Observations
What, then, do these cases show us? Competing with counsel's desire
for information are proper concerns about discrimination and privacy.
Although the cases rarely say so, the subtext of many cases reflect the
general rule that a person may not be disqualified from jury service by
virtue of his religion.0 9 In addition, it is sometimes said the venireman's
religious beliefs are private matters," 0 and there is sometimes a concern
that religion not be injected into a trial in which it has no place."'
Consequently, whether to permit inquiry in this area must be the subject of
careful judgment.
There are many cases in which courts have found it appropriate to
permit inquiry into a juror's religious affiliation to begin to determine
whether he should be challenged for cause. Some cases present issues in
which inquiry is necessary to determine if a juror harbors a bias simply
because of the religion of a participant in the trial. Thus, in cases in which
a church is a party, a religious figure has been a victim, or someone
associated with a minority (and, perhaps, unpopular) religion is a party,
witness, victim, or lawyer, it is understandable that a court would permit
107 United States v. Joseph, 892 F.2d 118, 122-24 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
'o' See id. at 124.
'o9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1862; supra note 33 and accompanying text. Presumably,
this means that a clerk of court could not exclude all Jews from the jury pool, for
instance. It does not appear to have been applied to determine whether to permit
questioning of individuals once they have been called into the jury box.
Nonetheless, the principle of nondiscrinimatory treatment is deeply held and colors
some of these cases. Conversely, a statute may permit inquiry. See supra note 38
and accompanying text (discussing the Georgia statute that permits such an
inquiry).
"o See, e.g., Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 63 (4th Cir. 1956)
(referring to religion as a "private matter"); Homsby v. Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929,
931 (Utah 1988) (reversing the court's decision that "it's none of this Court's
business, what [jurors'] religious preferences are."
... See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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inquiry, not as the end, but the beginning of a line of potentially relevant
questions.
Similarly, where a juror's beliefs are relevant to the case at hand, it is
appropriate to inquire about them, even if they are rooted in religious faith.
The overview question, "Do you have any religious, moral or ethical beliefs
that would make it difficult for you to decide this case in favor of either
party?" is generally inoffensive. It may, however, be of limited utility in
cases in which religion or religious views have a substantial bearing on the
controversy. So, courts have permitted more detailed inquiry in, say,
polygamy and abortion prosecutions.' 12 Likewise, courts have permitted
counsel to determine if a juror believes (for example) that it is improper to
pass judgment on a fellow man." 3
To the extent that counsel wishes to inquire about a juror's religion to
inform a peremptory challenge, the issue becomes more problematic. Since
Batson, there is a sense that it may not be proper to strike a juror perempto-
rily based on her religion." 4 If one cannot base a peremptory strike on that
ground, why ask? But the issue is more complicated than that.
Lawyers often use religion as a starting point for inquiry into beliefs
that may have a direct bearing on the case. Although a member of a given
denomination may not share all (or any) of its values, still, that membership
may be a clue that can help counsel focus his questions." 5 Learning a
112 Courts have split on this question in abortion prosecutions. Compare City
of Kettering v. Berry, 567 N.E.2d 316,321 (Ohio App. 1990) (per curiam) (holding
that there is no error to deny questions about religious affiliation in prosecution for
criminal trespass at abortion clinic) with State v. Barnett, 445 P.2d 124, 125 (Ore.
1968) (holding that it is reversible error to prohibit defendant from asking
prospective jurors their religious faiths).
In suits against contraceptive manufacturers, a questionnaire used in Michigan
state courts asked women, "What is your religious preference?" and listed a
number of denominations; then it asked "Would your religious preference or moral
beliefs in any way affect you in serving as a juror in a lawsuit of this nature?"
GINGER, supra note 4, § 12.30, at 777.
"13 See State v. Fulton, 566 N.E.2d 1195, 1200-01 (Ohio 1991) (stating that
jury commissioners "routinely excluded members of the Old Order Amish religious
faith because they believed that such individuals would not participate injury duty
due to their well-known prohibition.., to '[j]udge not, and ye shall not be judged:
condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned: forgive, and ye shall be forgiven"'
(alteration in original)).
",4 This is not yet established as a matter of federal law. See supra note 101
(discussing Davis v. Minnesota).
". See WERCHICK, supra note 4, §§ 4.1, 8.8.
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juror's religious affiliation should not be the end of the inquiry, but it may
be an important beginning if the denomination has beliefs relevant to the
case. Does the juror share those beliefs? If so, can he set them aside and
judge this case fairly? If he does not share those beliefs, is there something
special about his apostasy that raises a red flag for one side or the other?
As the dissent observed in Greer, there is something of a paradox." 6 If
counsel is to move beyond stereotypes, yet make an intelligent use of his
peremptory challenges, he needs more, not less, information, especially in
cases in which religious issues may play a part."
7
So, the more relevant religious affiliations or views are to a case, the
more willing courts are to permit probing for peremptories. Most courts,
however, properly take pains to insure that the inquiry is focused on the
juror's individual views." 8 Even where the basis for the question is a
peremptory challenge (rather than one for cause) the court should keep the
focus on determining whether the juror's beliefs may prevent him or her
from approaching the case fairly. In this regard, a juror's religious beliefs
are simply one set of beliefs and opinions, among many, which may be
relevant to the case at hand, and may be probed on voir dire.
But that still leaves the concern about privacy. Courts sometimes
manage this concern by utilizing a juror questionnaire. That seems less
invasive. At least it may spare the juror having to discuss such things in
open court." 9
Whether using a questionnaire or asking questions in open court, both
bench and bar should consider how obvious it is to the prospective jurors
that religion or religious beliefs will be at issue in the case. If the statement
of the case makes apparent the relevance of inquiry into religious matters,
then jurors will more likely understand why they are being asked about
something they may consider private. But ifjurors have no reason to think
..6 See United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 442 (5th Cir. 1992) (Higgin-
botham, J., writing for those who would reverse) (stating that the courts are "reluc-
tant to create the impression that the outcome of the judicial process turns on the
race of the participants," but courts "cannot will [prejudices] away by refusing to
probe both for their presence and their reach in a given case").
1171d.
"' The corollary of this is that courts must be alert to prevent the use of
peremptories to exclude jurors based solely on their religion. Although the
Supreme Court denied hearing in Davis, 511 U.S. at 1115, a juror's equal
protection rights should prevent such a challenge.
"9 The questionnaire may make disclosure of a juror's religion optional.
Similarly, a court may advise jurors that they may discuss, in camera, special
concerns they have about such matters.
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religious matters are relevant to the case, they are more likely to find the
inquiry offensive.
Ultimately, the court must first determine whether there is a legitimate
interest in inquiry. If so, it must then weigh that interest against the risk that
jurors may feel their privacy is being invaded needlessly. The latter can be
minimized by careful explanation. As to some jurors, however, it may never
be eliminated. Nonetheless, in an appropriate case, carefully tailored
inquiry should be permitted.
III. POLITICAL AFFILIATION
Attorneys often wish to know the political affiliation and views of
prospective jurors. Advice from one practice manual suggests that an
attorney "investigate members of the veniere [and c]onsult . . . public
records (such as voter registration lists ... ), or privately published jury
books containing background information on those called for jury duty."' 20
Clarence Darrow included "politics" in the list of "all important subjects
for questioning potential jurors."'12 'Trial manuals on civil cases also offer
general advice that the politics of a jury member matters-"plaintiff often
favors liberals, while defendant often favors conservatives. ' ' 12 More
sophisticated treatments of the subject avoid such gross generalizations, but
still recommend seeking information about political affiliation.'2 1
When jury consultants profile mock jurors, they often include political
affiliation in the list of facts known about each juror. 24 When recommend-
120 See 2 CALIFORNIA TRIAL HANDBOOK § 18:9 (1992); accord CATHY
BENNETT ET AL., BENNETT'S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION AND TRIAL DYNAMICS IN
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION § 9.12 (West 1993); GOBERT & JORDAN, supra
note 34, § 4.02, at 108 ("Among items typically included in an investigator's report
are the prospective juror's... political affiliation.").
121 See DARROW, supra note 1, at 315.
122 See CALIFORNIA TRIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 120, § 18:13.
123 DONNER & GABRIEL, supra note 34, § 32:1; see WERCHICK, supra note 4,
§ 7.3, at 69-70. "Republicans and Democrats are no longer making very useful
statements about probable behavior as jurors. Some trial lawyers cling to the idea
that a Republican will be pro-defense and a Democrat will be pro-plaintiff;
unfortunately, it is not so easy." Id. at 69. The author then discusses "strong party
identification," "inconsistent political registration," "non-voters," and similar
matters, concluding: "The feeling persists that political affiliation and registration
information is a useful element of voir dire. If such information is readily and
economically available, it is the type of additional information that may give a
slight edge to the attorney who troubles to integrate it into the jury selection plan."
Id. at70.
124 See, e.g., GINGER, supra note 4, § 19.55, at 1102; GOBERT & JORDAN,
supra note 34, § 3.03, at 84; NAT'L JURY PROJECT, supra note 34, § 11.04[3][a],
at 11-23, 11-27.
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ing which veniremen to select (or deselect), political registration may be
among the criteria. They may also suggest learning whether a juror is
politically active, with what associations he affiliates, and how he views
current political controversies.
But what does the law permit? When is it appropriate to inquire into
politics during voir dire? To what extent may an attorney probe? Must a
juror answer?
One can find absolute statements in the law. At least one court has
made the broad statement that "in order to ascertain whether a juror is
prejudiced in a particular case, it has always been held proper to inquire as
to his membership in any political, religious, social, industrial, fraternal,
law-enforcement, or other organization whose beliefs or teaching would
prejudice him for or against either party to that case."' 25
Sometimes a jurisdiction will allow indirect inquiry into a juror's
politics. For example, the California Judicial Council has approved a juror
questionnaire for civil cases that includes the following question: "If you
have any ethical, religious, political or other beliefs that may prevent you
from serving as a juror, explain."'' 26
Other jurisdictions have held that "[tihe politics of a juror is not a
proper subject of inquiry in any case, criminal or civil, unless a political
controversy is directly involved."127 And, "there are some questions that are
always pertinent .. . .Other questions, such as political or religious
affiliation of the jurors... only become pertinent under peculiar circum-
stances." ' 21 The tension between privacy and disclosure has translated into
much confusion regarding when, if ever, an attorney is allowed to inquire
into the political or ideological affiliations of potential jurors.' 29
'
25 ee People v. Buyle, 70 P.2d 955, 957 (Cal. App. 1937). Surprisingly, this
was the same court that eight years earlier had decided In reMalavasi's Estate, 273
P. 1097 (Cal. App. 1929) (holding that "[o]rdinarily the religious belief of a
prospective juror is immaterial and [the juror had] no duty... to volunteer").
126 See Juror Questionnaire for Civil Cases approved by the Judicial Council
of California (MC-001, Eff. Jan. 1, 2004).
'
27 BUSCH, supra note 35, § 146, at 211.
i28 Rose v. Sheedy, 134 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Mo. 1939) (holding that voir dire
questions as to jurors' religious or political beliefs should not be allowed until the
trial court has been convinced that such questions are relevant).
129 A long line of cases has established that in civil or criminal trials, it is
unconstitutional to exclude prospective jurors solely on the basis of membership
in certain types of groups. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146
(1993) (gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1990) (ethnicity);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (race). Other cases, however, have
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To understand how courts have determined whether to permit
questioning ajuror's political registration, affiliations, and beliefs, it is best
to examine three lines of cases separately: (A) cases involving political
corruption, 3 (B) cases involving times of deep political controversy, and
(C) ordinary, non-political cases.
A. Political Corruption Cases
By their nature, political corruption cases push the political activity,
affiliation, and allegiance of the prospective jurors to the forefront of the
lawyers' concerns. Yet some cases have taken a rather firm stand against
inquiry. For example, in State v. Longo defendant was charged with filing
a Democratic Party primary nominating petition that he knew to contain
forged signatures. 31 At trial, defendant sought to ask prospective jurors
whether they were members of the Democratic Party or had participated in
the primary election at issue.' 32 The trial judge refused to permit that.'33
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed, saying "mere membership in
the democratic party and participation in the primary election would hardly
indicate bias or prejudice against one accused of filing a nomination
petition for primary election knowing the same to be falsely made."' 34
Simply belonging to the Democratic Party does not necessarily suggest a
juror would be biased against the defendant. 3
Most political corruption cases do not take such an absolute stand.
Connors v. United States was perhaps the first Supreme Court case to
consider when an attorney may ask prospective jurors about their political
affiliations.'36 Connors was a prosecution for ballot box tampering. In what
must have been a particularly contentious election, James Connors "with
held that it is constitutional to base juror exclusion on certain characteristics. See
United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 1993) (age); United States
v. Mojica, 984 F.2d 1426, 1451 (7th Cir. 1993) (age); Whitehead v. State, 608 So.
2d 423,428 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (marital status); Lege v. N.F. McCall Crews,
Inc., 625 So. 2d 185, 189 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (physical disability).
"'
30 
"Political corruption" is used in the broadest sense to include an accusation
of wrongdoing involving the political process or by an officeholder.
31 State v. Longo, 3 A.2d 127, 127 (N.J. 1938).
132 Id.
133 id.
13 4 id.
135 See id.
136 See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 412-16 (1895).
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force of arms [did] seize, carry away, and secrete the ballot box" from the
eighteenth precinct of Arapahoe County.'37 Among the questions defense
counsel sought to put to the venire was: "To what political party do you
belong, and what were your party affiliations in November A.D. 189O? " 38
The trial judge refused to permit that question and others like it.'39 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed. 40 Thus, Connors is sometimes read
to support the view that questioning about political affiliation is disfavored.
But a closer reading shows the Court was more careful than that.
Connors did not prohibit questioning about political affiliation. It simply
held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting defendant
from asking eight questions and others of "similar import."'' Justice
Harlan first stated the general rule:
[A] suitable inquiry is permissible in order to ascertain whether the juror
has any bias, opinion, or prejudice that would affect or control the fair
determination by him of the issues to be tried. That inquiry is conducted
under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be
left to its sound discretion.142
117 Id. at 410.
'
38 Id. at 412.
139 id.
'40 Id. at 416.
14" Id. at 412. The court first sustained an objection to the question quoted in
the text. Id. Later, defendant proposed seven written questions:
"Q. Did you take an active part in politics in the general election of A.D.
1890; and if so, on which side?
Q. Did you take an active part in the general election of A.D. 1890; and
if so, with which of the parties did you affiliate, and where?
Q. Have you been heretofore or are you now strongly partisan in your
political belief?
Q. Would your political affiliations or party predilections tend to bias
your judgment in this case either for or against this defendant?
Q. Were you ever at any time a member of what was and is known in the
city of Denver, county of Arapahoe, and state of Colorado, as the
'Committee of One Hundred'?
Q. Were you ever at any time a judge or clerk of an election; and if so,
when and where, and by what party were you named and appointed?
Q. Are you a member of any political club organized for the
advancement of the interests of any political party; and if so, what party?"
The trial court refused to ask these as well. Id.
'
41 Id. at 413.
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The issue, then, was not whether political questions should be
permitted, but whether the trial court "did not exercise a sound discretion
in rejecting the [proposed] questions."'' 43 As to most of the questions, the
Court found it relatively easy to determine that the trial court acted within
its discretion. Since the case involved the theft of ballot boxes, it could not
be said that one political party or another favored or disfavored such
criminal behavior.' 4 Questions designed to determine the juror's political
affiliation seemed irrelevant.'
But the court had more difficulty with two of the questions. The
defendant wished to ask: "Would your political affiliations or party
predilections tend to bias your.judgment in this case either for or against
this defendant?"' 46 The trial court acknowledged overlooking this question
when it was tendered, and noted it would have permitted the question had
more attention been paid. 147 Even while ruling that it was not an abuse of
discretion to disallow that question, Justice Harlan preserved the possibility
that it could be asked in an appropriate case:
If the previous examination of a juror on his voir dire or the statements of
counsel, or any facts brought to the attention of the court, had indicated
that the juror might, or possibly would, be influenced in giving a verdict
by his political surroundings, we would not say that the court could not
properly, in its discretion, if it had regarded the circumstances as
exceptional, have permitted the inquiry whether the juror's political
affiliations or party predilections would bias his judgment as a juror.148
Similarly, the Court paused to consider the question regarding the
Committee of One Hundred.'49 The relevance of this question to the theft
143 Id. at 414.
I"Id.
145 Id. at 414-15.
" Id. at 412. Compare this to the religious affiliation questions that are often
permitted: "Do you have any religious, moral or ethical beliefs that would make it
difficult for you to pass judgment on this or any other defendant?"(criminal case)
and "Do you have any religious, moral or ethical beliefs that would make it
difficult for you to decide this case in favor of either party?" (civil case). See
FREDERICK, supra note 43, at 193, 203.
147 Connors, 158 U.S. at 412-13.
'4Id. at 415.
149See id. at 412 ("Were you ever at any time a member of what was and is
known in the city of Denver, county of Arapahoe, and state of Colorado, as the
'Committee of One Hundred'?").
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of the ballot boxes was not apparent from the record, but Justice Harlan
intuited that there may be some connection.'° He wrote: "If that committee
was in fact behind the prosecution of the defendant, actively supplying the
government with information to convict him of the crime charged, the
court, without abuse of its discretion, might have allowed the question."'
It is useful to note Justice Harlan's larger concern. He did not want the
attorneys or the court to "create the impression that the interests of the
political party to which the accused belonged were involved in the trial.' 52
Permitting inquiry into the juror's political affiliations could foster the
impression that the case turned not on whether the specific crime was
committed by the accused, but on whether a political party should be
condemned."53 Given that concern, Justice Harlan left the door open for
voir dire of political affiliation in one other set of circumstances:
If an inquiry of a juror as to his political opinions and associations could
ever be appropriate in any case arising under the statute in question, it
could only be when it is made otherwise to appear that the particular juror
has himself by his conduct or declarations, given reason to believe that he
will regard the case as one involving the interests of political parties rather
than the enforcement of a law designed for the protection of the public
against frauds in elections. 5 4
Other cases, closely examined, show that courts often permit some
questions about political activity or affiliation when they are relevant. For
example, in Gurley v. State the defendant had been county tax collector.'55
Allegations were made that he did not turn over to the county all the funds
he collected.5 6 These charges were debated in the election prior to his
trial. "'57 John Edwards, who ran for a judgeship, supported Gurley (to the
point of saying he would dismiss the charges if elected) and Gurley
reciprocated.'58 Somehow, the prosecutor knew that H.W. Trigg, who was
150 Id. at 415--16.
151 Id.
152Id. at 415.
153 Id.
154 Id.
"' Gurley v. State, 262 S.W. 636, 637 (Ark. 1924).
156 Id
157 Id. at 638.
158 Id.
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a prospective juror, was a supporter of Mr. Edwards." 9 So the prosecutor
asked these three questions:
Q. I will ask if you know that, during the primary election last summer
a year ago, in which John Edwards was a candidate for county and
probate judge, Mr. Gurley, the defendant, was enthusiastically in that
election supporting John Edwards?...
Q. Would the fact that Mr. Gurley was John Edwards' supporter in that
election influence you in the trial of this case?...
Q. You would go into the jury box and try him as though you and John
Edwards were strangers, and you had never heard of the election?' 6
Over objection, the trial court permitted this questioning, and the
Supreme Court of Arkansas found it did not abuse its discretion in doing
so. Indeed, the court invoked the general rule that
[t]he trial court has a discretion to permit the examination of a talesman
within a range reasonably calculated to disclose whether he has such bias
or prejudice.., as is calculated to influence his verdict, and either side
may ask relevant questions bearing on this subject, not only to establish
actual bias.., but [to] ... enabl[e] the party... to intelligently exercise
his right of peremptory challenge.'61
It appears that the prosecutor's question was not simply a shot in the
dark. Assuming there was reason to believe that Mr. Trigg might have been
biased as a result of his participation in the political process, it makes sense
that that prosecutor was permitted to probe.
In State v. Maxwell, a former chief deputy clerk was charged with
forging endorsements on county checks. 62 The clerk, Pal E. Bush, made
good the losses, and was to be a witness against Maxwell. Defense counsel
asserted that since Bush was clerk of the court and a Catholic, (and
Maxwell, his deputy, was a Protestant), he should be allowed to discover
the "political and religious faith of the jurors.' 63 The trial court permitted
him only "to inquire, in substance, whether for any political or religious
reason, the juror felt he could not serve as a fair and impartial juror, or
159 See id.
161 Id. at 638-39.
162 State v. Maxwell, 102 P.2d 109, 111 (Kan. 1940).
1631Id. at 113.
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whether by reason of his religion or politics, he could not give this
defendant a fair and impartial trial."'"
The Kansas Supreme Court held that was not an abuse of discretion
insofar as challenges for cause were concerned.'65 It was less clear about
whether it would have ruled otherwise had defendant argued in the trial
court that he needed to ask those questions to determine whether to exercise
his peremptory challenges. Since that point had not been preserved below,
or properly argued on appeal, the court ignored it."6
Another relevant case, United States v. Chapin, arose out of the
Watergate prosecutions of members of the Nixon Administration. 67 Dwight
Chapin had been the President's Appointments Secretary, a position the
court described as that of a "minor functionar[y]."' 68 Chapin was charged
with lying to a grand jury about his knowledge of the "dirty tricks" that the
White House employed to disrupt the 1972 Democratic nomination
process.' 69
Chapin was concerned about the venire, since the population of the
District of Columbia was overwhelmingly Democratic. 70 Although the
court does not report many of the questions permitted on voir dire, it says
there was an enlightening voir dire "on feelings toward the Nixon
administration and those connected with it.' 7' Jurors were asked "whether
they believed that their own connection or that of a close friend or relative
with a political party, particularly during the 1972 Presidential campaign,
would prejudice them for or against the defendant and whether anyone [sic]
or members of their families had worked in the 1972 campaign for the
Committee to Reelect the President."' 72
The trial court did not permit certain questions, including "who jurors
had voted for, which political parties they had contributed to, worked for,
etc."' 73 The court of appeals held this was well within the trial court's
164d. at 113-14.
161 Id. at 114.
166 id.
167 See United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
'68Id. at 1287.
169 id.
"old. at 1286. Chapin also was concerned that the population of this District
was "heavily black" since one of the "dirty tricks" was aimed at Shirley Chisolm,
a black congresswoman seeking the Presidential nomination. See id. at 1284-85,
1286.
'7 Id. at 1286-87.
'
72 d. at 1289.
173 Id.
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discretion. 174 Indeed, it noted these questions might raise First Amendment
issues.'75
Defense counsel also sought to ask two questions about voter registra-
tion.'76 The trial court refused.'77 The court of appeals affirmed, although
it had some doubts about the correctness of that ruling.' Since voter
registration lists by party were then public records in the District of
Columbia, there was less reason to deny asking those questions.'79
In the midst of its discussion of this issue, the court of appeals took
note of Connors, characterizing its rule as:
[Q]uestions about political affiliation should be disallowed, even in a case
involving politics, except where preliminary questioning, such as that
conducted here, had indicated that a potential juror 'might or possibly
would be influenced in giving a verdict by his political surroundings.'
There were no such indications with regard to the jurors here. 180
But in understanding what Chapin meant by this, it must be observed that
the court permitted "substantial voir dire on political bias and prejudice."' 8'
Presumably, the court meant that questions as to a person's party member-
ship should be disallowed except in such unusual circumstances.
It is instructive to compare Chapin with another Watergate case, for the
difference between them shows just how much discretion trial judges are
allowed, and how reluctant courts of appeals are to overturn a verdict
because of claimed errors in voir dire. United States v. Haldeman was the
prosecution of the most senior officials of the Nixon Administration."8 2 The
voir dire lasted eight days but focused predominantly on the effect of
pretrial publicity. 3 The voir dire of one prospective juror (said to be
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 Id. at 1290. One can infer that at least one question asked whether the juror
was a registered Democrat or Republican.
'77 Id. at 1289.
178 See id. at 1290.
'
79 Id. "It would even have been possible for Chapin's attorneys, armed with
the list of names and addresses of veniremen, to get part of the information directly
from the Board of Elections." Id.
'
80 See id. (citations omitted).
181 See id.
182 United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
183 See id. at 65.
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typical) is reprinted as an appendix to the dissent. Among the questions
were:
The Court: Now, I don't want to know how you voted in any election or
what your political affiliations or anything like that are, but this is a
question I would like you to think about:
Are you or any relative or close friend a member of any political
party? By, political party, I might say, like the local Republican State
Committee or Democratic Central Committee?
Juror Hoffar: No, sir.
The Court: Did you contribute or have you ever contributed to any
political party by way of cash or a check?
Juror Hoffar: Yes, sir.
184
That line of questioning ended there." 5 Surprisingly, the judge did not
pursue it.'8 6 The trial judge denied defense counsel's requests to ask to
which party the jurors' contributions were made. Indeed, four of the jurors
finally seated had "participated in or contributed to campaigns.' '
87
The dissent compared this limited questioning to that which was
permitted in the trial of Albert Fall in the Teapot Dome scandal.'8 8 It reports
those jurors were asked" 'whether politics or political parties' would affect
their decision."' 89 The dissent also noted that the population of the District
of Columbia was overwhelmingly Democratic in registration. "A pro-
Democratic bias could imply presence of some anti-Republican bias and
vice-versa. Such potential prejudice should certainly have been
explored."' 9 °
The majority, however, upheld the trial court's limits on voir dire.19'
No doubt, this case falls within the rule that the trial judge has considerable
discretion to conduct voir dire. Indeed, it seems unlikely that he would have
been reversed had he asked more questions about political affiliation.
'841d. at 180 app. B.
185 Id.
186 It appears the judge conducted the entire voir dire. See id. at 179-86. The
lawyers were only permitted to ask the judge to ask questions. Id. at 65. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 47(a).
'
87Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 160 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
188 See id. at 159-60. See also Fall v. United States, 49 F.2d 506, 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1931) (ruling that there was no error in the voir dire questioning).
189 See Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 160-61 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
'90 Id. at 161 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
9' Id. at 71.
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Similarly, United States v. Goland was a criminal prosecution for
"political campaign violations in connection with the race among Alan
Cranston, Ed Zschau and Ed Vallen, for the United States Senate in the
1986 California election."' 92 Defendant was permitted to ask jurors
"whether they had voted in the 1986 election, were active in politics, had
participated in any federal campaign,... were familiar with the FEC or
federal election law," and "whether [they] supported Cranston, Zschau or
Vallen in the 1986 election in a way other than voting, such as by actively
campaigning or contributing campaign funds."
193
The defendant, however, was not allowed to ask for which senatorial
candidate jurors voted in the last election 94 or with which political party
jurors were registered.' 95 The court of appeals found "the extensive voir
dire.., adequately tested the jurors for bias or partiality."'' 96 It was not an
abuse of discretion to refuse to permit the other two questions.
97
Harrington v. City of Portland is an example of how a careful trial
judge can handle such sensitive issues. 9 ' The former chief of police sued
the City of Portland and a number of individuals, including the mayor, for
sex-based employment discrimination.'99 Plaintiff and defendant sought to
ask prospective jurors their political affiliation and for whom they voted in
the most recent Portland mayoral election.200 The court rejected this
request,"' instead allowing the following questions in open court:
192 United States v. Goland, 959 F.2d 1449, 1451 (9th Cir. 1992).
19 Id. at 1454.
' See id. In California, an individual has a right to keep confidential the name
of the candidate for whom she voted. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1050 (2003); accord TEX.
R. EVID. ANN. § 506 (Vernon 2003).
'
95Halderman, 559 F.2d at 1454.
196 Goland, 959 F.2d at 1454. According to the government's brief on appeal,
defendant was also allowed to ask "whether 'the fact that someone supported any
one of the candidates [Cranston, Zschau, or Vallen] would affect your judgment
as a juror in this case' . . . as well as a host of other questions about campaign
financing, involvement with campaigns, political donations or fundraising." Brief
for Appellee at 48-49, Goland, 959 F.2d 1449 (No. 90-50423).
197 id.
' See Harrington v. City of Portland, No. 87-516-FR, 1990 WL 15688 (D. Or.
Feb. 8, 1990).
'9 Ms. Harrington was the first woman police chief of a major metropolitan
American city. See PENNY HARRINGTON, TRIUMPH OF SPIRIT 1 (1999).
200 Id. Oregon's statutes contain some provisions protecting the confidentiality
of the ballot; however, they do not expressly prohibit asking this question. See OR.
REV. STAT. § 260.695 (2001).
201 Harrington, 1990 WL 15688 at * 1.
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1) Are you or any close family members actively involved in
politics-as political candidates, political advisors, or political party
executives or workers? If so, please advise the court of your political
activities.
2) Are you now-at this time-actively involved in any organiza-
tions-for example, professional or business organizations?---or social or
educational organizations?-or political organizations? Please advise the
court about the organization and your involvement? [sic] 20 2
In individual, sequestered voir dire, the judge then asked each juror
questions including:
1) Do you have any opinion about Bud Clark's overall performance
as Mayor of the City of Portland? Do you recall any actions he has taken
as Mayor that would interfere with your ability to listen to the evidence
in this case, apply the law as given to you by the court, and render a fair
and impartial decision?
2) Have you been an active supporter or opponent of Mayor Clark?
3) Would the fact that you voted for Mayor Clark, if you did, or the
fact that you did not vote for Mayor Clark, if you did not, influence your
ability to listen to the evidence in this case, apply the law as given to you
by the court, and render a fair and impartial decision?
20 3
The court concluded "[t]hese questions will adequately address the
possible influences of politics upon prospective jurors and will avoid
possible first amendment problems. ' 2 4
Thus, it appears that in political corruption cases, courts are willing to
permit some inquiry into the possibility that a juror's decision might be
affected by his political affiliation or involvement. Some courts have
permitted only conclusory questions.0 5 Others have permitted significantly
202 id.
203 Id.
204 id.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Furey, 491 F. Supp. 1048, 1054-55 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (asking, in a bribery case involving a local tax assessor, whether there was
"any other factor that [the jury] believed could prevent them from being fair and
impartial jurors"); State v. Maxwell, 102 P.2d 109, 113-14 (Kan. 1940) (asking
only if the jurors "whether, by reason of [their] religion or politics, [felt they] could
not give this defendant a fair and impartial trial"). Although the trial judge in Furey
said in "prejudices and biases, possibly as to political figures in general, is a
permissible area for voir dire examination," it permitted less inquiry than some of
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more extensive inquiry.20 6 More often than not, it appears that courts will
allow neutral questioning regarding a juror's level of involvement in
politics and whether his political beliefs will affect his judgment.2 7
It can be inferred, then, that if there were a case brought by or against
the Democratic or Republican Party, a court would permit inquiry into
whether prospective jurors were active in party affairs to such an extent that
they might have a disqualifying bias.20 8
B. Times of Deep Political Controversy
There have been times in our history when political and social
movements divided the polity deeply. From the late nineteenth to the
midtwentieth century, the labor movement,2 9 anarchism, socialism, and
the other cases noted above. See Furey, 491 F. Supp. at 1053-55.206 See, e.g., Harrington, 1990 WL 15688 at *1.
207 For a useful discussion of how these issues may play out in a trial, and what
voir dire might be helpful in disclosing bias, see V. HALE STARR & MARK
MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION § 11.7.2, at 493-95 (2d ed. 1993).
208 Cf. Congregation of the Passion v. Touche Ross, 636 N.E.2d 503, 516-17
(Ill. 1994); (recognizing that interaction with a religious organization may create
prejudice that would be appropriate to disqualify a venireman) Hornsby v. Corp.
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 758
P.2d 929, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (acknowledging that voir dire inquiry into
religious activity, where a religious organization is a party is appropriate).
209 Possible prejudice for or against union members and leaders has given rise
to a separate line of cases. See, e.g., State v. Stafford, 109 S.E. 326 (W. Va. 1921)
(involving a criminal prosecution of a union leader charged with shooting at non-
union workers during a contentious strike at a mine). In Stafford, the defense
counsel sought and was permitted to ask a number of questions to determine if
jurors would be prejudiced against defendant because he was an officer of the
United Mine Workers. Id. at 331. In United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.
1966), the federal government prosecuted the President of the Teamsters Union and
several others for mail and wire fraud in the administration of the union's pension
fund. Id. at 701-02. Prior to the trial, there had been a history of "public clashes"
between Robert Kennedy, who was then the Attorney General, and defendant
Hoffa. Defendants sought to ask prospective jurors about their "political
affiliations" and whether they had "ever crossed a Teamsters picket line." Id. at
710-11. The trial court refused and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 710. The
appellate court noted that jury selection lasted ten days, and more than five hundred
veniremen were questioned. Id. at 710-11. While the court does not report what
was included in the questioning, it held that the trial court acted within its
discretion in "foreclosing inquiries which seemed to be of a dilatory nature." Id. at
710. The trial court's ruling in the famous Sacco case is also illustrative of voir dire
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communism each had their turns. Later, the Vietnam War created similar
passions.
These divisions concern the judiciary. Recall Hamilton's defense of an
independent judiciary as "an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humors in the society."21 These divisions also concern trial
advocates. In many cases, the connection is quite direct: an anarchist,
socialist, labor leader, or antiwar protester is on trial. In other cases, the
connection is more tenuous, but one side or the other seeks to insinuate, by
voir dire, that a party is a member of a disfavored group. Exparte Spies is
an early example of this class of case.' It arose out of the May 4, 1886
Haymarket riot in Chicago. The Knights of Labor, trade unions, socialists,
and anarchists were striking for an eight-hour day. In the riot, eight
policemen were killed and sixty-seven people were wounded.2 12 During
voir dire, the prosecutor had the following exchange with a juror:
Q. Are you a socialist, a communist, or an anarchist?
A. No, sir.
Q. You have no associations or affiliations with that class of people, as
far as you know?
A. No, sir.2
13
No objection was made.214 Indeed, it is reported that defense counsel asked
essentially the same question of another juror, but it is clear that defense
counsel's concern was the same as Justice Harlan's in Connors:
Q. You are not a socialist, I presume, or a communist?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you a prejudice against them from what you have read in the
papers?
concerning labor unions. See Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (Mass. 1926).
In Sacco, the defense counsel asked the court to inquire on voir dire: "Is the juror
an employer of labor? If the juror is an employer of labor, does he employ union
help when union help is available? If the juror is an employee, is he a member of
any union? Is the juror opposed to organized labor?" Id. at 848.
210 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
211 SeeExparte Spies, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
212 3 SAMUEL ELIOT MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 82 (1994).
213 Spies, 123 U.S. at 174.
2141d. at 179.
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A. Decided.
Q. A decided prejudice against them? Do you believe that that would
influence your verdict in this case, or would you try the real issue which
is here, as to whether these defendants were guilty of the murder of Mr.
Degan or not, or would you try the question of socialism or anarchism,
which really has nothing to do with the case? ...
Q. Now, the issue, and the only issue, which will be presented to this
jury, unless it is presented with some other motive than to arrive at the
truth, I think is, did these men throw the bomb which killed Officer
Degan? ... Now, that is all there is in this case,--no question of socialism
or anarchism to be determined, or as to whether it is right or wrong.
21 5
Note that the trial judge permitted direct inquiry into the potential juror's
political affiliation. Each side seems to have believed the question relevant,
so neither appears to have objected.1 6
Compare that, though, with three California cases. The first, People v.
Warr, involved a crime that may have been politically motivated.21 7 On
November 19, 1912, defendant entered the Los Angeles Central Police
Station wearing a yellow mask and green goggles and carrying sixty sticks
of dynamite wired to explode. 28 He demanded to see the "highest official
of a railroad company" in the city.219 At trial, seeking to link defendant to
anarchists or communists,2 20 the prosecutor asked jurors "whether they
believed in the doctrine of members of a certain political party known as
'direct action,' which signified that physical force was approved as a means
to secure desired ends., 22 ' The trial court overruled an objection to these
questions and the court of appeal affirmed, saying:
215 Id. at 176. The outcome of the appeal did not turn on this. The Court
determined that an Illinois statute governing bias did not preclude a fair trial for the
defendants. Id. at 179-80. Their convictions were affinned. Id. at 182.
216 By contrast, there have been other cases in which both sides wished to know
a juror's political affiliation, but the trial judge refused to permit such inquiry. See,
e.g., Harrington v. City of Portland, No. 87-516-FR, 1990 WL 15688 (D. Or. Feb.
8, 1990); United States v. Serafmi, 57 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
217 People v. Warr, 136 P. 304, 305 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1913).
2 18 Id.
219 Id.
220 In People v. Fitzgerald, 58 P.2d 718, 730 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936), the
California Court of Appeals said "it is a matter of common knowledge that the
[Communist] party ... believes in 'direct action' in the settlement of controversies,
and not in judicial determinations."
221 Warr, 136 P. at 306.
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It was not shown that defendant belonged to the particular political party
referred to, and the questions should be considered only as requiring the
veniremen to say whether they believed a person justified in using
physical force in redressing his own injuries, real or fancied. The
questions were proper in order that the matter of actual bias, if any existed
in the minds of the prospective jurors, should be brought out.222
The other two cases arose out of one criminal incident: People v.
Fitzgerald23 and People v. Buyle.224 During the Depression, maritime labor
unions on the West Coast joined together to strike the San Francisco
waterfront. Management brought in nonunion replacement workers.
Defendants stole dynamite from a quarry and set out to blow up the hotel
in which nonunion workers were staying. Fitzgerald and Buyle were tried
separately.
225
In Fitzgerald, on voir dire, the prosecutor asked whether jurors had
"any connection with the Communist party., 226 Although there was no
evidence that defendants were Communists (or that Communism was
somehow relevant to the charges) 227 the trial judge permitted the question-
ing and the appellate court affirmed.228 The sole basis for the ruling was
that "it is a matter of common knowledge that the party named believes in
222 id.
223 See Fitzgerald, 58 P.2d at 721-23.
224 See People v. Buyle, 70 P.2d 955, 957 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
225 Fitzgerald, 58 P.2d at 721-23.
226 Id. at 730.
227 Fitzgerald and Buyle involved a strike by waterfront unions in March and
April 1935. See id. at 721; Buyle 70 P.2d at 957. That followed, by only a few
months, the famous 1934 strike of the San Francisco waterfront, which evolved
into a general strike. Kevin Starr, the eminent California historian, describes the
1934 strike in EndangeredDreams. See KEVIN STARR, ENDANGERED DREAMS 119
(1996). Although Starr concludes the strikers were not led by Communists, he
reports there was a "universal resort to a Red Scare by management and key
government officials." See id. ("Both [San Francisco] Mayor Rossi . . . and
Governor Merriam . . . made radio addresses blaming the general strike on
Communists." Id. at 116. The 1934 strike was settled by an arbitrator's award on
October 12, 1934. Id. at 118. Despite the settlement, however, labor unrest
continued on the San Francisco waterfront. See JEREMY BRECHER, STRIKE! 176-77
(1997). The same unions which were part of the 1934 general strike were involved
in the "Tankers Strike" of 1935. Fitzgerald, 58 P.2d at 721. Thus, there was a
serious risk that prospective jurors in Fitzgerald and Buyle would associate the
strikers with communism.
228 Fitzgerald, 58 P.2d at 730.
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'direct action' in the settlement of controversies, and not in judicial
determinations. If this were developed, bias and prejudice might well bar
the prospective jurors from serving. 229 Of course, the trial court could have
directed the attorneys to inquire on that point without mentioning the
Communist Party, rather than risk inclining the jurors to guilt by associa-
tion.230
In Buyle, too, the prosecutor asked several prospective jurors whether
they were members of the Communist Party.231' The trial court repeatedly
admonished the jurors that communism was not an issue but permitted the
questions.232 The prosecutor argued that communists might think defen-
dants' acts were excusable and therefore communists should be removed
from the jury.233
Despite this argument, it appears the prosecutor's real objective was to
paint defendants with a communist brush, for he included the charge of
communism in his closing argument, bringing forth another admonition
from the judge. Nonetheless, the California Court of Appeal affirmed by
saying,
[I]n order to ascertain whether a juror is prejudiced in a particular case it
has always been held proper to inquire as to his membership in any
political, religious, social, industrial, fraternal, law-enforcement, or other
organization whose beliefs or teaching would prejudice him for or against
either party to that case.
234
The rationale of these cases seems flimsy. If the object of the prosecu-
tor was to determine if the jurors believed violence is an acceptable mode
of redress, he could have asked that question, rather than inquiring about
membership in an unpopular party. It seems more likely the prosecutor was
seeking to link defendant to a politically disfavored group, and was only
trying to precondition the jurors to convict. The trial judges in these
229 Id.
230 Compare id. (allowing a more general voir dire question that could
associate potential jurors to a more specific bias) with Connors v. United States,
158 U.S. 408, 415 (limiting general voir dire questions on political affiliation to
cases where the juror views the interests of political parties more than the
enforcement of law).
231 Buyle, 70 P.2d. at 957.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
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California cases stoked, rather than dampened, the "occasional ill humors
in society."
They are not alone. In United States v. Lebron, Puerto Rican national-
ists were charged with conspiracy to overthrow the United States govern-
ment.235 The conspirators' acts included the attempted assassination of
President Truman and the wounding of five Congressmen on the floor of
the House of Representatives. All were members of the Nationalist Party
of Puerto Rico.
236
At voir dire, the trial judge permitted the prosecutor to give each juror
a mimeographed list of "subversive organizations" that included the
Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, "the Communist Party and various groups
regarded as Communist 'fronts' and satellites. '237 The purpose appears to
have been to create an impression of guilt by association. Reluctantly, the
court of appeals stated "[a]though we do not endorse the practice... we
cannot say that [the trial judge] abused his discretion in this case .... We
suggest, however, that this practice be not again employed. 238
Sometimes it is the defendant who wishes to make inquiry. For
example, in Ruthenberg v. United States three World War I-era socialists
were charged with aiding, abetting, and inducing another to fail to register
for the draft.239 Defendants sought to ask veniremen "whether they
distinguished between socialists and anarchists. '240 The trial judge refused.
The Supreme Court affirmed in an opaque sentence which simply referred
to prior decisions, including Spies.24' Perhaps the reference was to the
considerable discretion afforded trial judges. In any event, the political
questions seemed only tangentially relevant to the crime.242
The Supreme Court showed more solicitude during the McCarthy era
when politically unpopular defendants sought to ask about jurors' political
views so they might better select an impartial jury. For example, Morford
235 United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 533 (2d Cir. 1955).
236 Id.
237 Id. at 536.
238 Id.
239 Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 481 (1918).
240 Id. at 482. Presumably, they believed the popular opinion of anarchists was
lower than that of socialists.
24 1 Id.
242 The Ruthenberg Court also dismissed a claim that defendants were deprived
of a fair trial because the grand and petit juries were "composed exclusively of
members of ... political parties [other than the Socialist Party] and of property
owners." See id. at 481-82. But see Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946)
(holding the systematic exclusion of wage earners unconstitutional).
[VOL. 92
2003-2004] RELIGION, POLITICS, RACE, AND ETHNICITY
v. United States involved the prosecution of the Executive Director of the
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. for failing to comply
with a subpoena issued by the House of Representatives' Committee on
Un-American Activities.243 The Truman Administration had recently issued
a "Loyalty Order" which raised a question of whether federal employees
might be criticized, sanctioned or even fired for serving on a jury that
acquitted a Communist.2" Morford sought, unsuccessfully, to ask
government employees in the venire whether that might influence their
judgment.245 The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, saying the trial
court deprived defendant of the opportunity to prove actual bias on the part
of the jurors.246 It referred, with approval, to the questions permitted in
Dennis v. United States on the same subject.247
But unpopular defendants did not always fare so well during the post-
war period. Eugene Dennis was the General Secretary of the Communist
Party of the United States.248 He was prosecuted not only for refusing to
testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee, but also for
violation of the Smith Act,249 which made it a criminal offense to teach and
advocate the overthrow of the American government by force or
violence.25" The Smith Act prosecution was a highly contentious affair.
There was "heated public feeling against Communists. 251 ' The trial judge
asked prospective jurors several questions directed to those passions.
Unfortunately, some of the questions were compound and turgid. For
example, jurors were asked:
Have you at any time been a member of, made contributions to, or been
associated in any way with business or religious organizations, or
organizations of any character, whose officers or representatives have
made any expressions of advocacy of or friendliness toward Communists
or Communism in general, on the one hand, or of opposition or hostility
to Communists or Communism in general on the other hand, which
expressions you have heard or read in any manner, which have led you to
form any opinions or impressions as to the merits of the charge, unfavor-
243 Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258, 258-59 (1950).
2' Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947).
241 Morford, 339 U.S. at 259.
246 Id.
241 Id. (citing Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 170-71 n.4 (1950)).
2481Id. at 164.
249 The Alien Registration (Smith) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2003).
250 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 1950).
251 Id. at 226.
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able either to the Government or to the defendants, or any of them, which
would prevent you or hinder you from holding your mind fully open until
all the evidence and the instructions of the Court are complete?
252
The Court asked other questions to determine whether (1) the jurors'
affiliations caused them to have any views on the merits of the case, (2)
they could give equal weight to the testimony of a Communist, and (3) they
would be "embarrassed" at theirjobs, church, political party, or other social
group if they rendered a verdict of not guilty.
25 3
Still, defendants complained that the court failed to ask ten specific
questions-each of which was less complicated than those asked by the
court, and each of which would have probed more directly and deeply the
jurors' political views.254 For example, defendants would have asked: "Do
you believe that a member of the Communist Party cannot be a loyal citizen
of the United States?,
255
Judge Learned Hand affirmed the conviction. He noted that voir dire
in the case consumed eight days.256 Although recognizing that the trial
judge's questions were less than crisp, he excused them in light of the
imperfections of voir dire:
It is of course true that any examination on the voir dire is a clumsy and
imperfect way of detecting suppressed emotional commitments to which
all of us are to some extent subject, unconsciously or subconsciously. It
is of the nature of our deepest antipathies that often we do not admit them
even to ourselves; but when that is so, nothing but an examination, utterly
impracticable in a courtroom, will disclose them .... No such examina-
tion is required .... If trial by jury is not to break down by its own
weight, it is not feasible to probe more than the upper levels of a juror's
mind.257
Note, the issue was not whether some political affiliation questioning was
proper; only how much. Given the discretion afforded to trial courts, Judge
Hand held the questions asked were enough.
252 Id. at 227 n.35.
253 id.
254 Id. at 226-27.
255 Id. at 226 n.34.
2 56 Id. at 227.
257 Id. Many years before, Judge Hand opined that the "length and
particularity" of counsel-conducted voir dire in criminal cases "had become a
scandal and required some effective control." See Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d
420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928).
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Political unrest in the 1960s and 1970s gave rise to similar cases. One
of the most notorious was United States v. Dellinger.2" That case arose out
of the antiwar demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in
Chicago in August 1968.259 As the court recites in its opinion, the times
were tumultuous; the country was becoming divided over the Vietnam
War.261 Several men (the so-called "Chicago Seven") were prosecuted for
violations of the federal Anti-riot Act 261 in connection with those demon-
strations.262 At voir dire, the defendants tendered a list of questions that
sought to inquire, among other things, into the prospective jurors' attitudes
toward "dissent and public protest against the Vietnam war. 263 The trial
court refused to allow this, and the Seventh Circuit reversed. 26' The
appellate court cited the "deep divisions in our society resulting from that
war" and noted that "[a]nti-war activists, such as these defendants,
have ... challenged the validity of a concept of patriotism. 265 It wrote:
"We do not believe that the court could safely assume, without inquiry, that
the veniremen had no serious prejudice on this subject, or could recognize
such prejudices and lay them aside. 266
258 United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972).
259 Id. at 348.
26o Id. at 368-69.
261 Anti-riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (2003).
262 Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 348.
26 31 d. at 370.
264 id. at 409.
2651 d. at 368.
266 Id. Other Vietnam-era cases required trial judges to grapple with similar
issues. One such case is United States v. Mattin, 419 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1970), a
Vietnam-era prosecution of one who refused to register for the draft. The trial
judge conducted the voir dire, in which he asked a number of questions designed
to elicit prospective jurors' political views about the Vietnam War, the draft, and
conscientious objection. On appeal, the defendant argued more questions should
have been asked, but the Eighth Circuit disagreed. Clearly it was within the trial
court's discretion to ask such things. Id. at 1088; see also United States v. Giese,
597 F.2d 1170, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the trial court properly asked
jurors about Vietnam War protests and was within its discretion in prohibiting
questions about President Ford's conditional amnesty plan or his pardon of
President Nixon because "it was essential for the trial judge . . . to examine
prospective jurors' attitudes toward appellant and the views he represented" in the
prosecution of a war protestor who bombed a Navy recruiting center); United
States v. Owens, 415 F.2d 1308, 1314-15 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding that the trial
judge properly asked each juror if he "possesses such strong opinions about the
international involvement of the United States that he feels that such opinion would
2003-2004]
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A case from a time when post-Vietnam politics had become a bit stale
attempted to state a general rule. In Cordero v. United States, the defendant
was undergoing a prosecution for disrupting Congress.267 In May 1979,
defendant stood in the Senate gallery, threw leaflets and shouted about "the
third world war," "revolution," and "the killing of people in Vietnam., 26
At trial, defendant proposed asking questions designed to determine
jurors' attitudes towards Vietnam Veterans Against the War and the
Revolutionary Communist Party.269 The defendant was apparently a
member of both organizations.2" He also proposed the following questions:
[Appellant] is accused of throwing leaflets into the Senate Gallery
and making a speech which in essence denounced the United States and
other countries for planning World War III. How many of you would
characterize your own feelings as being in complete disagreement with
those expressed in [appellant's] speech ... ? Having those feelings,
would it be difficult for you to be completely fair and impartial in sitting
as a juror in this case?...
Have any of you.., ever been a member of any organization which
had as one of its objectives opposition to Communism? 27'
The trial court refused to ask these questions, but the court of appeals
reversed. It set forth the following rule:
Fairness requires a careful voir dire examination when there is a
"significant likelihood" of juror prejudice .... A significant likelihood
prevent him from giving a fair and impartial trial under the law and the evidence
to both the United States and to the defendant, either way"); United States v.
Malinowski, 347 F. Supp. 347,355 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (permitting the inquiry "about
any prejudice which would exist because of defendant's motives, but did not ask
detailed questions about "jurors' views on the Indo-China conflict and on civil
disobedience" in a prosecution of a war tax protestor), affd, 556 F.2d 542 (3d Cir.
1973); Commonwealth v. Harrison, 331 N.E.2d 873, 874 (Mass. 1975) (sustaining
the trial court's refusal to ask certain questions, but noting that it would likely have
sustained the trial court if it had asked them), aff'g 321 N.E.2d 672 (Mass. App.
Dec. 1975).
267 Cordero v. United States, 456 A.2d 837, 839 (D.C. App. 1983).
268Id. at 839-40.
269 Id. at 843-44.
270 Id. at 840.
271 Id. at 843-44 (quoting defendant's proposed questions in voir dire) (altera-
tions in original).
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of prejudice exists when (1) a case involves "matters concerning which
either the local community or the population at large is commonly known
to harbor strong feelings" and (2) these matters are "inextricably
bound up with the conduct of the trial. 272
Since appellant's political views were inextricably bound up in the trial of
the case, and the community was said to harbor strong feelings about the
Revolutionary Communist Party, it was incumbent on the trial court to
conduct voir dire on the subject.273
Although the court reached the correct conclusion in Cordero, its
statement of the law is too limiting. Suppose a case that involves "matters
concerning which [the venire] is commonly known to harbor strong
feelings., 274 A party should be able to probe those "strong feelings" for
bias, regardless of whether they are "inextricably bound up with the
conduct of the trial. 275 A party who is a member of a disfavored group (and
1721d. at 841-42 (citing Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981);
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376
(D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972)).
273 For other examples of cases in which political affiliation questions were
permitted, see GINGER, supra note 4, § 9.17, at 525.
In a similar vein, a criminal defendant may be politically unpopular for other
reasons. For example, Terry Nichols was tried and convicted of blowing up the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. A lengthy questionnaire was
administered to the jurors. During follow-up voir dire, the following exchange went
unchallenged:
Q. Now let me ask a few questions from the information you supplied
on the questionnaire. You indicated in your questionnaire that
you-you've listened to Rush Limbaugh and Peter Boyles?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, where you put--on a political scale of zero to 100, hundred
being most conservative, zero being least conservative, where would you
put Rush Limbaugh?
A. 75, 80.
Q. Where would you put yourself?
A. 65, 70.
Criminal Lawyers Ass'n., American Jury Voir Dire Questioning, FOR THE
DEFENCE Oct. 1997, http://www.criniinallawyers.ca/newslett/1 8-6/nichol.htm. The
original transcripts can be found at The Oklahoma City Bombing Trial Transcripts,
http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/oklahoma/transcripts/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
274 Cordero, 456 A.2d at 842.
275 Id.
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whose status will become evident at trial) is entitled to trial by an impartial
jury. The fact that the disfavored status is not "inextricably bound up with
the conduct of the trial" (whatever that means) does not justify seating
biased jurors." 6
There is a converse concern. As can be seen, the temper of the time
may sometimes have more effect on these decisions than it should. In the
Depression-era labor cases,27 7 and in the Puerto Rican assassins' case,278
the trial court permitted questions that seemed designed more to sow
notions of guilt by association than to inform the parties for purposes of
jury selection. In times when there is popular animus toward certain
political organizations, great care must be taken to prevent voir dire from
being used improperly to try to prejudice the jury against a member of a
disfavored group. Care must be taken to insure that both parties have trial
by a jury as "indifferent" as may be possible under the circumstances.
C. Ordinary, Nonpolitical Cases
What about the usual case that involves neither political corruption nor
an unusually heated political climate? Is it permissible to inquire as to a
juror's party affiliation or political activities? The answer resides largely
in the discretion of the trial court. It appears that courts are more willing to
permit such inquiry in questionnaires than in live voir dire, but even that is
not universally true.
1. Questionnaires
There is considerable evidence that courts have permitted such inquiry
through the medium of questionnaires administered to potential jurors.
Also the lengthy juror questionnaire in the notorious O.J. Simpson trial
included several specific political questions, including:
202. What is your political affiliation? (Democrat, Republican, Independ-
ent)
203. Are you currently registered to vote?
276 Id. If the case did not involve "strong feelings" then the threshold for
permitting inquiry should, of course, be lower. Similarly, if the political affiliation
of the party is not likely to become evident during the trial, there is probably no
reason to inquire.
277 See supra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
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204. Did you vote in the June, 1994 primary elections?
205. Do you consider yourself politically (active, moderately active,
inactive)? 279
Similarly, Brandborg v. Lucas arose out of a murder trial.280 Brandborg
was called for jury duty and was asked to complete a questionnaire that
included a number of questions she considered intrusive.2 81' Among them
were "With which political party are you primarily associated?" and "Do
you consider yourself a liberal, a conservative or a moderate? 2 82 The Texas
trial court permitted those questions to be asked, but Brandborg refused to
answer them and eleven others. The trial court held her in contempt and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied her application for a writ of
habeas corpus. 83
Brandborg filed a habeas petition in the United States district court,
alleging a violation of her constitutional right to privacy. The federal court
was clearly troubled by the case. Concerned about Brandborg's privacy, it
nonetheless acknowledged that "pieces of the information sought with
regards to... political affiliation.., were discernable [sic] from public
records.2 84 While faulting with the trial court for failing to conduct a
sufficient balancing of the need for disclosure versus the value of juror
privacy, the Texas appellate court did not hold the questions were
necessarily improper. 85 It vacated the contempt finding, however.286
279 California v. Simpson, Juror Questionnaire, No. BA097211, 1994 WL
564388 at *18-19 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Doc. Oct. 3, 1994).
280 Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 353 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
281 See id.
282 Id. at 354 Other questions included "What was your combined family
income last year?," and "Religious preference (please name denomination and
specific church you attend)." Id.
283 Id. at 355.
284 Id. at 359.
285 See id.
286 See id. at 361.
Petitioner was not advised that private matters could have been discussed
in camera. In addition, the relevance of the specific questions at issue was
never considered or established. The trial court's failure to determine the
relevance of the questions and conduct a balancing test of the competing
interests, entitled the petitioner to refuse to answer. However, a potential
juror is certainly not free to refuse to answer any question propounded
when it is found by the court to be relevant, or potentially relevant, and a
balancing of the competing interests is performed.
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United States v. Battle was a prosecution for the murder of a prison
guard.287 The trial court permitted extensive voir dire that included group
questioning, individual (sequestered) voir dire, and a written questionnaire.
The questionnaire asked: "Would you describe yourself politically? Pick
the spot on the scale which seems correct:" The numbers one though six
were printed, with "1" denoting "Extremely liberal" and "6" denoting
"Extremely conservative." 2
88
Other trial courts have exercised their discretion to prohibit these kinds
of questions. United States v. Padilla-Valenzuela was a case in which
defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute more than
a ton of cocaine.289 At the time of his arrest, defendant was illegally in the
United States. 29° Defense counsel submitted a proposed voir dire question-
naire that sought to probe jurors' attitudes towards federal immigration
21policy and immigrants. It asked whether the respondent has "ever used
derogatory language in referring to members of a minority group ' ' 29 2 or has
"ever been a member of any racially-exclusive clubs or clubs where even
though not avowedly discriminatory--there are no minority members. 293
Counsel also filed a "Motion for Attorney Conducted Voir Dire," telling
the court he wanted "to explore the 'anti-immigrant fervor' of prospective
jurors. '294 The court found all this to be too sweeping an intrusion into the
privacy rights of the jurors. It refused to administer the questionnaire or
permit counsel to conduct the interrogation.29"
28 United States v. Battle, 979 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
288 Id. at 1474. The questionnaire also asked for a list of organizations
(including political) to which the juror or his spouse belonged, whether the juror
was a member of the National Rifle Association "or any other organization which
is concerned with protecting the right to own weapons," and information about the
juror's religious affiliation. Id. at 1472-73.
289 United States v. Padilla-Valenzuela, 896 F. Supp. 968,969 (D. Ariz. 1995),
aft'd, No. 96-10214, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10,661, at *7 (9th Cir. May 7, 1997).
290 Id.
291 See id.
2921 d. at 969.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 970.
295 See also United States v. Serafmi, 57 F. Supp. 2d 108 (M.D. Pa. 1999). In
a perjury prosecution against a state legislator, the court approved the use of a
questionnaire. Id. at 111. While it struck from the questionnaire "what political
party or political organizations do you belong to?" it permitted questions regarding
membership in environmental or conservation organizations, contributions of time,
services, or money to political campaigns, activity in political campaigns,
contributions to defendant's political campaigns, and attendance at political events
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2. Oral Voir Dire
Courts have also split on whether to permit oral voir dire regarding
political affiliation in a nonpolitical trial.
In United States v. Gonzalez-Quezada a previously deported alien was
convicted of having again been found in the United States." 6 According to
the Ninth Circuit, the defendant "sought to eliminate members of the
Republican Party from the jury because of their racist attitudes and anti-
affirmative action and immigration views., 297 The district court "asked
broad questions regarding the jurors' views on immigration, political
affiliations, and racial and cultural bias," '298 but it refused to ask certain
questions tendered by defendant "regarding the jurors' political party
affiliations and views on affirmative action and immigration., 299 The
appellate court held there was no an abuse of discretion in the manner in
which the district court conducted voir dire.300
Similarly, Samples v. State was an armed robbery prosecution.'O The
defendant sought to question potential jurors about the extent of their
political activity. Noting the request was based only on his "bare assertion
that the question was designed to reveal a pro-prosecution bias, without
support in logic, common experience, or authority,"30 2 the Georgia Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to permit defendant to ask
about political activity.30 3
in support of defendant. See id. at 113-16. By comparison, in the trial of Oliver
North, arising out of the Iran-Contra political controversy, the questionnaire asked
only "Are you a registered voter?" and "Have you, or has any member of your
immediate family, ever had an elected or appointed office in state, federal, or local
government?" It did not ask party affiliation or voting history. See Juror
Questionnaire for United States v. North, reprinted in FREDERICK, supra note 43,
at 216.296 See United States v. Gonzalez-Quezada, No. 96-10092, 1997 WL 119501,
**1 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 1997).297 Id. at **2.
298 Id.
299Id.
300 Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that "[s]pecific voir dire questions are needed
to ward off prejudice in cases with racial overtones, involving well-known
community matters about which the local community population feels strongly, and
involving other forms of bias and distorting influence." Id.
301 Samples v. State, 460 S.E.2d 795, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
3021 d. at 797.
303 Id. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision despite Georgia's jury
selection statute that extends to both parties the "absolute right to question jurors
regarding certain matters, including their 'religious, social and fraternal
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Texas has permitted counsel to ask jurors their political affiliation in
an appropriate case. Lopez v. Allee was a civil case in which the defendant
was charged with assault and battery.3"' The plaintiff was a young
Mexican-American; the defendant was a retired Texas Ranger. °5 The
altercation occurred when plaintiffwas serving defendant in a convenience
store. The case seems to have taken on larger, political overtones. During
voir dire, the defendant's counsel asked a juror, Mrs. Maria Elva Navarro,
"if she belonged to or sympathized with La Raza Unida," which, the court
explains, is a "recognized political party."3 6 Plaintiff objected because the
party had nothing to do with the case, but the court permitted the
question.3 7 Then, the plaintiff s counsel asked the La Raza Unida question
of some jurors with Anglo names, and the defendant's counsel asked the
question of some with Mexican-American names.308
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to permit the
question.30 9 It explained that even though the political party had no
connection with the suit "both parties apparently assumed that members of
such party or those in sympathy with its cause would be prejudiced towards
appellant, and that those not in sympathy with La Raza Unida, or its cause,
would be prejudiced in favor of appellee."3 ' It cited the testimony of one
prospective juror, a member of La Raza Unida, who said although he had
no prejudice against appellee, "most members . . . did have such
prejudice."3"1 In effect, then, the court allowed membership in the party to
be taken either as a surrogate measure of bias or as an indication of whether
to ask further questions on the juror's ability to focus only on the evidence.
Sometimes a court is sensitive to keep out an issue, only to have
counsel open the door to it. For example, Sell v. C.B. Smith Volkswagen
was a garden-variety personal injury action involving a blown tire.3 12 The
accident, however, occurred while plaintiffs were returning from a Socialist
connections.' "Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN § 15-12-133 (1995)). The court noted
the statute does not expressly include political activity, and declined to read the
statute broadly. See id.
3' Lopez v. Allee, 493 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
305 Id. at 333.
306 Id. at 334.
307/id.
308 id.
309 Id. at 336.
310 Id. at 335.
311 id.
312 Sell v. C.B. Smith Volkswagen, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 897,899 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981).
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Workers Party convention.313 So the plaintiffs' attorney filed a motion in
limine precluding the defendant from offering proof that the plaintiffs were
Socialists. 3 14 Nonetheless, during voir dire, that attorney told the jurors that
the evidence would show that one of the plaintiffs was very active in
politics and organizing and asked if anyone would hold it against her.
When a prospective juror asked, "'What kind [of organizing], I mean for
our government or against our government?,' the attorney replied, 'for our
,"311government, I can assure you ....
Later in the trial, defense counsel sought to cross-examine plaintiff on
the truth of that statement. The trial court permitted it, and the appellate
court affirmed, holding that plaintiff had injected the otherwise restricted
issue into the case and opened the matter to cross-examination.316
D. Statutory Considerations
In considering whether a jurisdiction should permit inquiry into a
juror's political affiliation, it is relevant to consider whether the state
allows public access to voter registration information. Some states may
regard this data as confidential. For example, the California Secretary of
State says registration information is available for only select purposes:
The Elections Code allows voter information to be released to any
candidate for federal, state, or local office, to any committee for or against
any initiative or referendum measure for which legal publication is made,
and to any person for election, scholarly, journalistic, or political purpose,
or for governmental purposes, as determined by the Secretary of State's
Office. 3
17
313 Id. at 900.
314 Id.
315 id.
3161d. at900-01. Plaintiffs' counsel also expressly waived his objection to this
line of cross-examination. The appellate court used that concession as an alternate
ground for its holding. Id.
317 California Secretary of State Homepage, Elections Division, Frequently
Asked Questions, at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections faq.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2004). The Secretary of State may take an unduly restrictive view. CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 2194(a) (West 2003) says: "The voter registration card information
identified in subdivision (a) of Section 6254.4 of the Government Code: (1) shall
be confidential." But CAL. GOv'T CODE § 6254.4 (West 2003) covers only "flhe
home address, telephone number, e-mail address, precinct number, or other number
specified by the Secretary of State for voter registration purposes, and prior
registration information shown on the voter registration card." Id.
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Otherjurisdictions, however, make voter registration rolls public.3"' Certain
statutes, in fact, require the disclosure of the list of prospective jurors in
advance of the trial.3 9 In a jurisdiction in which voter registration is public
information, it seems inconsistent to treat those data as confidential on voir
dire. Indeed, most people do not keep their politics secret, but readily
discuss such things with friends and acquaintances.320 It would seem that
only a relative minority would believe, like Brandborg, that revealing his
political registration would be an invasion of privacy.
Many jurisdictions have laws protecting the privacy of one's vote.
Thus, there seems to be no reported case in which counsel was permitted
to ask for whom a juror voted. Were this question to arise in a given
jurisdiction, counsel should research whether a statute or rule of court bears
on the matter.321
E. Summary of Observations
It is very unlikely that a juror's party registration, per se, will give rise
to a challenge for cause. Nevertheless, counsel often seek to use that bit of
The registration card contains more information than that, including party
affiliation. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2150 (West 2003).
It is unclear whether prosecutors in criminal prosecutions where the state is a
party would have access to voter registration rolls as a "government purpose."
According to representatives at the California Secretary of State's office, such a
request has not been made within recent memory. Telephone interviews with
Andrew Hinkel, Assoc. Program Analyst, California Secretary of State (June 11,
1999) and Linda Cabatic, Senior Staff Counsel, California Secretary of State (Mar.
2, 2004).
318 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-236 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-7-
27-6 (2003); 17 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2150 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-442
(Michie 2003) (all providing for some type of general public access to voter
registration rolls); United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(stating that the District of Columbia Board of Elections makes such information
available); Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (stating
that political affiliation is discernible from public records).
319 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2003). A defendant charged with "treason or other
capital offense" must be given a list of the veniremen "at least three entire days
before commencement of trial." 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2003). Each district court must
have a written plan for random selection of grand and petit jurors. Id. § 1863. Each
plan must "fix the time when the names drawn from the qualified jury wheel shall
be disclosed to parties and to the public." Id. § 1863(b)(7).
320 In California, where voting lists are not available, party affiliation lists are
posted at polling places during primary elections. Your neighbor's political
preference is no secret.
321 See supra notes 194, 200.
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information in determining whether to exercise a peremptory challenge.322
Since the relevance of party registration seems limited, there does not
appear to be a strong case to be made for asking jurors. In jurisdictions in
which political registration is a matter of public record, however, there does
not seem to be as strong a privacy consideration either, and there seems less
reason to deny counsel the information, even if only marginally relevant or
useful.
In nonpolitical cases, courts have split on whether to permit parties to
ask a prospective juror's political affiliation. A review of reported materials
suggests courts are more comfortable permitting this to be asked in a
questionnaire rather than in live voir dire, although even that is not
universally true. If one wished to be a bit more guarded, the question could
be made optional. Given the discretion afforded trial courts, it seems
unlikely one would be reversed for either permitting or refusing permission
to inquire about a juror's political affiliation." 3
In cases involving "political corruption," the need for information
about thejuror's political involvement is increased. Courts generally permit
interrogation relevant to the case, although they are reluctant to permit a
question about party registration because there is a new competing
consideration: the concern that jurors will conclude that party registration
matters or that a party (not an individual) is on trial. Thus, courts tend to
permit questions about political activity ("did you vote in the last election?"
"did you participate in a political campaign?") but not direct questions of
political affiliation ("of which political party are you a member?").
Courts also permit more generic questions, such as "would the fact that
you are a member of the Democratic, Republican, or some other party, if
you are, affect your ability to reach a verdict fairly, based on the evidence
you hear, and the law as I give it to you? '324 These are clearly important in
political corruption cases. Indeed, if the court has given the prospective
jurors a sufficient statement of the case at the beginning of voir dire, this
kind of question may be more effective than in other contexts, and the
322 There appears to be no constitutional basis for eliciting this information,
except perhaps in the rare case in which it is necessary to insure a fair trial. Thus,
a federal court would be very unlikely to reverse a state court decision denying
counsel the right to inquire. In federal court, this becomes a matter of the appellate
court's "supervisory" role.
323 This may be less true in a jurisdiction in which the legislature has made
political registration confidential, see Connors v. State, 15 8 U.S. 408, 412 (1895),
although there seems to be no reported case in which a trial judge was reversed for
permitting such inquiry.324 See supra notes 198-04 and accompanying text.
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jurors will be more likely to understand why (and accept that) it is being
asked.
Cases arising in turbulent political times are the most difficult. It is not
that the legal principles change but that judges too can be affected by the
turbulence. There are, unfortunately, cases in which judges have veered
from a neutral path. Indeed there is danger on both sides of the straight and
narrow. On the one hand, judges must be alert to prevent questioning
intended by counsel to influence the jury under the guise of eliciting
information on which to base a challenge. Questions should be reviewed
carefully to be sure the information-eliciting purpose at least predominates
over "preconditioning the jury" purpose. Cases such as Warr, Fitzgerald,
and Buyle are not the law's finest. 5
On the other hand, the parties need to be sure those impaneled are not
inflamed by the political heat of the moment. The parties should be granted
sufficient voir dire to make a careful evaluation the impact of the times on
those called for jury service. If courts are to remain a refuge of reason in
difficult political times, careful voir dire is necessary to insure that mission.
IV. RACE, ETHNIcrY, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AND GENDER32 6
Fifty years ago, it was widely believed that gender, ethnicity, and race
were, each by themselves, important factors in jury selection.3 27 More
325 See supra notes 217-34 and accompanying text.
326 The categories of "race" and "ethnicity" are not always neatly defined.
Indeed, they are sometimes blurred with religious beliefs. See, e.g., United States
v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (regarding possible prejudice against
"Arabs," "Islamic Fundamentalists," and "Muslims"). But see Commonwealth v.
Pina, 713 N.E.2d 944 (Mass. 1999) (discussing difference between "ethnicity" and
"race"). This article does not seek to differentiate such categories for separate
analysis. It is concerned with the limits on the right to discover prejudice on
account of any such characteristic. Commonwealth v. De La Cruz, 540 N.E.2d 168
(Mass. 1989) (definition of "race").
327See BUSCH, supra note 35. "Some will contend that women make better
jurors than men because in the matter ofjudging they are more careful and serious
than men; others will hold to the tradition voiced by Tennyson that 'woman is the
lesser man."' Id. § 143, at 210.
[M]any experienced advocates attach an importance to the national
ancestry of a venireman. These usually consider that in criminal cases the
Irishman and Jew, because of their national background and natural
temperament, will put a greater burden on the prosecution and prove more
sympathetic and lenient to a defendant than an Englishman or a
Scandinavian, whose passions for the enforcement of law and order are
stronger.
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recent writings by jury consultants show that these factors are still often
considered part of the "demographic" mix, or the "profile" that should be
considered in jury selection.32 Jury consultants often urge that questions
about such immutable characteristics be included in supplemental jury
questionnaires.
So, for example, the questionnaire used in the O.J. Simpson trial began
by asking
2. Are you male __ or female ?___
3. What is your race? (please circle)
a) White/caucasian
b) Black/African American
c) Hispanic/Latino
d) Asian/Pacific Islander
e) Other (please state) 329
But courts are not always so willing to permit such questions. In United
States v. Serafini, the court used a questionnaire that asked for gender, but
struck the proposed question about race and ethnic background.33° In United
Id. § 146, at 210.
328 See, e.g., GINGER, supra note 4, § 19.55, at 1101; HARVEY LEVINE, JURY
SELECTION 4-17 (1994) NAT'L JURY PROJECT, supra note 34, at 3-38. Some
modem authors defend the limited utility of "stereotyping" and report their view
of some stereotypes. STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 207, at 305-15. See LISA
BLUE & JANE NADIA SAGINAW, JURY SELECTION: STRATEGY & SCIENCE §§ 7:01,
7:19 (1st ed. 1986) supra note 34, §§ 7:01, 7:19 ("Stereotypically, people from
Mediterranean populations are considered desirable as jurors for the plaintiff....
Persons of German, Scandinavian, Swedish, Finnish, Dutch, Nordic, Scottish,
Asiatic, and Russian heritage tend to be stereotypically better for the criminal
prosecution."); WAGNER, supra note 35, § 1.04[8]; Robert K. Bothwell, The Ethnic
Factor in Voir Dire, in A HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH (Walter F. Abbott &
John Batt eds., 1999). But see WERCHICK, supra note 4, § 8.8 (arguing that race,
ethnic background, and religion stereotypes that are used in juror profiles derived
from misperceptions); BENNETT ET AL., supra note 120, §§ 6.18, 18.19 (arguing that
paper profiles are often misleading).
329 California v. Simpson, Juror Questionnaire, No. BA097211, 1994 WL
564388, at *2 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Doc. Oct. 3, 1994). While the
questionnaire used in the Oliver North trial did not ask jurors to state their race or
gender, the "Juror Summary Form" apparently used by counsel did contain spaces
for counsel or a jury consultant to fill in those bits of information. FREDERICK,
supra note 43, at 145.
330 United States v. Serafmi, 57 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (M.D. Pa 1999).
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States v. McDade, the court struck even a proposed question about
gender."'
What law underlies this? Three strands of authority are relevant. One
involves the law regarding the composition of juries. A second involves a
party's right to ask questions about a juror's race or ethnicity. The third
involves questions about a juror's prejudice on account of certain
immutable characteristics.
A. The Law Regarding the Composition of Juries
More than one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that the
exclusion of blacks from jury service violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Strauder v. West Virginia held unconstitutional a West Virginia statute that
permitted only white men to serve on grand and petit juries.332 Over the
years, the Court has consistently upheld that precedent.333
In 1975, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court determined women
must not be excluded from jury service based exclusively on sex.334
Louisiana's constitution and statutes prohibited the state from selecting a
woman for jury service unless she filed a declaration of her desire to serve
on ajury.335 As a result, women comprised less than ten percent of the jury
"' United States v. McDade, 929 F. Supp. 815, 816-17 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(noting that since it is unconstitutional to exclude a juror based on gender, it is
impermissible to ask, regardless "of whether that information might be gleaned
from circumstantial evidence").
332 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879) (expressing concern
over the limit to race, not gender).
... Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,501 (1972); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130
(1940); Carterv. Texas, 177 U.S. 442,447 (1900); Gibsonv. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
565, 581 (1896); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1879); see cases cited
in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,418-19 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204 n. 1, 230 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Eubanks
v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 585 n.1 (1958); see also Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U.S. 320,329-30 (1970) (recognizing that injunctive relief is available to members
of a class unconstitutionally excluded from jury service). The Court has also been
alert to prevent the de facto (rather than de jure) exclusion of blacks from state
court juries. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103
U.S. 397 (1880).
334 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975); see Barbara Allen Babcock,
A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REV.
1139 (1993) (arguing that women are unequally prevented from serving on a jury
through the use of peremptory challenges).
311 See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 523.
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pool, although they constituted fifty-three percent of the population.336 The
Court found this practice unconstitutional, holding "the fair cross section
requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 337 It held that the Constitution demands the
"presence of a fair cross section of the community on venires, panels, or
lists from which petit juries are drawn. 338
Four years later, in Duren v. Missouri, the Supreme Court held that a
prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section
requirement is demonstrated by proving (1) the allegedly excluded group
is "distinctive" in the community; (2) venire representation of this group "is
not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community"; and (3) such "underrepresentation is due to the systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process."'339 The Court
invalidated a Missouri statute automatically exempting all women from
jury service who asked to be excluded.340 It found that "systematic
exclusion" denied defendant his right "to a petit jury selected from a fair
cross section of the community. 341
Strauder, Taylor, and Duren involved Supreme Court review of state
statutes. Congress addressed this issue, with respect to federal courts in the
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.342 The Act states that all federal
336 See id. at 524.
337 Id. at 530. In a previous case, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment extends the Sixth Amendment's
provision of an impartial jury to the states. Id. at 149-50.
338 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526.
139 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). The State may rebut this
proof by showing that the challenged venire selection process "manifestly and
primarily" advances a "significant state interest." Id. at 368.
340 Id. at 359. The result of this statutory scheme was that, on average, women
composed less than fifteen percent of the jury venire. Id.
341 id.
3 42 Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat.
53 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (1994)). The Civil Rights Act
of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 638 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1861 (2003)) had made a step in this direction. Until then, federal law stated that
those who were incompetent to serve "by the law of the State in which the district
court is held could not serve on a jury in federal court." Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646 Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 951 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2003)).
This meant "federal courts were required by statute to exclude women from jury
duty in those States in which women were disqualified." Taylor, 419 U.S, at 536.
As of 1946, women were still excluded from jury service in about forty percent of
the states. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.187, 206 (1946).
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litigants "have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from
a fair cross section of the community in the district ... where the [federal]
court convenes." '343 The Act generally standardizes federal venire selection
and prohibits exclusion from petit juries based on "race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, or economic status. ' 3 "
Fundamentally, then, the background to this subject is a clear commit-
ment to full participation in federal and state jury service by all citizens,
regardless of their membership in some "distinctive group."
B. The Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
Nonetheless, for most of our history, the commitment to full
participation did not affect the exercise of peremptory challenges. As late
as 1965, Justice White wrote: "The essential nature of the peremptory
challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry
and without being subject to the court's control." '345 Indeed, the Supreme
Court approved the use of peremptories "on grounds normally thought
irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion,
nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned forjury duty." 346
That is no longer the law.
In 1986, Batson v. Kentucky held that state prosecutors violate the
Fourteenth Amendment when they base their peremptory challenges on
race.347 The decision arose after a criminal defendant moved to discharge
an all-white jury because the prosecutor had used his peremptory chal-
lenges to strike all four African-Americans on the venire.3 41 The trial court
denied the motion and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.349
Both courts rested their decisions on Swain v. Alabama,35 ° the first
Supreme Court case to decide an equal protection question involving the
use of peremptory challenges.351 In Swain, the Court held that "a State's
purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participa-
tion ... violates the Equal Protection Clause. 352 Swain, however, also held
143 28 U.S.C. § 1861.
344 Id. § 1862.
341 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
346 Id. at 220.
7 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).341 Id. at 83.349 Id. at 84.
350 Swain, 380 U.S. at 202.
311 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404 (1991).
... Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04.
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that the petitioner must "show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremp-
tory challenges [based on race] over a period of time."3" Such systematic
use was very difficult to prove.354
Batson overruled Swain, holding that a defendant establishes a prima
facie violation if the facts and circumstances "raise an inference that the
prosecutor used [the peremptory challenges] to exclude the veniremen from
the petit jury on account of their race."3" Upon such a showing, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation.356 Then, the
court decides whether the defendant established purposeful discrimina-
tion.357
Batson held that a prosecutor who bases his peremptory challenges on
race violates the equal protection rights of both the defendant and the
jurors.35s Subsequent cases have expanded Batson by focusing on the equal
protection rights of potential jurors. Powers v. Ohio held that a white
criminal defendant may object to the prosecutor's discriminatory peremp-
tory challenge of black veniremen, because a defendant has third-party
standing to assert the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors.359
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court extended Batson to
civil litigants by holding that discriminatory conduct by civil parties
qualifies as state action.36 In Georgia v. McCollum, the Court held that
criminal defendants function as state actors, so the Constitution subjects
them to the same limits on their use of peremptory challenges.361 In
Hernandez v. New York, the Court stated that a prosecutor may not use his
113 Id. at 227.
"" In the thirty years after Swain, only two litigants fulfilled this burden of
proof. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing State v.
Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La.
1979)).
355 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
356 See id. at 97-98.
311 See id. The Supreme Court later clarified this three-step process in Purkett
v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). In Purkett, the Court held the race-neutral
explanation by the party exercising the peremptory need not be "persuasive or even
plausible" and that "[t]he persuasiveness of the justification" is determined in the
third step of the Batson process. Id.358 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. Batson stated that "[t]he harm from discriminatory
jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror
to touch the entire community." Id. The Court stated this again in Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991).
359 Powers, 499 U.S. at 406.
... Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991).
361 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
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peremptory challenges to strike Hispanics from a venire by reason of their
ethnicity.362 Other cases have held or assumed that American Indians,
3 63
Mexican-Americans,3" Asian-Americans,365  whites, and Italian-
Americans, 367 are "cognizable racial groups.
' 368
More recently, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., the Court extended
Batson's protection to gender-motivated peremptory challenges.369 It held
that a litigant is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause when he
exercises peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. As the Court
stated, "whether the trial is criminal or civil, potential jurors, as well as
litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are
free from state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of,
historical prejudice. 370
362 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (holding that the
prosecutor had articulated a plausible, race-neutral explanation for striking
Hispanic jurors); accord Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) ("[I]t is
no longer open to dispute that Mexican-Americans are a clearly identifiable class");
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); People v. Trevino, 704 P.2d 719 (Cal.
1985) (holding that the term "Spanish-surnamed" is sufficiently descriptive of
Hispanics, a cognizable class within the community); Benavides v. Am. Chrome
& Chems., Inc., 893 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App. 1994).
363 See, e.g., United States v. Iron Moccasin, 878 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir.
1989); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987).364 See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495.
365 United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1578-79 (10th Cir. 1994).
3 Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1989); Roman v. Abrams,
822 F.2d 214, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1987).
367 United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 96 (1988); cf. United States v. Bucci,
839 F.2d 825, 833 (1st Cir. 1988) (involving a defendant that did not show that
Italian-Americans have been subjected to discriminatory treatment); United States
v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1988) (involving a defendant that failed to
offer proof as to the presence of a cognizable group); United States v. Sgro, 816
F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (involving a defendant that failed to offer proof as to
the presence of a cognizable group).
36' For useful discussions of what constitutes a "cognizable racial group," see
Bucci, 839 F.2d at 833; United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 276-77 (3d
Cir. 1988); Roman, 822 F.2d at 227-28; United States v. Marcano, 508 F. Supp.
462, 469-70 (D.P.R. 1980); Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 598 (Cal.
1979); Adams v. Superior Court, 524 P.2d 375, 378 (Cal. 1974) (discussing
"cognizable group").
369 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
371 Id. at 128. Recently, a California court extended People v. Wheeler, 583
P.2d 748, 757 (Cal. 1978), the California equivalent of Batson, to sexual
orientation. See People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 347-48 (2000). Soon after
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The net result of Batson, Powers, Edmonson, McCollum, Hernandez,
and J.E.B. is that neither side in a criminal or civil trial may base a
peremptory challenge on race, ethnicity, or gender. With that as back-
ground, it is possible to examine the law relating to voir dire and immutable
characteristics of venirepeople.
C. Direct Questions About Immutable Characteristics
One should first distinguish two types of questions: (1) those that ask
a prospective juror about his or her own race, ethnic origin, or gender; and
(2) those that seek to understand whether the juror has any biases based on
the immutable characteristics of the parties or witnesses. Most reported
cases focus on the latter. But there are times when jurors are asked the
former.
As one California judge recently wrote:
Race and ethnicity are not necessarily patent .... While gross estimations
of race can be made on the basis of physical appearances, such judgments
are entirely subjective and often erroneous. And ethnicity has become
virtually impossible to judge without inquiry. Our jury venires daily
include Cubans named O'Rourke, Indonesians named Opdyke, and
Anglos named Gomes. Every trial judge has encountered red-haired,
freckle-faced Cardenases and Hispanic-looking Maguires. The country is
a melting pot--and proud of it--and a large part of the great folly of
stereotyping is that nowhere on earth have race and ethnicity become
harder to determine than they are here. 371
Garcia, the California Legislature codified the rule in CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
231.5 (West 2003) ("A party may not use a peremptory challenge to remove a
prospective juror on the basis of an assumption that the prospective juror is biased
merely because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, national origin, sexual
orientation or similar grounds."); accord Johnson v. Campbell, 92 F.3d 951, 953
(9th Cir. 1996) (assuming, without deciding, that sexual orientation qualifies as a
Batson classification); Commonwealth v. Jones, 570 A.2d 1338, 1347 (Pa. Super.
1990) (questioning jurors about issues of bias regarding sexual preference). For an
example of a recommendation that trial counsel use sexual orientation as part of a
juror profile, see WAGNER, supra note 35, § 1.04[12]. At least one author argues
that a potential juror should be questioned individually regarding his or her sexual
orientation. See Eisemann, supra note 10, at 26-27. Another author, however,
argued that such questioning should not be allowed in most cases. See Lynd, supra
note 10, at 288.
31 Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346; see also Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 752
("[V]eniremen are not required to announce their race, religion or ethnic origin
when they enter the box, and these matters are not ordinarily explored on voir dire.
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Nonetheless, federal jurors are required to state their ethnicity in a juror
qualification questionnaire of the federal court administrator.37 The form
used by many federal district courts asks the respondent to check either
"Mrs.," or "Miss." It then says:
Please indicate your race on the list below
__Indian (American)
Oriental
__ Black (or Negro)
White
__ 
Other (Specify)37
3
It is not clear whether counsel has access to the information on these forms
during jury selection.
There are also many examples of supplemental jury questionnaires in
which counsel have been permitted to ask jurors, in a given case, to state
their race, gender, or ethnic background.374 Indeed, the American Bar
Association's Committee on Jury Standards recommend some such
information be made available to attorneys at the beginning of voir dire.375
The reason, of course, is that the courts of California are-or should be-color
blind to all such distinctions among our citizens.").
372 See 28 U.S.C. § 1869(h) (2003) (requiring potential jurors to list their race,
as well as other personal information such as name, address, age, race, occupation,
education and length of residence within the judicial district. Prior to 1972, venire
members could decline to provide race information if they found it objectionable
to do so, but the statute was amended to require venire members to list their races.
Act of Sept. 29, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-437, 86 Stat. 740 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1869(h)).
171 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Form No. AO-178,
reprinted in Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 472, and in STARR & MCCORMICK supra
note 207, at 746. The text next to the question on the federal form advises the
prospective juror: "this answer is required solely to avoid discrimination in juror
selection and has absolutely no bearing on qualifications for jury service." Another
version of this form lists the choices as "Black, Asian, Native American-Indian,
White, Other (Specify)." Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Form
No. F-11987.37 4 BENNETT ET AL., supra note 120, at Form 8.28 (discussing the Rodney King
beating trial, in which lawyers asked about the "sex" and "race or ethnic
background" of the veniremen); FREDERICK, supra note 43, App. III, at 224
(indicating that jurors were asked their gender in the Exxon Valdez case).
371 COMMITrEE ON JURY STANDARDS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT 107 (1993) ("For voir
dire purposes, only the basic background information requested in nearly every
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There are very few reported cases in which courts have considered
whether counsel could ask jurors to reveal their own race or ethnicity
during oral voir dire. One such case was United States v. Barnes, a high-
profile prosecution of fifteen people charged with conspiracy to distribute
narcotics in Harlem and the South Bronx.376 All but one of the fifteen
defendants were black.377 The trial judge was concerned with the juror's
safety because of the notoriety of the case, so he withheld the names and
addresses of potential jurors.378 Defense counsel submitted several voir
dire questions dealing with potential jurors' religion and ethnicity, as well
as their attitudes toward black people. The Second Circuit held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to inquire into the ethnic
backgrounds of the potential jurors.3 79 It said that trial courts may limit
questioning about matters that are "too remote from the issues in the case
to warrant the intrusion into the potential jurors' private thoughts.""38
Because the criminal charges did not deal with any overt racial issues,
ascertaining potential jurors' ethnic backgrounds was not necessary. "There
is nothing to indicate that persons of one ethnic type or another are more
favorably disposed toward narcotic trafficking or to using firearms."38'
The appellate court's ruling was bolstered by its belief that the trial
judge asked enough questions to discover racial prejudice in the venire.3 s2
The trial court asked jurors about their general attitude toward black
people, whether any of them had moved to a different neighborhood out of
concern about "changing conditions," and whether they had any experience
with persons of different races that would make them unable to judge
people of that race fairly.3 83 Several jurors were excused after admitting
case should be sought. This includes the age [and] gender....").
376 United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 1979). For an excellent
discussion of Barnes, see Case Comment, supra note 9.
377 Barnes, 604 F.2d at 134.
378 Id. at 134-35. This is not the only case in which an anonymous jury was
empanelled. See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1022 (3d Cir. 1988)
(collecting cases).
39 Barnes, 604 F.2d at 140. The appellate record disclosed some, but not all,
information about the ethnic makeup of the jury that was empanelled. Id. at 136
n.5.
380 Id. at 140 (citing .several cases upholding trial courts' limitation of ques-
tioning into matters such as jurors' educational backgrounds and attitudes about
sex, drug use, political activists, antiwar demonstrators, and homosexuality).
381 Id.
381Id. at 136.
383 id.
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they had moved neighborhoods to avoid the increasing drug trafficking in
the area or that they were prejudiced against blacks.3
The other reported case in which a court was asked to inquire directly
about the jurors' national origin was Virgin Islands v. Felix. 5 The
defendant was a native of St. Thomas, one of the American Virgin Islands.
He was prosecuted for the murder of a man from Tortola, one of the British
Virgin Islands. At trial, the defense counsel sought to learn if any of the
venire was from Tortola. He claimed that Tortolans, who were naturalized
American citizens, could be prejudiced toward people from St. Thomas." 6
The trial judge refused to make that inquiry, instead asking whether the
fact that defendant was a native of St. Thomas would affect the jurors'
judgment."' The Third Circuit held the inquiry to be sufficient because the
nature of the prejudice that the defendant alleged was "unfocused" and
"diffuse."3 The circuit court added that public policy supported the trial
judge's decision, stating:
Such an investigation, carried out in a highly visible criminal trial on the
island of St. Thomas, could reasonably be expected to foster polarization
in the community. In effect, it could be perceived as representing an
official endorsement of the notion that there is deep prejudice between
those who are nativebom citizens and those who are not.
389
These cases are similar to many discussed above. The courts refused to
focus on a juror's characteristics, and inquired instead about his or her
opinions, prejudices, and beliefs. The focus was not on the juror's skin (or
birth certificate), but rather on his or her state of mind.
Inquiry into the juror's state of mind is at issue in the more usual case.
How far, then, may a court go in probing that? The next section explores
this issue in the context of racial and ethnic prejudice.
384 Id.
385 Virgin Islands v. Felix, 569 F.2d 1274, 1276 (3d Cir. 1978).
386 id.
387 Id. The judge said,
If then, either because you are a U.S. citizen or because you are a U.S.
citizen by naturalization or you lived in any of these neighboring islands,
you think that the difference in the status between the deceased, a
Tortolian, if that's what it turns out to be, and the defendant, a St.
Thomian, if this in any way will affect your judgment in the slightest
degree, please raise your card.
Id. 388 Id. at 1277.
319Id. at 1278.
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D. Questions About Prejudices That May Be Harbored By Prospective
Jurors
Generally, the Supreme Court has afforded trial courts a great deal of
discretion in conducting voir dire. The Court has never held that trial
judges must ask specific questions or a certain number of questions. The
Court, however, has placed some limits on a trial court's discretion in cases
involving race. The Court has conducted two separate inquiries: (1) what
does the Constitution require and (2) what is the non-constitutional rule
applicable to federal court cases?
The development of the modem federal law began in 1931. InAldridge
v. United States, the government charged Alfred Aldridge, a black man,
with killing a white police officer.39 ' At the first trial, a juror stated that the
fact that defendant was black and the victim white, had perhaps unduly
influenced her. Consequently, at the second trial, the defendant's counsel
sought to ask the jurors about racial prejudice they might harbor. 9' The
trial court denied the request.392
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's broad
discretion was "subject to the essential demands of fairness. 3 93 The
defense counsel's request did not focus on "immaterial matters" but rather
on prejudice that "would disqualify a juror., 394 The trial court erred in
failing "to ask any question which could be deemed to cover the subject"
of racial prejudice. 39' The fact that the defendant was black and the victim
white seemed to require the trial court to "cover the subject" of racial
prejudice during voir dire.3 96
390 Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 309 (1931).
19 Id. at 309-10.3921 d. at 310. The Court refused to let the attorney ask potential jurors if they
would be influenced by the fact that the "defendant was a negro and the deceased
a white man." Id.
393 id.
394Id. at 311.
395 id.
396 Courts after Aldridge interpreted the decision this way (that is, if the victim
and accused are of different races, the court must inquire into racial prejudice).
Aldridge, however, does not clearly require this, stating, "If the defendant was
entitled to have the jurors asked whether they had any racial prejudice, by reason
of the fact that the defendant was a negro and the deceased a white man, which
would prevent their giving a fair and impartial verdict, we cannot disregard the
court's refusal .... "Id.
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Significantly, Aldridge did not state clearly the source of its holding.
It used the word "impartial," suggesting a Sixth Amendment foundation,397
but the Supreme Court later said that Aldridge was based on the Court's
supervisory powers over the federal courts.398
Four decades after Aldridge, the Supreme Court decided Ham v. South
Carolina399 and Ristaino v. Ross,00 the two cases that help define the
constitutional standard for inquiry into racial prejudice. In the first, the
state indicted Gene Ham, an African-American, for drug possession.40 ' In
his defense, Ham argued that because of his race and civil rights activities,
the police were "out to get him," and that he was "framed."40 2 Ham
proposed that the trial judge ask four questions of the venire. Two focused
on possible racial prejudice, one involved the fact that the defendant had a
beard, and one involved pretrial publicity.403 The trial court rejected the
four inquiries, although it did ask three general questions about bias,
prejudice, and partiality required by South Carolina law.4"
The Supreme Court reversed and held that under the facts of the case405
the Fourteenth Amendment required questioning the jurors about racial
prejudice for two reasons. First, "one of the purposes of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to insure these 'essential demands
391 Id. Criminal defendants have a right to trial by an "impartial jury." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.398 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 n.10 (1976).
39See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
o See Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 589.
401 Ham, 409 U.S. at 524-25.
402 Id. at 525.
403 Id. at 525-26. At the time of Ham's trial, "rebellious youth" and "hippies"
often wore beards, while most adults did not. Beards were a symbol of the cultural
divide of the time. That probably motivated Ham to raise the issue on voir dire.
' Id. at 526 n.3 (quoting S.C. CODE § 38-202).
45Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596-97 (1976), the Court isolated the facts that caused
Ham to require inquiry. It said,
Ham's defense was that he had been framed because of his civil rights
activities. His prominence in the community as a civil rights activist, if not
already known to veniremen, inevitably would have been revealed to the
members of the jury in the course of the presentation of that defense.
Racial issues therefore were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the
trial. Further, Ham's reputation as a civil rights activist and the defense he
interposed were likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members
of the jury might harbor.
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of fairness,'" which limited the trial court's discretion in Aldridge."6
Second, "a principal purpose of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to prohibit the States from invidiously discriminating on the basis of
race."40 7 For these reasons, the Court found the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause required the trial court to ask about racial bias.40 8
The Court, however, found that the trial court did not violate Ham's
constitutional rights by refusing to examine jurors about possible prejudice
against Ham because he wore a beard.409 The Court based its holding on
"the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the trial judge in conducting
voir dire and [its] inability to constitutionally distinguish possible prejudice
against beards from a host of other possible similar prejudices.-'410
Three years later, the Supreme Court limited Ham in Ristaino v.
Ross.411 A Massachusetts court convicted James Ross, a black man, of
several violent crimes against a white security guard.41 2 Prior to voir dire,
Ross asked the trial court to question prospective jurors about racial
prejudice.413
The Ristaino Court rejected the contention that, under Ham, a trial
court must probe into racial prejudice every time the race of the victim and
a criminal defendant are different. Rather, the Ham opinion "reflected an
assessment of whether under all of the circumstances presented there was
a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent question about racial
prejudice, the jurors would not be as 'indifferent as (they stand)
unswome."' 414 Although the case involved an interracial crime, racial
issues were not "inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial," and
an inquiry was therefore not constitutionally required.41 5
' Ham, 409 U.S. at 526 (quoting Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308,
310 (1931)).
407 Id. at 526-27 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81
(1873)).
408 The Court explained that inquiry into racial prejudice "derives its
constitutional stature from the firmly established precedent of Aldridge and the
numerous state cases upon which it relied, and from a principal purpose as well as
from the language of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment." See id. at
528.
409 Id.
4 101 d. (citation omitted).
... Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).4121 d. at 590.
4 13 Id. at 590 n.1.
4 14 Id. at 596 (quoting COKE ON LITTLETON 155b (19th ed. 1832)).411 Id. at 597.
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Ristaino established a "special circumstances" rule: the Constitution
only requires a court to allow defendants to ask questions designed to elicit
racial prejudice when the special circumstances of a case indicate a
significant likelihood of prejudice by the jurors.4" 6 The Ristaino Court,
however, did not state expressly what circumstances necessitate inquiry
into racial bias.
The Court defined one "special circumstance" in Turner v. Murray."7
Turner involved the trial of a black man for the murder of a white jewelry
store owner." 8 During voir dire, in Virginia state court, the trial judge
refused to ask any of the defendant's proposed questions regarding racial
bias." 9 Instead, the judge asked only general impartiality questions.420 The
jury convicted Turner of murder and recommended a death sentence, which
was imposed by the trial court.42 '
In response to a petition for habeas corpus, the Supreme Court vacated
Turner's death sentence.422 The Court ruled that the additional fact that the
jury convicted Turner of a capital crime distinguished it from Ristaino, and
presented a "special circumstance," which mandated the requested
inquiry.423 The Court announced a limited per se rule: "a capital defendant
accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors
informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial
bias." 24 However, it noted that the trial court maintains discretion over the
form and number of the questions and the decision whether to examine
4161d. at 596-97.
417 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
411 See id. at 29.
419 See id. at 30-31.
420 See id. at 31. In fact, the judge asked the questions before the jury knew it
was an interracial crime. Id.
4 2 1 Id.
422 Id. at 37. A plurality of the Court based its decision on the special inquiry
a jury must make in deciding the penalty, not the guilt, phase of the case. Since a
Virginia jury is given "broad discretion" in determining the sentence, "there is a
unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected." Id. at 35
(plurality opinion). Thus, the Court vacated the sentence but not the determination
of guilt. Id. at 37 (plurality opinion). Although this may have been of limited utility
to Mr. Turner, as a practical matter it insures that voir dire on racial issues will be
permitted at the outset of subsequent inter-racial capital trials in which the same
jury hears both the guilt and penalty phases of the case. See id. at 45 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
423 See id. at 33 (plurality opinion).
4 24Id. at 36-37.
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jurors collectively or individually.425 The Court described this rule as
"minimally intrusive. 426
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not require
questioning about racial prejudice absent "special circumstances," but a
capital charge is a "special circumstance." In non-capital cases, "the mere
fact that [a defendant] is black and his victim white does not constitute a
'special circumstance' of constitutional proportions."'27 The fundamental
question is whether "there [is] a constitutionally significant likelihood that,
absent questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors would not be as
'indifferent as (they stand) unsworne."" '28 Where racial issues are
"inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial," racial questioning
should be permitted. 29
Of course these constitutional requirements are applicable in federal as
well as state courts, but in federal courts, more is required. Ristaino
illustrates this well. In this case, the Supreme Court found the Massachu-
setts courts did not deprive defendant of a constitutional right, 30 but it
noted that "the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions
designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant. Under
our supervisory power we would have required as much of a federal court
faced with the circumstances here.""43
In Rosales-Lopez v. United States, the Supreme Court undertook to
determine what rule should apply under that "supervisory power."432 First,
it observed the tension inherent in deciding whether to permit questioning
about racial prejudice. On the one hand, it may suggest to the jury that
racial prejudice has more sway in federal court than it should. On the other
hand, if questioning is not permitted, the defendant may feel he was not
afforded a fair trial. The Court stated:
[I]t is usually best to allow the defendant to resolve this conflict by
making the determination of whether or not he would prefer to have the
411 See id. at37.
426 Id.
427 Id. at 33.
428 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976) (quoting COKE ON LITTLETON,
supra note 414).
429 Id. at 597. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981), the
Court described this as a "critical factor." Id. at 189.
430 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597.
431 Id. at 597 n.9.
432 Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 182.
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inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice pursued. Failure to honor his
request, however, will be reversible error only where the circumstances
of the case indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that racial or
ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury.433
Then, the plurality stated a two-part test. First, if the case involves a
violent crime, and the victim and defendant are of different racial or ethnic
origins, "a reasonable possibility" of prejudice exists and federal courts
must permit racial inquiry on voir dire if the defendant requests it.
434
Beyond that, if the "total circumstances suggest a reasonable possibility
that racial or ethnic prejudice will affect the jury, ' ,435 the trial court should
permit questions about racial prejudice. The trial court will be given
deference in appellate review.436
Second, if the facts of the case do not give rise to the need for such
questions, then "the trial court must determine if the external circumstances
of the case indicate a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice
will influence the jury's evaluation of the evidence. 437 In Rosales-Lopez,
the defendant was of Mexican descent. 438 He was charged with smuggling
illegal aliens across the Mexican-American border and was tried in San
Diego, a few miles from Mexico. 439 The trial judge explained the purpose
of voir dire was, in part, to be sure to discover "underlying prejudices." 0
He asked jurors their feelings towards "aliens" and the "alien problem" and
followed that with a general question about whether there was any reason
they could not be fair and impartial. 4" The Supreme Court held that to be
sufficient to discern any prejudice." 2 The "external circumstances" were
addressed satisfactorily." 3
433 Id. at 191.
434 Id. at 192.
43 5 Id.
43 6 Id. at 188.
411 Id. at 192-93; see also United States v. Cordova, 157 F.3d 587 (8th Cir.
1998) (analyzing the defendant's claim that trial court's inquiry regarding possible
prejudice against Hispanics created a "presumption of guilt"). Id.
438 Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 184.
439 Id.
440 1d. at 186.
441id.
442 Id. at 185. Therefore, it was unnecessary to ask the question proposed by
defendant: "Would you consider the race or Mexican descent of Humberto
Rosales-Lopez in your evaluation of this case? How would it affect you?"
443id.
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It is important to note that the first part of this test did not command a
majority of the court. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the result, but refused to endorse a "bright line" test that
would require racial questioning whenever there was a violent crime
between members of two different racial or ethnic groups.4' They would
continue to commit such matters to the discretion of the trial judge subject
to case-by-case review by the appellate courts. 445
On the other hand, Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall based their
dissent on a view that the plurality's rule is too crabbed. They would have
permitted racial questioning in a broader range of cases other than those
involving violent, interracial crimes.446 Rather, they would have established
a rule "entitling a minority defendant to some inquiry of prospective jurors
on voir dire about possible racial or ethnic prejudice unrelated to the
specific facts of the case. 447
That appears to be the current state of federal law, with one caveat:
Mu 'Min v. Virginia was a case in which the Supreme Court considered
whether it was necessary to ask about jurors' exposure to pretrial
publicity.44 In dicta, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the
Court, endorsed the plurality position in Rosales-Lopez as a matter of
constitutional law. He summarized the prior law as follows: "[T]he
possibility of racial prejudice against a black defendant charged with a
violent crime against a white person is sufficiently real that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that inquiry be made into racial prejudice . . . .
Since Mu 'Min involved a murder and since this discussion was dicta, one
cannot be certain that the Supreme Court intended to expand the constitu-
tional requirements. There have been no further Supreme Court opinions
on point, however.
4" Id. at 194 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in result).
44 Id. at 194-95 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in result).
"
6 Id. at 202 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
471ld. at 201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
448 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 417 (1991).
449 Id. at 424. There is one other distinction between ChiefJustice Rehnquist's
statement in Mu 'Min and the plurality in Rosales-Lopez. The latter would require
inquiry into racial prejudice whenever there is a violent crime and the defendant
and victim are of different racial or ethnic origins. Id. The Chief Justice's dictum
in Mu'Min refers only to a case in which a black defendant is accused of
committing violence against a white victim. Id. That is likely a distinction without
a difference. But see infra note 507 and accompanying text (discussing
Massachusetts cases that distinguish between race and ethnicity).
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A clear view of the impact of Ristaino and Rosales-Lopez can be had
by examining a set of Fourth Circuit cases. Before Rosales-Lopez the
Fourth Circuit had held it was reversible error to deny a black defendant the
right to ask prospective jurors: "Is there anybody on the jury panel who is
a member of the White Citizen's Council, Defenders of State Sovereignty,
or any similar organization?""45 Four years after Rosales-Lopez, a case
arose in which the trial court had refused to ask essentially the same
question.45" ' This time the circuit court reached the opposite result and
found no abuse of discretion.452
By and large, the federal appellate courts have followed the Supreme
Court's rulings carefully, albeit with some occasional hints of dissent. An
example of a case that hewed the line closely is United States v. Tipton.453
Three black defendants were tried for several murders in connection with
the activities of a large drug ring."' They asked the district court judge to
ask sixty-two questions designed to ferret out racial prejudice.455 The judge,
who conducted individual voir dire in chambers, asked only one such
question: "Do you harbor any bias or prejudice, racial or otherwise, that
would prevent you from being fair to the defendants in this case?" 456 "The
450 Smith v. United States, 262 F.2d 50, 51 (4th Cir. 1958); see also United
States v. Johnson, 527 F.2d 1104, 1106-07 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that it was
reversible error to refuse to permit black defendant to ask "Do you believe that
black men are more prone to commit crimes than white men?"); United States v.
Gore, 435 F.2d 1110, 1113 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding that it was reversible error to
refuse to ask whether the race of the defendant would prevent any juror from
returning a fair and impartial verdict for or against either the accused or the
government).
451 See United States v. Brown, 767 F.2d 1078, 1080 n.31 & 32 (4th Cir.
1985).
452 See id. at 1083. At least one Georgia court held (post-Ristaino and post-
Rosales-Lopez) that it is permissible to ask whether a juror is a member of "any
club or organizations such as the Southern Knights of the KKK or the Invisible
Empire of the KKK." See Mize v. State, 378 S.E.2d 392,393 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
The opinion was based on GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-133 (1989) that gives a litigant
"an absolute right to examine prospective jurors about... religious, social and
fraternal connections of the juror." Mize, 378 S.E.2d at 393 (citing Cowen v. State,
275 S.E.2d 665 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)).
... United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996).4541d. at 867.
455 Id. at 877.
456 Id.; see also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525 n.2, 527 (1973)
(holding that the question "[w]ould you fairly try this case on the basis of the
evidence and disregarding the defendant's race?" was "sufficient to focus the
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court then permitted limited follow-up inquiry by counsel depending upon
responses made to his general question." '457 Noting that race was not
"inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial, 458 finding no "special
circumstances," '459 and finding the murders were not inter-racial, the Fourth
Circuit found voir dire was adequate.460
Occasionally, an appellate court chafes. In Llach v. United States the
defendant was a Colombian-born, naturalized American citizen charged
with drug related crimes.46' Despite his request, the trial judge refused to
ask jurors about possible bias against Hispanics. Instead, he simply asked
the jurors, "as a group and individually, whether they could serve fairly and
impartially. 462 In affirming the lower court, Judge Theodore McMillian
noted:
Although this court is constrained to follow Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, the author agrees with the dissent in Rosales-Lopez, that the
majority opinion is based on an overly restrictive interpretation of
Aldridge v. United States. As the dissent notes, although Aldridge
involved "special circumstances," i.e. interracial, violent crime, neither
the reasoning in the opinion for the Court, nor the reasoning in the state
court opinions quoted at length by the Court in Aldridge relied on those
special circumstances.
The purpose of voir dire is to assure that a defendant is tried before
an impartial and unbiased panel of jurors. Although certain cases will
attention of prospective jurors on any racial prejudice they might entertain").
411 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 877.418 Id. (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976)).
459 Id.; accord Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986); Rosales-Lopez v.
United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981); Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 589.
40 Tipton, 90 F.3d at 877-78. Tipton raised an additional issue: the district
court judge was black. The defendants argued this made "the concealment of racial
bias more than ordinarily a risk" and asserted it was an abuse of discretion for the
judge to conduct the voir dire by himself. Id. at 872. The circuit court rejected that
out of hand. Id. It responded, "[A]side from the shakiness of the reason advanced
by appellants---that the prospective jurors would be significantly more inhibited by
questions put by the judge himself than by questions put by others in his immediate
presence--the adoption of such a per se rule would be unthinkable as a matter of
policy." Id. at 878 n.8.
"' Llach v. United States, 739 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1984).
462 Id. at 1333. The questions defendant submitted were: "Would the fact that
the accused is of Spanish background affect your ability to fairly try this case?" and
"Do you feel you can sit as a fair and impartial juror at the trial of a Latin
defendant?" Id. at 1331 n.5.
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necessarily engender prejudice or bias, thus giving rise to special
circumstances, there are jurors who harbor prejudices against all members
of a race, religion or ethnic group for reasons totally unrelated to the facts
of the case. If a prospective juror is prejudiced against Latins, it is
illogical that courts only seek to exclude such a juror when interethnic,
violent crime is involved. No biased or prejudiced juror should ever be
permitted to sit in judgment of one against whom the juror is biased.463
The court concluded that the better practice would have been to honor the
defendant's request for more detailed voir dire. Nevertheless, the appellate
panel could not find the trial judge abused his discretion by not doing
that.4 6
Other circuit courts have expressed the view that the "wiser" or "better
practice" is to permit questioning if defendant requests it.4 65 That, of
43 Id. at 1333 n.7 (citations omitted). The other two members of the panel filed
a concurring opinion that simply noted their view that the trial court committed no
prejudicial error. Id. at 1334 (Lay, C.J., concurring) (citing Rosales-Lopez, 451
U.S. at 182).
4 14 Id. at 1333.
465 See United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 412-13 (6th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2513 (2003) ("[W]e still believe the district court would have
been well-advised to allow more detailed questioning to reveal an individual
prospective juror's prejudice, if any, against Cosa Nostra and the obvious Italian
heritage of the defendants and the Sicilian or Italian connection with the Mafia....
[T]he district court's failure to ask more specific questions regarding Mafia or
Italian-American prejudice was a mistake, but not an error compelling reversal
under the circumstances."); United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 525-26 (2d Cir.
1994) ("[W]hile the wiser course would have been for the district judge to ask the
prospective jurors about racial bias, as requested we are convinced that his refusal
to do so was not reversible error." (citations omitted)); United States v. Brown, 938
F.2d 1482, 1485 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that "giving the defendant's instruction
would have been more prudent," but it was not required); United States v. Groce,
682 F.2d 1359, 1361 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) ("In ourjudgment, it is usually best to allow
the defendant to resolve this conflict by making the determination of whether or not
he would prefer to have the inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice pursued. Failure
to honor his request, however, will be reversible error only where the
circumstances of the case indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that racial
or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury." (quoting Rosales-Lopez, 451
U.S. at 191)). Prior to Rosales-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit held that "[w]hile it would
have been the better practice to submit the requested questions, we cannot say that
there was an abuse of discretion in failing to do so under the circumstances of this
case, particularly in view of the fact that no objection was made to the court's
failure to ask the questions." United States v. Walker, 491 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir.
1974).
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course, follows the Supreme Court's statement in Rosales-Lopez.46
Few courts have found "special circumstances" requiring reversal of a
district court's ruling. One that did, prior to Ristaino, was United States v.
Bear Runner.a67 There, an American Indian was being tried for larceny. In
the months prior to trial tension between Native Americans and whites ran
high due to a series of well-publicized events in western and central South
Dakota, including the occupation of Wounded Knee. 46' Although the case
at bar had nothing to do with those events, the appellate court focused on
the passions in the community. Since the "overall circumstances and
surroundings suggest the possibility of racial bias," it held the trial judge
should have conducted a searching inquiry, directed to each potential juror,
regarding the possibility of racial prejudice.469 Similarly, a California court
held that when a black defendant claims a white police officer fabricated
the claim against him, a "special circumstance" is present that requires
racial issues to be probed in voir dire.47°
Some cases have struggled with the definitional questions. For
example, in United States v. Kyles, the Second Circuit held that armed bank
robbery did not qualify as a violent crime for purposes of Rosales-Lopez.47'
Although the defendant was black and the bank tellers were white, the
tellers did not suffer any "physical or proprietary" injury.472 The court
found the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to ask
prospective jurors about race bias.473
Similarly, courts have been required to assess the likelihood of racial
prejudice in the communities in which they sit. For example, a district court
judge in Puerto Rico held that a black defendant's allegations that racism
existed in Puerto Rico were not special circumstances requiring voir dire
into racial bias.474 Although the case involved drug-related offenses,
assault, and causing an intentional killing while engaged in a continuing
4 See supra notes 432-47 and accompanying text.
, United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1974).
4Id. at 909.
91d. at912; seealsoJordanv. Lippman, 763 F.2d 1265, 1276 n.12 (1 IthCir.
1985) (holding that additional voir dire should have been permitted regarding
exposure to pretrial publicity in a defendant's trial for participation in interracial
prison riot that was conducted after a weekend civil rights march that received
widespread notoriety).
0 See People v. Wilborn, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 583, 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
411 United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1994).
472 Id.
473 id.
41 United States v. Escobar-De Jesus, 187 F.3d 148, 165 (1st Cir. 1999).
2003-2004]
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criminal enterprise, the First Circuit found no fault with the lower court's
decision.47 Other cases have required courts to consider whether there was
a reasonable possibility of prejudice against Nigerians,476 Italians or
Sicilians,477 Cape Verdeans,47s Laotians,479 defendants of different races
married to one another,48 ° and Russians, Armenians, and gypsies.48' District
courts occasionally find no "special circumstances" or "reasonable
possibility" that prejudice will infect the trial,482 but more often, it seems,
trial judges are willing to ask a limited number of questions.
The reported cases reflect a wide range of approaches. At times, trial
judges essentially lecture the jury.483 Slightly more informative to the
parties is a closed ended question such as "would any of you have any
prejudices or biases that would prevent you from being fair and impartial
in this case?" 4" or "will your decision in this case in any way be based
4 75 Id. at 156-57.
476 See, e.g., United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426, 433 (5th Cir. 1995).
171 See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 411 (6th Cir. 2000).
47 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pina, 713 N.E.2d 944, 950 (Mass. 1999).
41 See, e.g., State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 867 (Utah 1998).
480 See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 80 F.3d 964, 967 (4th Cir. 1996).
8' See, e.g., United States v. Sarkisian, 197 F.3d 966, 979 (9th Cir. 1999).
482 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 938 F.2d 1482, 1486-87 (1st Cir. 1991)
(affirming trial court, but stating that it would have been "more prudent" to
inquire); United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1145 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the evidence did not present a reasonable possibility of racial prejudice by the
jury).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Groce, 682 F.2d 1359, 1363 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1982)
(analogizing to personal preference of ice cream flavors to explain racial bias to the
jury pool). This, of course, would not be an abuse of discretion if there is no
"reasonable possibility" that racial prejudice might infect the proceedings. United
States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426, 434 (5th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908, 912 (8th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he better practice in a
sensitive case is to direct probing questions touching areas of possible prejudice to
each individual juror.... Individual questioning is particularly necessary when the
overall circumstances and surroundings suggest the possibility of racial bias.").484 See, e.g., Medrano v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1507 (9th Cir.
1992). There are many variations on this theme. See, e.g., United States v. Barber,
80 F.3d 964, 969 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing a trial judge's questions to jurors on
whether they knew of any reason why they could not "hear the facts of this case
fairly and impartially and render a just verdict"). Justice Stevens argued, in dissent,
that such a general question "is not an adequate substitute for a specific inquiry; if
it were, trial judges might be well advised simply to ask that question and nothing
else." Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 203 n.8 (1981).
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upon the race, religion or the ethnic background of the defendant?"485 But
often judges include some open-ended interrogation into racial prejudice.
In some cases, trial judges have done far more. One case in which "the
circumstances of the case indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that
racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury" was United States
v. Salameh.48 6 Defendants were accused of various crimes related to the
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Given the notoriety of the crime
and the potential for prejudice, defendants sought, and the trial judge
included in voir dire, substantial questioning designed to discover bias
against Muslims.487 Indeed, the voir dire procedures undertaken by the court
evidence a careful winnowing of the venire. On appeal defendants
complained the trial judge did not ask a list of seventy-nine questions (in
a written questionnaire) about possible bias against Arabs and Islamic
Fundamentalists. The Second Circuit held the district court judge did not
abuse his discretion in refusing to do that. It held that the judge's questions
were sufficiently thorough, and the fact that additional questions would
have aided defense counsel in exercising its peremptory challenges did not
render the voir dire defective.488
E. State Law
These rules have not necessarily been followed in state courts, for a
number ofjurisdictions have developed their own standards on independent
state grounds. For example, under the Colorado Constitution, "defense
counsel [has] a right and an obligation to inquire into the racial views of the
venire members in the interest of obtaining a fair and impartial jury."48 9
Thus, questioning about racial bias has been required in a prosecution for
contributing to the delinquency of a minor when there was no indication
that the defendant and victim were of different races.490
485 United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 943 (7th Cir. 1990).
Prospective jurors were also questioned regarding their knowledge of the Chicano
street gang, El Rukns. Id.
486 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 191).
487 See id. at 120-21. Obviously, this case merges issues regarding religion
with ethnicity and national origin. Defendants sought broader questioning on the
latter two topics; the trial court focused principally on the former. See id.488 Id. at 121.
People v. Baker, 924 P.2d 1186, 1191 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
49oSee id.; Maes v. District Court, 503 P.2d 621, 625 (Colo. 1972) (collecting
cases).
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Connecticut has also permitted extensive questioning about racial
matters as a matter of state constitutional law. This has extended well
beyond cases involving interracial, violent crime.49 Indeed, its courts have
said, "Our state, by constitutional provision, allows the questioning of each
prospective juror individually by counsel, and, within that framework,
counsel is entitled to interrogate on the subject of race prejudice."4 92
Other states have developed their rules as a matter of statutory
interpretation. For example, Georgia reached the same result as Turner v.
Murray on the basis of its own statutory requirements. 93 On the other hand,
South Carolina, which has a similar statute regarding voir dire,494 has read
its law to permit a court to refuse to ask about racial bias in a murder
case.
495
The Massachusetts courts have rejected a constitutional right to inquire,
but have established an elaborate set of requirements based on a rule of
criminal procedure and a state statute. 96 The rule permits "a juror to be
examined upon issues extraneous to the case if it appears that the juror's
49' State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1078 (Conn. 1993) ("[I]f a venireperson's
response reveals an antagonism toward racial intermarriage the trial court should
... extend substantial latitude to explorative inquiries.").
492 State v. Marsh, 362 A.2d 523, 525 (Conn. 1975) (sale of narcotics); see also
State v. Smith, 608 A.2d 63, 66-67 (Conn. 1992) (collecting cases).
493 Legare v. State, 348 S.E.2d 881, 881-82 (Ga. 1986) (citing GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-12-133 (1986)); Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680, 688 (Ga. 1994); Walker v.
State, 449 S.E.2d 322, 324 (Ga. App. 1994).
494 S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1020 (Law. Co-op. 2003) provides: "The court
shall, on motion of either party in the suit, examine on oath any person who is
called as a juror therein to know whether he... is sensible of any bias or prejudice
therein...."
491 See State v. Cason, 454 S.E.2d 888, 889 (S.C. 1995). The opinion reveals
the victim was a black woman. Id. It does not say whether defendant was also black
or whether the sentence was death. See id. The opinion cites both state and federal
law to reach its result. See id. at 489-90. It seems to employ the "special
circumstances" rule and to use federal law to help determine whether a "special
circumstance" exists. Id.; see also State v. Gibbs, 228 S.E.2d 104, 105 (S.C. 1976)
(involving a case in which certain voir dire questioning was denied in an interracial
armed robbery).
I See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 593 (1976). Recall it was a
Massachusetts state court, Commonwealth v. Ross, 282 N.E.2d 70 (Mass. 1972),
decision that gave rise to Ristaino in which the Supreme Court ruled there is no
constitutional right to ask about race bias unless special circumstances indicate a
significant likelihood of prejudice. Id.
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impartiality may have been affected by the extraneous issues.,497 The
statute permits inquiry if relevant to learn whether a juror is "sensible of
any bias or prejudice.""49 From the rule and the statute, detailed rules have
been elaborated.
In Commonwealth v. Sanders, the Supreme Judicial Court held a trial
court must, upon request, conduct an individual voir dire of prospective
jurors in a case in which a defendant of one race is charged with raping a
victim of another race.499 Sanders drew on Rosales-Lopez and the First
497 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 20(b)(2).
498 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234, § 28 (2003). More fully stated, it reads:
Upon motion of either party, the court shall, or the parties or their
attorneys may under the direction of the court, examine on oath a person
who is called as a juror therein, to learn whether he is related to either
party or has any interest in the case, or has expressed or formed an
opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice, therein ....
For the purpose of determining whether a juror stands indifferent in
the case, if it appears that, as a result of the impact of considerations
which may cause a decision or decisions to be made in whole or in part
upon issues extraneous to the case, including, but not limited to,
community attitudes, possible exposure to potentially prejudicial material
or possibly preconceived opinions toward the credibility of certain classes
of persons, the juror may not stand indifferent, the court shall, or the
parties or their attorneys may, with the permission and under the direction
of the court, examine the juror specifically with respect to such
considerations, attitudes, exposure, opinions or any other matters which
may, as aforesaid, cause a decision or decisions to be made in whole or in
part upon issues extraneous to the issues in the case. Such examination
may include a brief statement of the facts of the case, to the extent the
facts are appropriate and relevant to the issue of such examination, and
shall be conducted individually and outside the presence of other persons
about to be called as jurors or already called.
Id.
499 Commonwealth v. Sanders, 421 N.E.2d 436, 436-37 (Mass. 1981),
overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 555 N.E.2d 2081 (Mass. 1990).
The background to Sanders is important. As noted, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court first decided Ristaino in 1972. See Commonwealth v. Ross, 282
N.E.2d 70 (Mass. 1972). When defendant petitioned for certiorari, the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Ham, which had
been recently decided. See Ross v. Massachusetts, 410 U.S. 901, 901 (1973). On
remand, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed its earlier ruling. See Commonwealth
v. Ross, 296 N.E. 2d 810, 816 (Mass. 1973). It distinguished Ham and determined
the Constitution does not require racial inquiry absent "special circumstances." See
id. at 815. But, it said, on non-constitutional grounds,
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Circuit's statement that "interracial rape may be a 'classic catalyst of racial
prejudice.' "500 That was extended in subsequent cases to require such voir
dire, upon request, in cases in which a defendant is charged with sexual
offenses against children where the defendant and the victim are of
different races,01 cases of interracial murder," 2 and cases of "knowingly
deriving support and maintenance from the earnings of a prostitute" in
which the pimp and prostitute are of different races and the relationship
involves physical violence. 0 3 Indeed, a later case summarized these cases
as establishing a rule that cases involving "[a]cts of sex and violence
between members of different races . . . 'requir[e] individual voir
dire."' 5 4 Each of these cases requires individualized voir dire outside the
when a defendant requests that the prospective jurors be questioned about
their racial prejudice, the judge should make specific inquiries of counsel
concerning the racial aspects of the case .... If it appears from such
preliminary inquiries that the case might reasonably be expected to
present factors involving possible racial prejudice, then the judge should
question the prospective jurors in this area.
Id. at 816.
Ross successfully petitioned for habeas corpus. Ross v. Ristaino, 388 F. Supp.
99, 101 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd, 508 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1974). While the case was
making its way back to the Supreme Court, the Massachusetts legislature amended
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234 § 28. It changed "may" to "shall" in the phrase "the
court [may] shall ... examine the juror specifically with respect to such ...
attitudes." Id.; see supra note 498. The Supreme Court then reversed the First
Circuit's grant of habeas, holding the constitution does not require racial voir dire.
Ristanio, 424 U.S. at 597. However, five years later it decided Rosales-Lopez,
drawing the distinction between constitutional requirements and supervisory
powers that had been elaborated in some of these Massachusetts cases. Rosales-
Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981). Six weeks later, Sanders was
decided.
5 o Sanders, 421 N.E.2d at 438 (quoting Dukes v. Waitkevitch, 536 F.2d 469,
471 (lst Cir. 1976)).
511 See Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 434 N.E.2d 633, 641 (Mass. 1982).
502 See Commonwealth v. Young, 517 N.E.2d 130, 136 (Mass. 1987).
103 See Commonwealth v. Stephens, 446 N.E.2d 410, 411 (Mass. App. Ct.
1983). This case framed the general rule that "cases... [that] involve both sex and
violence between members of different races, also present as a matter of law 'a
substantial risk that extraneous issues will influence the jury."' See id. at 413
(quoting Sanders, 421 N.E.2d at 438).
"04 Commonwealth v. Ramos, 577 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991)
(quoting Stephens, 446 N.E.2d at 410).
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presence of other jurors. General inquiry of the jury panel as a whole is
insufficient.
Before this interrogation occurs, however, the trial judge must be sure
the defendant understands the risks of injecting race into the case.
[B]efore granting a motion for such questioning the trial judge must
determine sua sponte that the defendant has been informed of, and
understands, the risks and potential danger of this type of voir dire. Thus,
a valid request for individualized interrogation ... imposes, by itself, a
duty on the trial judge to engage in a colloquy with the defendant. 505
The court quoted an earlier decision, explaining that racial inquiry "'may
activate latent racial bias in certain prospective jurors or may insult others
without uncovering evidence of bias in hard-core bigots who refuse to
acknowledge their prejudice.' "506
But even while Massachusetts has been elaborating these rules, it has
consciously refused to expand its holdings to cover inquiry in inter-ethnic
cases. It has held that "[t]he word, 'Hispanic,' ordinarily refers, not to race,
but to national origin. ' ' Thus, a case in which a Hispanic male was
charged with sex crimes against a white victim was not an "interracial"
crime, and the rules of Sanders and Hobbs did not extend to it.508 The court
expressly recognized that this was a narrower view than federal courts
take pursuant to Rosales-Lopez, and it did not foreclose the possibility that
the trial judge might permit inquiry if the case appears to warrant it. It
refused, however, to require inquiry on the basis of the precedents
discussed above. 509 The concurring opinion observed that nothing in the
505 Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 485 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Mass. 1985). A
subsequent decision of the Massachusettes high court held that a judge is not
required to conduct a colloquy. Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 555 N.E.2d 208, 209
(Mass. 1990).506 See id. (quoting Sanders, 421 N.E.2d at 438).
507 Commonwealth v. De La Cruz, 540 N.E.2d 168, 170 (Mass. 1989). The
murder of a Hispanic man by a black man is "interracial." Young, 517 N.E.2d at
130, 135.
508 De La Cruz, 540 N.E.2d at 171.
509 See id.; accord Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 716 N.E.d 659, 663 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1999). Something else may be at work here. Over time, the extent to which a
jurisdiction permits voir dire may expand and contract as abuses of too much and
then too little questioning drive decisions. It appears the Massachusetts courts took
an expansive view of racial voir dire beginning in the 1970s and continuing
through most of the 1980s, when the Ross, Sanders, Hobbs, and Young line of
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Massachusetts statute limits the court's concern to racial prejudice."'
Other state appellate courts have exercised their "supervisory author-
ity" to create such rules. For example, Maryland expressly adopted a rule
broader than Ristaino as a matter of state nonconstitutional criminal law.
Exercising its supervisory authority over state courts, the Maryland high
court held that questioning as to racial prejudice was required in a
prosecution of an African-American for possession of cocaine. 1' It is not
necessary that there be an interracial, violent crime; voir dire should be
permitted at the request of the defendant, to discover if any potential juror
harbors a disqualifying bias.5 2 New Jersey law is similar. "Even in cases
with no interracial crime or obvious racial overtones, this Court has stated
that it prefers a searching inquiry into racial bias, if so requested by the
defendant." ' 3
Seemingly exercising its supervisory powers over lower courts, the
Arkansas Court of Appeals has required questioning about racial bias in a
case in which a black man was charged with delivery of a
controlled substance." 4 However, even the development of independent
cases was being developed. In later years, however, the court seems to be
rethinking the efficacy of that, and taking a more narrow view; see also
Commonwealth v. Grice, 574 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Mass. 1991) (refusing to extend
Sanders, Hobbs, and Young to interracial armed robbery); Commonwealth v.
Ramos, 577 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (finding trial for assault and
battery with a dangerous weapon and assault with intent to murder was "racially
neutral" where race of defendant was "uncertain"). But see Commonwealth v. La
Faille, 704 N.E.2d 206, 210 (Mass. App. Ct.) (intermediate appellate court
requiring questioning in case of interracial assault and battery by means of a
dangerous weapon), rev'd on other grounds, 712 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1999).510 See De La Cruz, 540 N.E.2d at 172 (Liacos, J., concurring).
511 Hill v. State, 661 A.2d 1164, 1169 (Md. 1995); see also Bowie v. State, 595
A.2d 448, 453 (Md. 1991) (holding that questioning as to racial prejudice is
required in a trial of an African-American charged with murder) and cases cited
therein.
512Hill, 661 A.2d at 1168-69.
3 State v. McDougald, 577 A.2d 419, 434 (N.J. 1990) (involving a murder
case in which the defendant and victims are of same race) (citing State v. Ramseur,
524 A.2d 188, 250 (N.J. 1988)); accord State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677, 736-39
(N.J. 1996) (O'Hem, J., dissenting) (collecting capital cases); State v. Horcey, 629
A.2d 1367, 1370-71 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1993) (collecting cases).
514 See Smith v. State, 800 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990); see also
Cochran v. State, 505 S.W.2d. 520, 521 (Ark. 1974) (holding that voir dire
questioning on racial prejudice is required when an African-American defendant
is charged with assaulting a Caucasian police officer).
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state law may draw upon the federal constitutional principles discussed
above. 515
Finally, states may resolve these issues, in whole or in part, in rules of
court or similar standards. For example, the California Standards of Judicial
Administration suggest that courts ask, in appropriate cases:
It may appear that one or more of the parties, attorneys or witnesses come
from a particular national, racial or religious group (or may have a life
style different from your own). Would this in any way affect your
judgment or the weight and credibility you would give to their
testimony?
16
As in the cases involving religion and politics, courts must sometimes
be careful to prevent voir dire from being used to sow prejudice. For
example, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the conviction of an
Iranian-born defendant." 7 The trial took place in 1980, just five months
after the American Embassy in Teheran was seized and while Americans
were still held hostage. During voir dire, the overzealous prosecutor asked
prospective jurors about the Koran and whether they had "ever heard the
phrase 'Death to the infidel'. '' 18 The questions were clearly designed to
prejudice the jurors against defendant. Although the trial judge succumbed,
the supreme court properly overruled that.519
F. Summary of Observations
As noted at the outset of this article, trial judges are afforded consider-
able discretion. They are rarely reversed for asking (or failing to ask) about
religious and political issues, but that is not necessarily true of inquiry
515 See, e.g., State v. Lamar, 698 P.2d 735, 740-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
(unclear whether applying federal constitutional law or state standards); State v.
Lopez, 657 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (unclear whether applying
federal constitutional law or state standard); State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861,
868 (Utah 1998) (Laotian defendant convicted of murder in which the trial judge
asked closed-end questions); State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977, 999 (Wash. 2000)
(murder of Japanese-American by African-American in which it was held that the
trial judge had no duty to inquire, sua sponte, into racial prejudice where the
defense counsel failed to do so during extensive voir dire).
516 CAL. R. CT. § 8.5(b)(18).
17 State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 419 (N.D. 1981).
5 8Id. at 413.
519Id. at 419.
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regarding racial bias. The question then, is how should courts approach this
problem.
At base, there is a problem of knowledge, self-knowledge, and
willingness to confess prejudice. When jurors are called into a courtroom,
generally, they know nothing about the case, the trial participants, or the
facts as to which they might harbor some relevant prejudice. 20 As voir dire
unfolds, the court provides more information, but at any given moment a
juror may not know enough about the case to know whether something
about it will touch a particular bias. Thus, it is necessary for judges to be
alert to provide sufficient information about the case ifjurors are to be able
to respond to questions about bias.
Equally important, jurors may not be aware of their own prejudice or
may be embarrassed or unable to admit it. 2' Justice Marshall canvassed
some of this learning in his dissent in Mu 'Min.
[A] prospective juror's own "assurances that he is equal to the task cannot
be dispositive of the accused's rights." As Justice O'Connor has observed
in Smith v. Phillips, an individual "juror may have an interest in conceal-
ing his own bias... [or] may be unaware of it." "Natural human pride
would suggest a negative answer to whether there was a reason the juror
could not be fair and impartial. 522
Regardless of these failings, there is no place to begin other than by
asking a juror about his biases. "As the juror best knows the condition of
his own mind, no satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at, without resort
520 "All trial lawyers, and all students of the science of jurisprudence,
know that general questions directed to the jury panel, or to individualjurors, by a judge who at the beginning of the trial has no special
information regarding the issues, or the relationship of the parties, or the
attending circumstances, sometimes fail to elicit answers which may cause
even the most conscientious juror to reveal an existing prejudicial status."
Cochran v. State, 505 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Ark. 1974) (quoting Griffin v. State, 389
S.W.2d 900, 902 (Ark. 1965)).
521 "[N]o man is a villain in his own eyes." JAMES BALDWIN, BLUES FOR MR.
CHARLIE 6 (1964); see State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1077-78 (Conn. 1993) ("Ajuror is not likely to admit being a prejudiced person. . and indeed might not
recognize the extent to which unconscious racial stereotypes might affect his or her
evaluation of a defendant of a different race .... ).
522 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 440 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(alteration and omission in original) (citations omitted). But see Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 728 (1961) ("No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he
would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring
such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father.").
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to himself. Applying this test then, how is it possible to ascertain whether
he is prejudiced or not, unless questions similar to the foregoing are
propounded to him?'
523
Justice Marshall identified another strand to this problem of self-
knowledge. A juror may not be aware of her own bias because the issue of
impartiality is, to some extent, a mixed question of law and fact.524 A juror
may accept his attitudes as facts of life while the law regards those same
attitudes as biases.5
25
This argument is sometimes answered by judges who observe that
jurors have confessed bias in the case at bar. Therefore, the argument goes,
the questioning must have been sufficient. That, however, assumes the
same amount of questioning is sufficient to discover bias in each juror.
Trial lawyers know that is simply not so. Some jurors are just more candid
than others, and others are more than candid. Every trial lawyer has seen
citizens who wish to be excused from jury service "confess" to prejudice,
sometimes even before being asked.
Regardless of how candid some jurors may be, it does not change the
fact that other jurors may conceal a fact or a prejudice, whether advertently
or not. A juror may honestly misunderstand a question, and therefore fail
to disclose a fact sought by counsel,526 or a juror may not consider his or
her own bias to be a prejudice, an attitude that would give counsel pause.5 27
523 People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349 (1855), quoted with approval in Aldridge
v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 313 n.3 (1931). Contrast this with Learned Hand's
observation that courts do not have time "to probe more than the upper levels of a
juror's mind." See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,227 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
524 Mu 'Min, 500 U.S. at 442-43.
One of the reasons that a "juror may be unaware of" his own bias is that
the issue of impartiality is a mixed question of law and fact, the resolution
of which necessarily draws upon the trial court's legal expertise. Where,
as in this case, a trial court asks a prospective juror merely whether he can
be "impartial," the court may well get an answer that is the product of the
juror's own confusion as to what impartiality is.
Id. (citations omitted).
" See, for example, Judge Calabrese's discussions of implied and inferred
bias in United States v. Torres, 128 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1997).
526 In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984),
a juror misinterpreted a question asked by counsel and therefore remained silent
when, arguably, he should have provided a bit of information. Id. at 552-53.
527 See, e.g., United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir.
1999) (involving ajuror who "arguably should have provided [certain] information,
[but] her failure to do so was at most a good faith mistake").
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On occasion a juror might simply lie.52 These concealments are not easily
rectified. For, even though the Supreme Court has said "[t]he necessity of
truthful answers.., is obvious,"529 it has set forth a relatively restrictive
standard of review of such matters:
[T]o obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate
that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and
then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid
basis for a challenge for cause. The motives for concealing information
may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly
be said to affect the fairness of a trial.530
Thus, unless prejudice is ferreted out during voir dire, it is not likely that
the possible error will be cured on appeal. Additionally, as the First Circuit
observed, "we do not allow the possibility of a false answer to serve as an
excuse for not asking these questions. ' 53'
To some extent, this is a matter of credibility. Normally, issues of
credibility are tested by questioning. If there is any serious issue about
whether a juror harbors a disqualifying prejudice, the court or counsel
528 See Gaba, supra note 10, at 532 ("Venirepeople do not always tell the truth
on voir dire-in such a public setting there is the obvious temptation not to admit
being prejudiced."); Eileen C. Moore, Judicial Voir Dire More Important Than
Ever, 13 CAL. LiTiG. 45, 45 (2000) ("I have concluded from my experience as a
trial judge... that, perhaps due to political correctness, agendas or disgust with
the system, many jurors either attempt to hide their true feelings, or approach their
task with preconceptions, cynicism and activism."); Jerry Markon, Jurors With
Hidden Agendas, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2001, at B1.
29 McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554.
30 Id. at 556; accord Pope v. Man Data, Inc., 209 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir.
2000). Compare In re Hitchings, 860 P.2d 466, 481 (Cal. 1993) (holding that
concealment of material information on voir dire and discussion of the case
amongst jurors gives rise to a presumption of prejudice), and Wiley v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 177, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("[A] juror's
intentional concealment of relevant facts or giving false answers during the voir
dire examination constitutes misconduct and raises a presumption of prejudice."),
with In re Hamilton, 975 P.2d 600, 614 (Cal. 1999) ("Still, whether an individual
verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity is resolved by
reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard. Any presumption
ofprejudice is rebutted and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record...
indicates there is no probability of prejudice.") (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
"' Ross v. Ristaino, 508 F.2d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1974).
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should be alert to make careful inquiry. As with any other question of the
credibility of a witness, the trial judge has an advantage an appellate court
lacks--4he ability to see and hear the witness, observe his demeanor, and
judge his candor.
Given this, Justice Kennedy noted an important limit on an appellate
court's willingness to defer to a trial court: "Our willingness to accord
substantial deference to a trial court's finding of juror impartiality rests on
our expectation that the trial court will conduct a sufficient voir dire to
determine the credibility of a juror professing to be impartial." '532 In other
words, if there is no informed judgment below, then deference is not
warranted."' 3
No rule can prescribe how much questioning is sufficient for all
purposes, and there are competing considerations. Some judges are
concerned that inquiring about race or ethnicity actually gives prejudicial
attitudes more credence. In Rosales-Lopez Justice White noted the
consumption of time such questioning might consume. Then, he observed:
[A] more significant conflict... involv[es] the appearance ofjustice ....
[R]equiring an inquiry in every case is likely to create the impression "that
justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin [or] the
accident of birth." Trial judges are understandably hesitant to introduce
such a suggestion into their courtrooms.534
The competing view was stated in Aldridge.
The argument is advanced on behalf of the government that it would
be detrimental to the administration of the law in the courts of the United
States to allow questions to jurors as to racial or religious prejudices. We
think that it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that
persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as
jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were
barred. No surer way could be devised to bring the processes of justice
into disrepute. 35
532 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,451 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131 Justice O'Connor-responded to this by saying: "As we observed in Patton
v. Yount, credibility determinations of this kind are entitled to 'special deference'
and will be reversed only for 'manifest error."' Id. at 433 (citations.omitted).
534 Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 191 (1981) (quoting
Ristaino, 508 F.2d at 596 n.8) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
13' Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1931).
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Justice White agreed, noting that "if the defendant claims a meaningful
ethnic difference between himself and the victim, his voir dire request
should ordinarily be satisfied." '536
Although the Supreme Court has limited the scope of the Constitution's
protection, it has provided federal trial courts with latitude to deal with
these problems. While Ristaino and Rosales-Lopez require one to look at
the circumstances of the case and the likelihood of prejudice in the
community (rather than prejudice against the individual) to determine if
there is a constitutional violation, Rosales-Lopez makes it clear that the
nonconstitutional standard embraces the possibility that an individual juror
may be prejudiced against the individual, regardless of the nature of the
case.537 Additionally, while the constitutional standard looks for a
"significant likelihood" that the jurors might not be impartial, the
nonconstitutional standard requires only a "reasonable possibility" of that.
As many state courts have found, there is little reason to limit inquiry to
some artificial class of cases, such as interracial violence. If there is a
cognizable risk that an individual juror is prejudiced against a party or a
witness, then that should be discovered during voir dire.
CONCLUSIONS
At the outset, it was noted that the trial court's discretion is limited by
a party's right to information sufficient to inform a challenge, while the
party's right to ask is limited by the trial judge's very broad discretion.
This, however, does not leave courts and litigants free to clash on terrain
with no other rules or guidance. There are clearly a number of consider-
ations that must be weighed in determining what inquiry to allow and it is
possible to distill some learning from the cases to guide future courts.
536 Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 191 n.7.
531 See id. at 197. This was a point that divided the majority from the dissent
in Rosales-Lopez. Justice Stevens, in dissent, quarreled with the notion that the
Constitution requires" 'special circumstances' connected with an alleged criminal
transaction indicating an unusual risk of racial or other group bias." See id. He
thought the court should acknowledge "there are many potential jurors who harbor
strong prejudices against all members of certain racial, religious, or ethnic groups
for no reason other than hostility to the group as a whole.... [A] member of the
Nazi Party should not be allowed to sit in judgment on a Jewish defendant"
regardless of whether the facts of the case raise issues relevant to that prejudice.
Id. at 196-97.
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A. Limiting Factors
Courts invoke a number of factors in support of arguments to limit voir
dire. One is intensely practical: minimizing the consumption of time it takes
to empanel a jury. Those charged with the administration of justice must
manage courts as efficiently as possible, consistent with actually adminis-
tering justice. At times, this becomes a rationale to cabin attorney voir dire.
It is said that lawyers cannot question jurors as effectively as judges--that
lawyers waste time asking about irrelevant, peripheral matters. Not only
does it waste the time of busy judges, the argument runs, but it also tries the
patience of potential jurors who have given their time to serve. Unduly
prolonged voir dire arguably lowers the public's opinion of the justice
system.538 A subspecies of this argument is that questioning, limited to a
"reasonable" amount of time, cannot really uncover bias; it can only expose
what is in the "upper levels of a juror's mind."
A second set of arguments relates to the perceived need to protect the
privacy of jurors. The Supreme Court has recognized that jurors may have
"legitimate privacy interests."539 An argument can be made that jurors have
a right to "informational privacy" that must, sometimes, be weighed against
the parties' need to inquire.54 In practice, it is clear that courts must often
safeguard jurors from embarrassing, intrusive questions. Opposing counsel
may not have adverse interests when it comes to seeking information from
prospective jurors. Both sides tend to be interested in having more, rather
538 In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 n.9 (1984),
the Court noted that voir dire had lasted six weeks. It stated:
We cannot fail to observe that a voir dire process of such length, in and
of itself, undermines public confidence in the courts and the legal
profession.... Properly conducted it is inconceivable that the process
could extend over such a period. We note, however, that in response to
questions counsel stated that it is is not unknown in California courts for
jury selection to extend six months.
Id. at 510 n.9.
"9 See id. at 512; id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring). Note, however, that
Justice Blackmun, while concurring, was careful to observe, "the Court does not
decide, nor does this case require it to address the asserted 'right to privacy of the
prospective jurors."' See id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Glover,
supra note 9, at 709-13 (discussing a prospective juror's right to privacy).540 See Nixon v. Adm'r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,441 (1977); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977); Glover, supra note 9, at 717; Lynd, supra note 10, at
257-60.
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than less, information.' Thus, it becomes, uniquely, the duty of the trial
judge to be alert to the privacy of the jurors.
A variant on the privacy factor has arisen in a number of criminal cases
in which the trial judge worried about the safety of the jurors. In Barnes
and similar cases, the court empaneled anonymous jurors and limited the
information that could be made known during voir dire.542
Courts are also concerned about suggesting prejudice or injecting false
issues into trial. This argument has appeared in cases involving religion,543
politics,544 and race.545 With regard to politics, Justice Harlan made the
seminal statement in Connors suggesting that a trial court should avoid
creating the impression that the political party to which defendant belonged
was somehow involved in the trial. 46 In the cases concerning race, this
crops up repeatedly.547
Courts also tend to limit voir dire if the questioning seems designed to
lead to a challenge on impermissible grounds. For example, the trial court
in Chapin refused to permit counsel to discover the jurors' political
affiliation, 48 and in an extreme example, the court in McDade struck from
a proposed questionnaire a question that simply asked if the juror was male
or female.549
Finally, some courts are simply limited by statute. For example, in
criminal cases in California, questions may be asked only to discover
grounds for a challenge for cause.550
141 United States v. McDade, 929 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[W]hen
it comes to prying into matters personal to a juror, the interests of counsel on either
side of the aisle are not necessarily antagonistic. All the lawyers want to learn just
about all they can about the prospective jurors."); see also United States v. Padilla-
Valenzuela, 896 F. Supp. 968, 971 (D. Ariz. 1995) (stating that a trial lawyers
desire for information is "insatiable,"). Actually, the belief that more information
will always help a party is not entirely true. One party may be "profiling" jurors
based on a different set of factors than the other party. Sometimes the jury
consultants for both sides stumble on a factor they believe is particularly instructive
for one side, but not the other. In that circumstance, one party may resist the other's
efforts to discover that fact.
542 See supra notes 376-84 and accompanying text.
543 See supra note 68; supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
5" See, e.g., Connors v. State, 158 U.S. 408, 415 (1895).
545 See, e.g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976).
5" See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 431 and accompanying text.
548 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
541 United States v. McDade, 929 F. Supp. 815, 816-17 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
550 See supra note 25.
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B. Expansive Factors
Each of these arguments has a counter. To those who worry that
prolonged voir dire brings disrespect to the courts, others reply that "the
public's response to the use of unusually elaborate procedures to protect the
rights of the accused might well be, not lessened confidence in the courts,
but rather heightened respect for thejudiciary's unshakable commitment to
the ideals of due process."'' Surely jurors who are subject to brief, closed-
end questions by a judge who appears in a rush to fill the jury box cannot
think their biases have been exposed. It brings disrespect to the system to
have jurors tell their friends they were able to serve on a jury despite the
fact that they were able to bring strong, relevant, undiscovered biases into
deliberations. Experience shows that voir dire can often expose prejudices.
The fact that it may not detect all bias is no reason to limit the effort
unduly.
Undue intrusion into a juror's privacy is clearly an important concern,
but there are competing concerns. As the Court said in Press-Enterprise,
one of the strengths of our justice system is that trials are conducted in
public.552 Justice is not only done, but seen to be done. Voir dire has been
a part of that tradition, and there are a number of devices to ameliorate the
privacy concern including the use of questionnaires, inquiry at sidebar or
in chambers, and ultimately the redaction of sensitive information in a
transcript. 5
53
The concern about injecting false issues into trial has been handled
differently in cases regarding race, on the one hand, and politics and
religion on the other. In the former, Chief Justice Hughes' admonition in
Aldridge has been persuasive. 5' This can be seen in Rosales-Lopez where
Justice White said that the defendant should be permitted to choose
whether he wants to raise these issues on voir dire when there is a concern
about ethnic or racial bias.555 Although we do not afford defendants the
"' Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 522 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
112 Id. at 505.
... Indeed, if ajuror shows unusual sensitivity to being asked certain questions
that the court deems relevant, that juror may simply be excused from that case and
returned to the jury assembly room for assignment to another trial court.
514 Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1931).
... The dissent in Rosales-Lopez objected to the functional limitation placed
on appellate review of this principle, see Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S.
182, 201-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting), insofar as the plurality opinion held that
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same option in cases involving political or religious bias, Chief Justice
Hughes' teaching could be read to cover those situations as well. Indeed,
the concern about voir dire "suggesting prejudice" may sometimes be
remedied by extending voir dire. The inquiry itself can serve to impress
upon prospective jurors the need to be fair and open-minded.
The notion that some questions should not be asked because they can
only lead to challenges on impermissible grounds can be overstated. Chapin
is one of the few cases that suggests it would be a violation of First
Amendment freedom of association to say, on voir dire, to what political
party one belongs. 56 McDade's refusal to include gender on the question-
naire must be read as almost tongue-in-cheek, unless the court was prepared
to conceal prospective jurors from the litigants' view.
Sometimes, the notion that a question should not be asked is a
conclusion, not a reason. For example, in Ham one could have said the
racial questioning was improper because the case was simply a prosecution
for possession of marijuana. Framing the issue so narrowly can lead to an
erroneous conclusion.
While there are jurisdictions that limit inquiry as a matter of statute,
there are others that expand it legislatively or as a matter of state constitu-
tional law.557
There are other reasons to permit inquiry. The less a lawyer knows of
the views of the prospective juror, the more that lawyer is forced to rely
upon his or her own prejudices, stereotypes, and judgments based on
appearance, body language, and other non-verbal factors. Given the
difficulty of ferreting out prejudices, sometimes close questioning is
required to determine if a juror is really "indifferent as he stands
unsworne."
558
And ultimately, of course, the purpose ofvoir dire is to help assure that
a case is judged by a fair and impartial jury. The factors invoked to limit
questioning must be tested against this most fundamental guarantee.
failure to ask such questions is not reversible error unless the trial involves an
interracial violent crime or "the circumstances of the case indicate there is a
reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the
jury."Id. at 191.
556 United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Indeed,
Chapin observed voter registration information was publicly available in that
jurisdiction. Id. at 1290.
551 See supra notes 489-92 and accompanying text.
558 See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976) (quoting COKE ON
LITrLETON, supra note 414.
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C. Constitutional Standards
The Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments all provide constitu-
tional guarantees of due process and fair trial. Thus, notions of fundamental
fairness underlie many of the cases regarding voir dire, but it is only in
cases involving immutable characteristics (race, ethnicity, and gender) that
constitutional standards have been brought into play in any more detailed
fashion.
Partly, this is a matter of history. As the Court noted in Ham, "a
principal purpose of... the Fourteenth Amendment was to prohibit States
from invidiously discriminating on the basis of race." 59 Decades of legal
battles were fought to integrate our juries.5 ° This spawned many constitu-
tional decisions about the composition of juries, initially focused on race,
but ultimately including questions of gender and ethnicity. Thus, it was
impossible for the Court to ignore the possibility of constitutionally
significant prejudice when it was raised in cases such as Aldridge and Ham.
Faced with such a history, the Supreme Court has, with some reluc-
tance, elucidated certain minimal constitutional requirements for inquiry in
cases of interracial crime presenting "special circumstances" that raise a
constitutionally significant likelihood that jurors would not be indifferent.
Part of the reason there is not more constitutional law on the subject,
however, may be that the development of the law has been deflected to
evaluation under the "supervisory powers" of the appellate courts. To the
extent that the courts have elaborated supervisory rules that encourage or
require questioning, they have avoided confronting constitutional claims.
Note, however, the difference between the federal constitutional standard
(a "constitutionally significant likelihood of prejudice") and the federal
supervisory standard ("reasonable possibility" of prejudice) while real, may
not be that great in practice.
How then, are courts to consider and apply these standards? The key
to the development of these rules is often the concept of relevance, broadly
understood.
D. Relevance
As one court said,
"9 Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1973).
'60 See supra notes 332-44 and accompanying text.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
an intrusion into the prospective jurors' personal and private thoughts is
warranted when a question has great probative value with respect to the
issues in the case or the ability of the prospective juror to be fair,
unburdened by strongly-held opinions. But as the connection between the
voir dire question and matters of actual bias or fair-mindedness becomes
attenuated, the intrusion into the prospective juror's personal and private
thoughts cannot be sanctioned. And when the inquiry has no obvious
relevance to actual bias or fair-mindedness, the inquiry should be
disallowed.56'
Courts have looked to factors raised directly by a case (internal
circumstances) and those surrounding the case (external circumstances) to
help determine relevance.
Weaving through the religious, political, racial, and ethnic cases is a
strong view that courts should consider whether the circumstances of the
case give rise to concerns about prejudice that require questioning. Judges
and lawyers are enjoined to understand enough about the presentation of
the case--before the jurors are called into the courtroom--to determine
whether it is going to require consideration of bias on voir dire.
To determine whether there is a "reasonable possibility" that the case
raises issues of bias, the judge must evaluate the temper of the community
with respect to both the participants in the trial and the issues raised by the
case. Consequently, courts have weighed whether a party (or, if relevant,
a witness, victim, or lawyer) is a member of a religious, political, racial, or
ethnic group as to which some jurors may harbor bias.
Courts must also consider the circumstances surrounding the case to
determine whether questioning about religious, political, or racial bias is
required. When there were disturbances at Wounded Knee, the court ruled
there should be inquiry into the possibility of prejudice against a Native
American defendant even though neither he nor the case had any connec-
tion to those events.562 When a Hispanic defendant was charged with
smuggling illegal aliens in a trial near the Mexican border, the court urged
inquiry about "aliens" and "the alien problem." '563 Similarly, in Connors,
Justice Harlan would have permitted questioning if there was reason to
believe the Committee of One Hundred was "behind the prosecution of the
56' United States v. Serafmi, 57 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
562 See discussion of BearRunner, supra notes 467-69 and accompanying text.
563 See discussion of Rosales-Lopez, supra notes 432-47 and accompanying
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defendant."5" Today, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attack on the
World Trade Center, it is clear that courts must inquire more closely into
bias against Muslims, Islamic Fundamentalists, and persons of certain
ethnicities.565
But judging the "temper of the community" is not always easy. The
fever can be chronic or acute. Sometimes the community bias against a
group of people is acute and manifest. This is especially true in the political
cases. For example, it was socially acceptable (in many circles) to be biased
against anarchists at the turn of the century or communists in the 1950s.
Jurors would not necessarily conceal these biases. When it is popular or
common to be biased, determining the temper of the community may be
easy but not all biases are so readily confessed.
As noted above, jurors may not recognize or be willing to admit a bias.
Courts have dealt with this in two ways: some have focused only on the
issues in the case; others have permitted questioning based simply on the
characteristics of the trial participants. Both should be considered.
Courts properly consider whether the issues raise a particular need to
inquire. The polygamy cases forced courts to worry about the jurors'
beliefs-based in religious faith--to insure a fair trial. Similarly, where a
trial involved issues of political corruption, courts have permitted some
inquiry. In racial cases, courts have been worried that certain kinds of inter-
racial crime are more likely than others to wake feelings of bias that might
otherwise be dormant.
While consideration of the issues has not led to categorical rules in the
area of politics and religion, it has with respect to race. The federal view
has been to permit inquiry in cases involving inter-racial (or inter-ethnic)
violence if a defendant asks. The Massachusetts rule permits inquiry in
cases involving inter-racial (but not inter-ethnic) sex and violence. Other
jurisdictions have not made such fine distinctions. They have required such
questioning regardless of whether there has been an inter-racial or inter-
ethnic crime of sex or violence.
States such as Colorado, Connecticut, and New Jersey reject these
distinctions. They permit questioning when the defendant may be the object
of prejudice, regardless of the issue in the case. The principle behind the
latter rule is easy to state: If a juror is prejudiced against a defendant, he
564 Conners v. State, 158 U.S. 408, 415 (1895); see also supra notes 141-54
and accompanying text (discussing Harlan's opinion in Conners).
565 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998); State v. Mehralian,
301 N.W.2d 409 (N.D. 1981); see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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should not judge a case of larceny any more than a case of rape. We want
jurors to be unbiased in all cases, not just certain categories of cases.
Courts have sometimes framed this as a choice between two undesir-
able outcomes: giving the jury the impression "that justice in a court of law
may turn upon the pigmentation of skin [or] the accident of birth," or giving
a party reason to believe the jury was prejudiced against him or his case.5"
It is not clear that permitting inquiry into bias creates the impression
Rosales-Lopez articulates, and it hardly seems sufficient reason to permit
a biased juror to judge a case, but to a considerable extent, the choice
hypothesized by courts is a false one. Judges can, and should, use the
introduction to voir dire to explain that justice requires jurors without
disqualifying bias. They can ameliorate the problem by giving jurors a
description of the case before voir dire begins. Trial courts can minimize
the risk that jurors overemphasize religion, politics, race, or ethnicity by
explaining why these questions are asked, and how they help to insure due
process. If the jurors understand why they are being asked these questions,
they are likely to be more understanding and cooperative.
In appropriate cases, courts should use questionnaires to obtain relevant
information relatively quickly and without concern of public embarrass-
ment. In addition, the court should explain that prospective jurors can be
questioned individually, in chambers if they wish, to avoid embarrassment
about some particular matter.
At the start of voir dire, judges should also explain to the venire
something about the case they may hear. Who are the parties? What are the
issues? The judge should explain enough to give the prospective jurors an
understanding of which of their biases may be relevant to voir dire. Jurors
can cooperate better if they are not asked simply to guess if there is a
reason they cannot judge the case fairly.
Lawyers, too, can help clear the air during voir dire. Observe, for
- example, how the lawyer in Spies obtained a commitment from the jurors
that they would not allow their prejudice against anarchists to prevent them
from judging the particular case before them.567 Voir dire, properly used,
can help to reduce prejudice, not incite it.
Courts and counsel must take care, however, to do this with tact and
sensitivity. Clumsy speeches, or rambling, poorly focused questions will
not do the job and may even exacerbate the problem.
There is no question that voir dire can be abused. Lawyers may try to
precondition jurors or commit them to a result. Courts must guard against
" Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976).
567 See Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 176 (1887).
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attempts to use voir dire to prejudice jurors with "guilt by association"
questions. Courts and counsel may be fumbling in their efforts to discover
bias. They may waste time, but the response must not be to restrict voir dire
unduly. Examination of prospective jurors is an ancient right. 68 It helps
assure parties they will receive a fair trial. It helps juries to understand the
importance of entering the jury box with a willingness to judge a case
fairly.
These are not judgments that lend themselves to simple rules.569
Making these judgments--case-by-case, question-by-question-is not al-
ways easy, but there is no way to avoid it. This is an area that demands fine
judgment, carefully exercised, and more than a little common sense.57
568 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 506-08 (1984).
569 One commentator has admirably tried to reduce these complexities to a
concise set of statements, but his reduction does not capture the variegated contexts
in which these problems arise. See Spears, supra note 8. For example, his first
proposed guideline ("Defining Content") does not cover the case in which the race
or religion of a non-testifying victim or a lawyer in the case makes voir dire
necessary. See LaRocca v. Gold, 662 F.2d. 144, 150 (2d. Cir. 1981). More
important for the trial lawyer, it would require counsel to lay an evidentiary
foundation before being permitted to probe in certain areas. While that may be
appropriate in a quite extraordinary case, in the vast majority of cases, it threatens
to prolong voir dire with detours into matters that can, almost always, be left to the
sound discretion of the court. In addition, while his guidelines provide a useful
statement of matters to be considered, they cannot be adopted as rules of law
without changing significantly the way in which voir dire is constructed. Were they
made law, there would undoubtedly be far more appeals based on inadequate voir
dire. And the prospect of such an appeal would skew the behavior of trial counsel
and judges. No doubt, judges--concerned about reversal on a peripheral
matter-would allow far more voir dire, potentially bogging down cases in
extended questioning of prospective jurors.

